Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

Low carbon joint strategy and coordination for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the paper, fairness concern criterion is utilized to explore the coordination of a dyadic supply chain with a fairness-concerned retailer (acting as a newsvendor), who is committed to low carbon efforts. Two models are developed for stochastic demand disturbances in the forms of multiplicative case and additive case, respectively. Firstly, the optimal joint decision of the retailer and the supply chain are proposed in two scenarios, i.e., decentralized decision and the centralized decision. Secondly, in order to realize channel coordination, the contract of revenue sharing combined with the mechanism of low-carbon cost sharing is designed. Moreover, the influences of the retailer's fairness concern and bargaining power on the joint decision and the contract parameters are also investigated. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions to supply chain management are also provided. The results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain achieved coordination with the cost sharing mechanism of low-carbon efforts. Furthermore, the optimal low-carbon effort level and ordering quantity decrease in terms of fairness-concerned parameter and Nash bargaining power parameter, which increases in unit cost. However, the optimal pricing makes the opposite change.</p>

Coordination Model of Consumer Information Sharing in the Online Tourism Supply Chain

This is a study of the coordination model of consumer information sharing in the tourism supply chain with e-commerce platforms as the core. On the basis of considering the risks, a game theory is used to explore the information sharing effort level and the output profit of the tourism supply chain under both, centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the model and put forward a method of coordination for all parties in the tourism supply chain to achieve maximum profit.

The Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information of the Third-Party Collector

This paper investigates the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) implemented by the government in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with asymmetric information. The manufacturer produces and sells products to consumers, while the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is delegated to the third-party collector, the one who has private information about the collection effort level. An information screening contract for the manufacturer is put forward to obtain the private information from the third-party collector, which is composed of buy-back price and franchise fee. By utilizing principal-agent theory, two cases are mainly examined including the CLSC without the RPM and the CLSC with the RPM. The results demonstrate that (i) the information screening contract is effective in capturing the collector’s collection effort level, (ii) raising the buy-back price to motivate the third-party collector is confirmed to perform well on enhancing the collection quantity from consumers, (iii) H-type collector collects more WEEEs and earns more profits than L-type collector, and (iv) the RPM improves the collection quantity of the enterprise and reaps more environmental benefits. The numerical results verify the validity of the contract and the feasibility of the RPM.

The Effect of a Supplier’s Eco-Design on the Economic Benefits of a Supply Chain and Associated Coordination

The eco-design of upstream suppliers can reduce the environmental impact from the production process for downstream customers. To analyze the effect of suppliers’ eco-design on the economic benefits of up-downstream supply chain and the mechanisms, this study constructed a master–slave game theory model for a supplier and a manufacturer. Based on this game theory model, this study comparatively analyzes the effects on raw material/part prices, retail product prices, sale volume, revenue, and eco-design effort level under three conditions (no eco-design, decentralized decision-making with eco-design, centralized decision-making with eco-design). And to further analyze the effect of eco-design costs on the optimal solution, this article takes the supply chain of tire production as an example. This analysis could provide suggestions for the suppliers and manufacturers to develop and improve their eco-design. The main results are as follows: the supplier eco-design is beneficial to improving the overall economic benefits for suppliers and manufacturers under certain conditions, and the range in which a supplier is willing to implement eco-design in a decentralized decision-making situation is wider than that in a centralized decision-making situation; when a supplier implements an eco-design, it will transfer part of the cost to the manufacturer by raising the unit raw material/parts prices. Meanwhile, the manufacturer can reduce the production cost when the benefit of eco-design is more than the increased purchasing price, and they can decrease the retail price to expand the sales volume. Hence, consumers will benefit from lower prices. Thus, it is a multi-win situation among the suppliers, manufacturers, and consumers.

Venture investment under multi-stage incentive model based on fairness concerns

PurposeThis study explores the impact of EN's (venture entrepreneurs, simplified as EN) jealousy fairness concerns coefficient on two-stage venture capital decision-making in cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical information. It discusses the equilibrium solution of two-stage venture.Design/methodology/approachThe principal-agent model was established based on multiple periods, and differentiated contracts were established at different stages. The validity of the models and the contract was verified by numerical simulation.FindingsThe results suggest that with the increase in the EN fairness concerns coefficient, the effort level of EN decreases continuously and decreases faster in the second stage because this is the last stage. The level of VC's (venture capitalist, simplified as VC) effort declines first and then increases; that is, VC will increase the effort level when the fairness concerns coefficient increases to a certain threshold. To motivate EN to pay more effort, VC will increase the incentive to EN in the first stage. However, it will reduce the level of incentive to EN in the second stage. In the limited stage of venture investment, consider that the fairness concerns of EN do not make the profits of EN and VC achieve Pareto improvement simultaneously.Originality/valueFirst, the authors implanted fairness concerns into multi-stage venture capital and discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the efforts and returns of both parties. Second, among the influencing factors of the project output, the authors consider the bilateral efforts of EN and VC, the working capacity of EN, the initial investment scale, and the external uncertain environment.

