A Criminal's Duty to Go to Jail? Four Arguments Against Tadros' Philosophy of Punishment, with Responses by Victor Tadros

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric D. Blumenson ◽  
Victor Tadros

Author(s):  
عبد المجيد قاسم عبد المجيد (Qasim Abdulmajid) ◽  
محمد ليبا (Liba)

تناولت هذه الورقة فلسفة العقوبة في الشريعة الإسلامية، وفلسفتها في القانون الوضعي، وتمت الموازنة بين الفلسفتين، وخلص العرض والموازنة إلى نتائج ملخصها أن مسألة عصمة الشريعة وسموها تعد علامة فارقة بين الشريعة الإسلامية والقانون الوضعي، هذه العلامة نتج عنها فروق كثيرة أولها أن العقوبة في التشريع الوضعي تكون تابعةً للهدف، فالهدف يوضع أولاً ثم تصاغ على ضوئه العقوبة، ولذلك كلما ظهرت مدرسةٌ جديدةٌ تؤسس لفكرٍ جديدٍ ظهر اختلافٌ في التشريع العقابي. بينما النظام العقابي الإسلامي ثابتٌ ومعصوم، وقد وُجدت الحاجة إلى معرفة أهدافه وفلسفته ليتسنى السير على مقتضاها فيما يستجد من وقائع، وأن سمو فلسفة العقوبة في الشريعة الإسلامية ينبع من سمو مصدرها، فواضع هذه العقوبات هو خالق البشر. بينما العقوبة في القانون الوضعي تعتمد في فلسفتها على خبرة واضعيها، وهي خبرة محدودة وأحكامها نسبية، لذا كان تطبيق العقوبات الشرعية أجدر حتى وإن لم يُدرَك كنه هذه العقوبات وفلسفتها. الكلمات الرئيسية: فلسفة العقوبة، القانون الإسلامي، القانون الوضعي، التشريع العقابي.******************************In this paper light is shed on the philosophy of punishment in Islamic and positive laws and a comparison between them is accomplished. In brief, the conclusion of the exposition and comparison is that issue of infallibility of SharÊ‘ah and its nobleness are the distinguishing marks between Islamic and positive laws. This led to further differences. The first difference is that the punishment in positive laws is in accordance with the stipulated goal, that is, the goal is set first and then the punishment is formulated in that light. That is why whenever any new school of thought appears based on some ideology, differences emerge in punitive legislation. Islamic penal system is, however, immutable and infallible. There is a need to know its objectives and wisdom so as to in order to tackle new emerging issues. The nobility of the philosophy of punishment in Islamic law stems from the nobility of its source and that is no one but the Creator of human beings. The punishment in the positive law, on the other hand, relies on the philosophy that is based on the experiences of the authors of these laws. And these experiences are limited and their rulings are relativistic. Applying Islamic legal punishments are, therefore, more legitimate, even though their essence and philosophy are not fully grasped.Key words: Philosophy of Punishment, Islamic Law, Positive Law, Punitive Legislation.



2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Murphy
Keyword(s):  


2018 ◽  
pp. 237-258
Author(s):  
Steven Sverdlik

Many philosophers argue that it is morally objectionable in principle to punish people in order to deter others from committing crimes. Such punishment is said to treat the offender simply as a means to benefit others. This Kantian argument rests on a certain reading of the Formula of Humanity. However, the central concept in that formula is not “treating a person simply as a means” but rather “treating a person as an end.” This conclusion speaks against the moral principle that Victor Tadros uses to support his nonconsequentialist theory of punishment. Furthermore, a plausible way of interpreting the injunction to treat people as ends—Rawls’s original position—does not rule out seeking deterrence. Therefore, Kantianism and consequentialism do not differ in a fundamental way on the permissibility of deterrence. But Rawls’s Kantianism sets an implausible ceiling on the severity of punishments, and consequentialism does not.



2012 ◽  
pp. 60-80
Author(s):  
Jacob Abbott


1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 581-594
Author(s):  
Michael Davis

Von Hirsch has presented me with a dilemma. As he says, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment” is a “substantially revised” version of the paper originally prepared for the Jerusalem conference. Its predecessor, “Allocating Penalties”, was in part a response to my “Criminal Desert, Harm, and Fairness”, the paper I prepared for the conference. “Proportionality” is instead (if only in part) a response to what I said at the conference — the “Postscript” cited in its footnotes.Here is the dilemma. On the one hand: I could leave “Postscript” more or less as I gave it. That would preserve the historical record, but at some cost. I would have missed a chance to advance discussion of important issues. I would also have caused an anomaly in the order of papers printed here. On the other hand: I could rewrite “Postscript”, making it a response to “Proportionality” rather than to “Allocating Penalties”.



2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-430

Book reviews: Adam, Barbara, Ulrich Beck and Joost van Loon (eds), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory (reviewed by Charlotte Augst); Mansell, Wade, Belinda Meteyard and Alan Thompson, A Critical Introduction to Law (reviewed by Ralph Sandland); Rowe, Michael, The Racialisation of Disorder in Twentieth Century Britain (reviewed by Preet Nijhar); Boland, Faye, Anglo-American Insanity Defence Reform: The War Between Law and Medicine (reviewed by Victor Tadros); Kauzlarich, David and Ronald C Kramer, Crimes of the American Nuclear State at Home and Abroad (reviewed by Roger S. Clark); Lippens, Ronnie, Chaohybrids: Five Uneasy Peaces (reviewed by Bruce A. Arrigo); Basu, Srimati, She Comes to Take Her Rights: Indian Women, Property and Propriety (reviewed by Saira Rahman)



Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-177
Author(s):  
Christopher Bennett

ABSTRACTAn influential view in recent philosophy of punishment is that the apparatus of criminal justice should be geared at least in part to state censure of wrongdoing. I argue that if it were to be so geared, such an apparatus would make ambitious claims to authority, and that the legitimacy of the relevant state would then depend on whether those claims can be vindicated. This paper looks first at what kind of authority is being claimed by this apparatus. The criminal law, I argue, cannot merely be thought of as claiming a right to rule and to be obeyed. Rather, its authority is better understood as the authority of moral oversight: a power to alter, at will (though within certain limits), citizens’ liability to answer for their compliance with—and to be officially censured for their failure to comply with—a designated set of pre-existing moral 7reasons. The paper then looks at whether a state could realistically be expected to possess such authority—that is, whether a state that claims to have such a power could ever be legitimate.



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