An initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.

An initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.

An initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.

Specificity of the chromatic noise influence on the luminance contrast discrimination to the color vision phenotype

Many studies have examined how color and luminance information are processed in the visual system. It has been observed that chromatic noise masked luminance discrimination in trichromats and that luminance thresholds increased as a function of noise saturation. Here, we aimed to compare chromatic noise inhibition on the luminance thresholds of trichromats and subjects with severe deutan or protan losses. Twenty-two age-matched subjects were evaluated, 12 trichromats and 10 with congenital color vision impairment: 5 protanopes/protanomalous, and 5 deuteranopes/deuteranomalous. We used a mosaic of circles containing chromatic noise consisting of 8 chromaticities around protan, deutan, and tritan confusion lines. A subset of the circles differed in the remaining circles by the luminance arising from a C-shaped central target. All the participants were tested in 4 chromatic noise saturation conditions (0.04, 0.02, 0.01, 0.005 u′v′ units) and 1 condition without chromatic noise. We observed that trichromats had an increasing luminance threshold as a function of chromatic noise saturation under all chromatic noise conditions. The subjects with color vision deficiencies displayed no changes in the luminance threshold across the different chromatic noise saturations when the noise was composed of chromaticities close to their color confusion lines (protan and deutan chromatic noise). However, for tritan chromatic noise, they were found to have similar results to the trichromats. The use of chromatic noise masking on luminance threshold estimates could help to simultaneously examine the processing of luminance and color information. A comparison between luminance contrast discrimination obtained from no chromatic and high-saturated chromatic noise conditions could be initially undertaken in this double-duty test.

More than noise: context-dependent luminance contrast discrimination in a coral reef fish (Rhinecanthus aculeatus)

ABSTRACTAchromatic (luminance) vision is used by animals to perceive motion, pattern, space and texture. Luminance contrast sensitivity thresholds are often poorly characterised for individual species and are applied across a diverse range of perceptual contexts using over-simplified assumptions of an animal's visual system. Such thresholds are often estimated using the receptor noise limited model (RNL). However, the suitability of the RNL model to describe luminance contrast perception remains poorly tested. Here, we investigated context-dependent luminance discrimination using triggerfish (Rhinecanthus aculeatus) presented with large achromatic stimuli (spots) against uniform achromatic backgrounds of varying absolute and relative contrasts. ‘Dark’ and ‘bright’ spots were presented against relatively dark and bright backgrounds. We found significant differences in luminance discrimination thresholds across treatments. When measured using Michelson contrast, thresholds for bright spots on a bright background were significantly higher than for other scenarios, and the lowest threshold was found when dark spots were presented on dark backgrounds. Thresholds expressed in Weber contrast revealed lower thresholds for spots darker than their backgrounds, which is consistent with the literature. The RNL model was unable to estimate threshold scaling across scenarios as predicted by the Weber–Fechner law, highlighting limitations in the current use of the RNL model to quantify luminance contrast perception. Our study confirms that luminance contrast discrimination thresholds are context dependent and should therefore be interpreted with caution.

Chronically implantable LED arrays for behavioral optogenetics in primates

Challenges in behavioral optogenetics in large brains demand development of a chronically implantable platform for light delivery. We have developed Opto-Array, a chronically implantable array of LEDs for high-throughput optogenetic perturbation in non-human primates. We tested the Opto-Array in the primary visual cortex of a macaque monkey, and demonstrated that optogenetic cortical silencing by the Opto-Array results in reliable retinotopic visual deficits on a luminance discrimination task.

More than noise: Context-dependant luminance contrast discrimination in a coral reef fish (Rhinecanthus aculeatus)

Achromatic (luminance) vision is used by animals to perceive motion, pattern, space and texture. Luminance contrast sensitivity thresholds are often poorly characterised for individual species and are applied across a diverse range of perceptual contexts using over-simplified assumptions of an animal’s visual system. Such thresholds are often estimated using the Receptor Noise Limited model (RNL) using quantum catch values and estimated noise levels of photoreceptors. However, the suitability of the RNL model to describe luminance contrast perception remains poorly tested.Here, we investigated context-dependent luminance discrimination using triggerfish (Rhinecanthus aculeatus) presented with large achromatic stimuli (spots) against uniform achromatic backgrounds of varying absolute and relative contrasts. ‘Dark’ and ‘bright’ spots were presented against relatively dark and bright backgrounds. We found significant differences in luminance discrimination thresholds across treatments. When measured using Michelson contrast, thresholds for bright spots on a bright background were significantly higher than for other scenarios, and the lowest threshold was found when dark spots were presented on dark backgrounds. Thresholds expressed in Weber contrast revealed increased contrast sensitivity for stimuli darker than their backgrounds, which is consistent with the literature. The RNL model was unable to estimate threshold scaling across scenarios as predicted by the Weber-Fechner law, highlighting limitations in the current use of the RNL model to quantify luminance contrast perception. Our study confirms that luminance contrast discrimination thresholds are context-dependent and should therefore be interpreted with caution.

Perceptual decision confidence is sensitive to forgone physical effort expenditure

Contemporary theoretical accounts of metacognition propose that action-related information is used in the computation of perceptual decision confidence. We investigated whether the amount of expended physical effort, or the ‘motoric sunk cost’ of a decision, influences perceptual decision confidence judgements in humans. In particular, we examined whether people feel more confident in decisions which required more effort to report. Forty-two participants performed a luminance discrimination task that involved identifying which of two flickering grayscale squares was brightest. Participants reported their choice by squeezing hand-held dynamometers. Across trials, the effort required to report a decision was varied across three levels (low, medium, high). Critically, participants were only aware of the required effort level on each trial once they had initiated their motor response, meaning that the varying effort requirements could not influence their initial decisions. Following each decision, participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that participants were more confident in decisions that required greater effort to report. This suggests that humans are sensitive to motoric sunk costs and supports contemporary models of metacognition in which actions inform the computation of decision confidence.