Unmasking the truth: experimental evidence of facemask compliance in Bangladesh, Kenya, and Nigeria during the COVID-19 pandemic

High levels of compliance with public health measures are critical to ensuring a successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, most data on compliance are self-reported. Tendency to overreport due to social desirability can yield biased estimates of compliance. We estimate rates of compliance with facemask mandates in Kenya, Nigeria, and Bangladesh using data from phone surveys conducted in March-April 2021. Data on compliance are collected from different survey modules: self-reported compliance (stated) and a list experiment (elicited). We find substantial gaps between stated and elicited rates of facemask wearing for different groups depending on specific country contexts and high levels of overreporting of facemask compliance in self-reported surveys. We observe differences in rates of self-reported facemask wearing among key groups but not using the elicited responses from the list experiment, which suggest that social desirability bias may vary by demographics. Data collected from self-reported surveys may not be reliable to monitor ongoing compliance with public health measures. Moreover, elicited compliance rates indicate levels of mask wearing are likely much lower than those estimated using self-reported data.

Linking individual and group motives for violent conflict

Research on the role of grievances in civil conflict is surprisingly inconclusive, with well-cited studies disagreeing on the relationship between perceived deprivation and violence. I argue that the role of grievances depends on an interaction between individual and group-level incentives. Individuals who perceive themselves as personally deprived are more likely to support or participate in anti-regime violence, but only if a successful rebellion would enhance their group’s power relative to the status quo. I test this argument in the context of Iraq’s sectarian civil war using data from a 2016 survey of 800 Baghdad residents. Using a list experiment to measure individuals’ willingness to consider violence against a government they feel is ignoring their needs, I find that minority Sunnis who are economically dissatisfied are significantly more willing to consider violence than similarly aggrieved Shias. However, as economic satisfaction increases, Sunnis’ propensity for violence decreases until it becomes indistinguishable from Shias’ propensity. These results clarify the joint impacts of vertical and horizontal grievances. Group inequality and individual deprivation are each necessary but not sufficient to fully explain individuals’ propensities for anti-state violence.

Authoritarian Rallying as Reputational Cascade? Evidence from Putin’s Popularity Surge after Crimea

When international conflict causes an authoritarian leader’s popularity to soar, extant theories lead us to treat such “rallying” as sincere preference change, the product of surging patriotism or cowed media. This study advances a theory of less-than-fully sincere rallying more appropriate for nondemocratic settings, characterizing it as at least partly reflecting cascading dissembling driven by social desirability concerns. The identification strategy combines a rare nationally representative rally-spanning panel survey with a list experiment and econometric analysis. This establishes that three quarters of those who rallied to Putin after Russia annexed Crimea were engaging in at least some form of dissembling and that this rallying developed as a rapid cascade, with social media joining television in fueling perceptions this was socially desirable.