Liability of Banks for Aiding Tax Evasion: A Comparative Analysis of German and UK Law

This article compares the regulatory liability of German banks for aiding tax evasion under the German Act on Regulatory Offences with the UK corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion under the Criminal Finances Act (CFA) 2017. The study demonstrates that the approaches share some similarities; however, major differences are also evident. Unlike the German approach, the CFA provisions are designed as strict liability provisions, whereas the German regulatory offence requires an intentional or negligent omission to take the supervisory measures required to prevent contraventions of the law. Moreover, the scope of the offences under UK law is wider than the scope of their German equivalent. In addition, the CFA provisions do not place financial limits on the fines that can be imposed. Because of these differences, the CFA is likely to be more effective in preventing banks from aiding tax evasion than its German counterpart. Consideration should therefore be given to reforming German law to make it more like its UK equivalent, especially in the post-Panama Papers world.

Tracking Liability – Traceability and the Farmer

Many farmers are reluctant to enter into traceability programs, which would create a record of the source and movement of raw farm products. Farmers are concerned that these programs could make them more vulnerable to regulatory offence prosecution and negligence lawsuits, as lite protection vulnerable afforded by anonymity is lost. However, participating in a traceability program may assist a farmer in protection establishing due diligence and reasonable care. Canadian jurisprudence also suggests that it will likely be difficult to overcome the causation stage of a negligence claim and ultimately prove a farmer's liability. Moreover, farmers will also benefit from the restrictive treatment of pure economic loss claims Canadian courts. Traceability programs would therefore prove to be more positive than negative for Canadian farmers.

Publicity, punishment and protection: the role(s) of adverse publicity in consumer policy

This paper argues that adverse publicity can fulfil two crucial roles in consumer protection law and policy. First, it can operate as an effective regulatory sanction in its own right; secondly it can play a vital role in helping consumers to exert market discipline by making informed choices about suppliers. However, there are significant risks to using adverse publicity to achieve these ends and it is imperative that any regulatory regime addresses these. Studying this topic now is particularly important for three main reasons. First, there has been widespread recognition that the regulatory offence, typically backed up with fines, is not the most effective form of sanction. More flexible, targeted and responsive options are required. Secondly, there is now ample evidence that regulated information, for example in the form of mandatory disclosure, frequently fails to help consumers to make fully informed choices. Finally, there are some highly significant very recent examples of enforcers using publicity in ways that can be viewed both as a sanction and as an information tool. The need to sanction responsively and to bolster consumer sovereignty demonstrates the potential for adverse publicity as a tool of consumer protection policy.