TAX HEAVENS PHENOMENON: TAX PLANNING STRATEGY OR TAX AVOIDANCE

Tax planning is one example of the use of regulatory loopholes. On the other hand for the Fiscal Authority, carrying out tax avoidance practices as a form of tax planning will have a negative effect on the Government and, for this reason, the Government makes fiscal corrections as its remedial. Many also hide their assets in tax heavens countries. This is so that the assets they have are not taxed. Tax heavens countries are usually small countries that apply very low taxes, some even do not impose taxes at all. However, the government has prepared an Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) data exchange plan that occurs in 2018, certainly will make tax evaders unable to run away from the pursuit of the tax authorities, even if they have to flee to tax heavens countries (tax heavens). Keywords: tax heavens, tax planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) Abstrak Perencanaan pajak adalah salah satu contoh penggunaan celah peraturan. Pada sisi lain bagi Otoritas Fiskal, melakukan praktik penghindaran pajak sebagai bentuk perencanaan pajak akan membawa efek negatif bagi Pemerintah dan, untuk itulah, Pemerintah melakukan koreksi fiskal sebagai remedialnya. Banyak juga yang menyembunyikan asetnya di negara-negara tax heavens. Hal ini bertujuan agar aset yang mereka punya tidak terkena pajak. Negara tax heavens biasanya merupakan negara kecil yang menerapkan pajak yang sangat rendah, bahkan ada yang tidak mengenakan pajak sama sekali. Namun, pemerintah telah menyiapkan Rencana pertukaran informasi data perbankan secara otomatis (Automatic Exchange of Information/AEoI) yang terjadi pada 2018, dipastikan akan membuat para pengemplang pajak tidak akan bisa lari dari kejaran otoritas pajak, sekalipun mereka harus kabur ke negara surga pajak (tax heavens). Kata kunci: Tax Heavens, Tax Planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI)

Rethinking corruption on fiscal decentralization and global competitiveness Nexus

Purpose This study investigates the effects of fiscal decentralization on global competitiveness through the level of corruption. This study aims to clarify the causal impacts of fiscal decentralization policy on the achievement of competitiveness rank considering the degree of corruption in a country. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses an empirical study using both cross-country arithmetic mean and panel data, covering ten-year period (2005-2014). The analysis uses both linear and non-linear specification in search of actual intermediating effects of corruption with controlling the possible endogeneity. Findings The paper provides empirical insights about corruption effects of fiscal decentralization on global competitiveness. It suggests that increasing level of fiscal decentralization has a positive contribution to competitiveness for the less-corrupt countries. The adverse effects appear for corrupt countries where the delegation of fiscal authority should endanger the country competitiveness. Research limitations/implications This research exploits the well-known measurement of fiscal decentralization, the degree of corruption and competitiveness. Therefore, this measurement might be challenged for representing the real concept of decentralization, corruption and competitiveness, furthermore its relationship. Despite the limitation, this research explores the entanglement of fiscal decentralization, corruption and competitiveness. Practical implications The paper provides the implications for the national policymakers about decentralizing the fiscal authority to achieve higher competitiveness level, through assessing their state of corruption. Originality/value The research provides additional comments for Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem in connection to competitiveness, by adding corruption level as pre-requisite condition.

Fiscal and Monetary Policy

Romar Correa continues to use the Godley-Cripps (1983) stock-flow-consistent (SFC) framework in this update to refine the thesis that the monetary authority is the ‘handmaiden’ of the fiscal authority. The bank, commercial and central being indistinguishable, is central to the account. A revitalized ‘real bills doctrine’ is proposed. The deleterious consequences of promoting the alternative, ‘financialization’ are traced.