Linking individual and group motives for violent conflict

Research on the role of grievances in civil conflict is surprisingly inconclusive, with well-cited studies disagreeing on the relationship between perceived deprivation and violence. I argue that the role of grievances depends on an interaction between individual and group-level incentives. Individuals who perceive themselves as personally deprived are more likely to support or participate in anti-regime violence, but only if a successful rebellion would enhance their group’s power relative to the status quo. I test this argument in the context of Iraq’s sectarian civil war using data from a 2016 survey of 800 Baghdad residents. Using a list experiment to measure individuals’ willingness to consider violence against a government they feel is ignoring their needs, I find that minority Sunnis who are economically dissatisfied are significantly more willing to consider violence than similarly aggrieved Shias. However, as economic satisfaction increases, Sunnis’ propensity for violence decreases until it becomes indistinguishable from Shias’ propensity. These results clarify the joint impacts of vertical and horizontal grievances. Group inequality and individual deprivation are each necessary but not sufficient to fully explain individuals’ propensities for anti-state violence.

Time Spent on School-Related Activities at Home During the Pandemic: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Group Inequality Among Secondary School Students

Substantial educational inequalities have been documented in Germany for decades. In this article, we examine whether educational inequalities among children have increased or remained the same since the school closures of spring 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our perspective is longitudinal: We compare the amount of time children in secondary schools spent on school-related activities at home before the pandemic, during school closures, and immediately after returning to in-person learning. We operationalize family socio-economic status using the highest parental educational attainment. Based on the theoretical assumption that the pandemic affected everyone equally, we formulate a hypothesis of equalization during the first period of school closures. For the period thereafter, however, we assume that parents with a low level of education had more difficulties bearing the additional burden of supervising and supporting their children’s learning activities. Thus, for that period, we postulate an increase in educational inequality. To study our hypotheses, we use data from the 2019 wave of the SOEP and the SOEP-CoV study, both of which are probability samples. The SOEP-CoV study provides a unique database, as it was conducted during the lockdown of spring 2020 and in the following month. For statistical analysis, we use probit regressions at three measurement points (in 2019, in 2020 during the school closures, and in the month after closures). The comparison of these three time points makes our analysis and findings unique in the research on education during the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular with regard to Germany-wide comparisons. Our results confirm the hypothesis of equalization during the first school closures and the hypothesis of an increase in educational in the subsequent period. Our findings have direct policy implications regarding the need to further expand support systems for children.

Social Dominance Orientation in Agrarian Resources Accumulation in Coastal Area Indonesia

Intergroup contact influenced the adaptation capacity of Bugis ethnic in the economic system in the destination site. When they become the highest of social-rank than other ethnicities in livelihood strategies by land-accumulation, it becomes important to analyze the working of power from the ethnic-Social Domination Orientation (SDO) theoretical. The role of ethnic-SDO is studied with assessment determination in a sociocultural context in intergroup ethnic inequality. Moreover, decision making in framing becomes challenged to be assessed at the individual level because it is assumed would influence the individual to enhance the hierarchy in the middle of uncertainty outcomes. This study aims: (1) elucidate the structure of ethnic inequality in livelihood strategies by ethnic-SDO in Bugis ethnic; and (2) recognize the role of framing in decision making as influencing factors of ethnic-SDO. This study approach is qualitative, which involves 25 informants. Data showed that ethnic-SDO in Bugis’s economic activities comprised of power that enhancing-hierarchy evolved ethnic inequality by high between-ethnic group inequality (BGI) and within- ethnic group inequality (WGI) in land-accumulation. It is found that the framing of Bugis people regarding skills and attitudes owned by other ethnicities in the decision-making tends to risk-avoid that enhancing-hierarchy in economic activities at an individual level.

Within-Group Inequality, Prediction, and the Value of Heuristics

In this chapter, I argue that groups with greater within-group variation in income are less useful as predictors of future incomes for group members. This implies that members of groups with higher levels of within-group inequality should express lower levels of linked fate and display a lower correlation between the mean group income and attitudes toward redistribution. I test this argument by examining a survey of Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, followed by a global sample from the World Values Survey. I close by returning to the three-country survey to show that within-region inequality does not seem to reduce regional identity.

Groups, Interests, and Heuristics

In this chapter, I lay out a heuristic theory of group membership and attitudes toward redistribution. I argue that the impact of ethnic and regional incomes on attitudes is mediated by a sense of linked fate, and that this relationship is stronger when levels of within-group inequality are lower, when economic uncertainty is higher, and when politicians raise the salience of the relevant cleavage. I also argue that federalism can, depending on the form it takes, increase or decrease the relevance of group incomes for redistributive attitudes.

To fight or demonstrate? Micro foundations of inequality and conflict

Do people from disadvantaged ethnic groups favor political violence over non-violent tactics? Studies of horizontal (between-group) inequality often concentrate on civil war. This article drills below the macro level and looks beyond civil war, to investigate individual participation in various types of conflict. Different types and combinations of ethnic disadvantage favor participation in different kinds of conflict, because of different opportunity structures. Political exclusion motivates leadership, which facilitates organized movements. Economic disadvantages restrict economic leverage, making non-violent tactics less likely to succeed. The article maps these components of groups’ opportunity structure onto different constellations of inequality. It uses Afrobarometer survey data ( N = 29,727) to show that economic disadvantages increase participation in political violence short of civil war. When they coincide with political exclusion, they also make people steer actively away from demonstrations. The evidence is less conclusive for political disadvantages alone, but points toward increased participation in demonstrations.

The Political Economy of Governance Quality

This paper develops a dynamic theory of the social and political foundations of governance quality. In the model, groups of citizens have different expected needs for a public service, and citizens choose whether to demand service when the need arises. Politicians representing these groups can determine policy benefits and delegate to bureaucrats the ability to invest in long-run service quality. The main feature of the theory is its foundation for citizen–government interactions, which draws from well-known queueing models of organizational service provision. The model provides a framework for characterizing the effectiveness and durability of government programs. A main implication is that politicized bureaucracies improve program survivability and increase the frequency of investment, while insulated bureaucracies increase the intensity of investment; overall service quality trades off between these two factors. Other results examine the implications of cross-group inequality, electoral conditions, and decentralization.