Supply Chain Decision Analysis of Community E-Commerce Platform under Different Power Structures: Considering the Influence of Value Cocreation

In order to explore the impact of different decision-making methods on the profits of various entities in the supply chain of the community e-commerce platform, this paper adopts the method of the Stackelberg game. For the community e-commerce platform supply chain composed of suppliers, community e-commerce platforms, and grid station service providers, considering the degree of supplier value cocreation efforts, this paper studies the optimal decisions under centralized decision-making, supplier-led decentralized decision-making, and community e-commerce platform-led decentralized decision-making, respectively. The results show that the supply chain obtains the highest profit in centralized decision-making; under decentralized decision-making, the dominant party will get higher profits; and the supplier value cocreation sensitivity coefficient is positively correlated with sales price, value cocreation effort level, and total supply chain value. The results are helpful to improve the competitiveness of the community e-commerce platform supply chain in the market and are of great significance to the long-term development of the community e-commerce industry.

Convolution model for COVID-19 rate predictions and health effort levels computation for Saudi Arabia, France, and Canada

Many published infection prediction models, such as the extended SEIR (E-SEIR) model, are used as a study and report tool to aid health authorities to manage the epidemic plans successfully. These models face many challenges, mainly the reliability of the infection rate predictions related to the initial boundary conditions, formulation complexity, lengthy computations, and the limited result scope. We attribute these challenges to the absence of a solution framework that encapsulates the interacted activities that manage: the infection growth process, the infection spread process and the health effort process. In response to these challenges, we formulated such a framework first as the basis of our new convolution prediction model (CPM). CPM links through convolution integration, three temporal profile levels: input (infected and active cases), transformational (health efforts), and output functions (recovered, quarantine, and death cases). COVID-19 data defines the input and output temporal profiles; hence it is possible to deduce the cumulative efforts temporal response (CETR) function for the health effort level. The new CETR function determines the health effort level over a period. Also, CETR plays a role in predicting the evolution of the underlying infection and active cases profiles without a system of differential equations. This work covers three countries: Saudi Arabia, France, and Canada.

Profit Allocation of Agricultural Machinery Service-Oriented Manufacturing Alliance Based on Modified Shapley Value Method

Shapely value is a method of determining the importance of individuals in the collective, avoiding the equal allocation of profit. The profit allocation on SOM (service-oriented manufacturing) alliance between agricultural machinery manufacturing enterprises and suppliers under the SOM mode is a complex problem restricted by many factors, but the Shapely value method does not consider the differences of member enterprises. Therefore, factors that affect the profit allocation are given in this paper, such as input level, effort level, innovation level, risk factor, and value-added factor. Based on these factors, the Euclidean distance is used to modify the traditional TOPSIS method to determine the profit allocation correction coefficient, and the GRA (grey relational analysis) is introduced into the TOPSIS method to calculate the closeness degree, which reflects the position relationship and consistency of data curve. Based on the modified Shapley value method, a profit allocation method of agricultural machinery service-oriented manufacturing alliance is constructed. Finally, an application example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.

The Principle-Agent Conflict Problem in a Continuous-Time Delegated Asset Management Model

This paper considers the principle-agent conflict problem in a continuous-time delegated asset management model when the investor and the fund manager are all risk-averse with risk sensitivity coefficients γ f and γ m , respectively. Suppose that the investor entrusts his money to the fund manager. The return of the investment is determined by the manager’s effort level and incentive strategy, but the benefit belongs to the investor. In order to encourage the manager to work hard, the investor will determine the manager’s salary according to the terminal income. This is a stochastic differential game problem, and the distribution of income between the manager and the investor is a key point to be solved in the custody model. The uncertain form of the incentive strategy implies that the problem is different from the classical stochastic optimal control problem. In this paper, we first express the investor’s incentive strategy in term of two auxiliary processes and turn this problem into a classical one. Then, we employ the dynamic programming principle to solve the problem.