Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value Discount

We analyze the valuation-tax avoidance relation and find there is, in fact, a market value discount for tax avoidance. We identify several channels for the adverse valuation effects of tax avoidance. Tax-avoiding firms that (i) lack foreign income, (ii) are financially constrained, and (iii) incur relatively high capital expenditures have lower valuations. A portfolio long the highest and short the lowest tax-avoiding firms has a significantly positive four-factor alpha, highlighting greater risk and thus lower valuation associated with tax avoidance. Our results are robust to a variety of tests, including several different tax avoidance measures.

Examination of the effects of non-measurable explanatory variables on the value of real estate in the process of mass valuation of land

The paper proposes a solution to the problem of how to introduce non- -measurable features (attributes) of a property that significantly affect its value to the process of its valuation. The authors adopt two measures enabling them to study the influence of order features on the value of property, the Spearman rank coefficients and standardized ßk coefficients, and proceed to check their efficiency, applying an algorithm of mass property valuation (SAMWN) to the sample of 567 plots of land in Szczecin designated for housing purposes. The results thus obtained are then compared with the valuations of these plots of land performed by property appraisers. The study demonstrates that lower valuation errors are obtained when using standardized ßk coefficients than the Spearman rank coefficients.

Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the Song of Songs

Gregory is often treated in Western scholarship as a norm of orthodoxy, notwithstanding the reservations of his Eastern co-religionists; in his Commentary on the Song of Songs he certainly gave currency to a form of mysticism. In recent years his admirers have protested that this work is too often read as an echo of Origen’s lucubrations on the same text. Since Origen still has the reputation of being more a Platonist than a Christian, the virtue of Gregory is supposed to lie in his rediscovery of the body as an integral part of the person, in accordance with Pauline teaching and in contrast to the philosophy which disparages it as a temporary vehicle of the soul. A closer examination of both authors suggests, if anything, that Gregory is the Platonist, at least if this term is taken to connote an indifference to history and a lower valuation of the written text as a medium of instruction.

Opportunistic Accountability: State–Society Bargaining Over Shared Interests

Conflicting preferences between the state and society underpin most accountability mechanisms by providing a credible way for society to impose costs on the state. Adapting a classic bargaining framework, we argue that broader conditions can support state–society bargaining. Policies that both the state and society value can also enhance society’s negotiating power, provided society has a relatively lower valuation and is more patient than the state. By threatening to sabotage their own interests but hurt the impatient state even more, citizens can compel the state to deliver broader policy benefits. We illustrate this logic with the case of polio vaccination in northern Nigeria, where entire communities have resisted the vaccine as a strategy to bargain for more desired services. To resolve and preempt noncompliance, the Nigerian government has enhanced service delivery in other areas, demonstrating the opportunity for improved accountability in the presence of shared-interest policies.

Firm valuation, performance and origin of controlling shareholder in Brazil

This study analyzes if the origin of the controlling shareholder influences firm value and performance in Brazil. Although there is a vast literature on this topic, the results vary significantly and, in some cases, are even inconclusive. Our analysis of 407 Brazilian companies from 2002 to 2009 provide evidence that firms controlled by families and government have lower valuation. There is no significant relation between origin of control and firm performance.

A Laboratory Study of Customer Markets

In our laboratory customer markets, sellers post price and buyers incur cost (controlled at zero, low and high values) when they switch to a new seller. Sellers’ production costs follow various random walks in 28 sessions, each with 50-100 trading periods. We find that prices are sticky, and sellers absorb almost half of their cost shocks. Transaction prices are about 10 percent higher when buyers face positive switch costs, and trading efficiency is slightly impaired. Experienced buyers switch about 10 percent of the time with either high or low switch costs. Buyers switch more often when they face a higher posted price, have a lower valuation for the good, face lower switch costs, have more time remaining, and have more favorable information on alternative prices. Sellers price higher when they have more attached buyers, when buyers have less information on rivals’ prices, when rivals post higher prices, and when less time remains.