« Si res ad synodum traheretur » (I, 416) Les procès imaginaires dans le livre I de l'Ysengrimus.

The first book of medieval Latin beast epic, Ysengrimus, relates imaginary trials. In the episodes of the stolen ham and the fishing, the characters, Ysengrin and Renart, imagine that they would convene an ecclesiastic assembly, a synod, and that they would plead their case. Their plead reverses right and wrong (translatio criminis), invents speeches to denigrate each other (sermocinatio), and seems to take the form of large digressions. These speeches, which have been considered as “interminable” and “wordy” by J. Mann and É. Charbonnier, can be reassessed through classical rhetoric. This paper aims to demonstrate that, in spite of the extent of these speeches' apparent rambling, we can extricate some rhetorical structures (constitutiones) from the judicial oratory. This is the first point of a speech that also uses prolixity as an “art of being right.”

Culture and the Courts in France: thePlaidoirie Sentimentalein the Nineteenth and EarlyTwentieth Centuries

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Vital Mareille—a champion of theplaidoirie sentimentale—tried to explain the reasons for its rise in France and its continued popularity into his own era. He defined it in the following terms: “Theplaidoirie[defense summation]sentimentaleis, precisely, that which seeks to move; one can say: that which comes from the heart of the attorney, to address that of the judges.” Theplaidoirie sentimentalehad existed in France before 1800, but it entered its golden age in the nineteenth century, and became a specialized form of judicial oratory. It developed chiefly in response to the introduction of trial by jury in 1791. Attorneys had to craft a rhetorical approach that would appeal to these “simple citizens,” and for this, sentimental eloquence was ideal; however, no recent scholar has attempted a systematic study of this important form of courtroom rhetoric from its origins in the early nineteenth century to its gradual replacement after 1890 or thereabouts by a more fact-based, “positivist” approach. This is unfortunate, because the history of theplaidoirie sentimentalereveals much. It includes juridical issues such as how the rhetorical practices of magistrates themselves contributed to the affective nature of French jury trial and the impact of the abolition in 1881 therésumé(summing up),which had been the judge's one means of countering the effect on a jury of an eloquent defense summation. It also reveals important changes in the attitudes of judges and jurors toward male mistreatment of women and the sexual “double standard” from the middle of the nineteenth century on and of how attorneys of the era drew on both the “new” emotion of sympathy and the “old” one of honor to persuade jurors to acquit. This adds to the evidence that emotions have a “history.”

The Moralization of Guilt in Late Imperial Russian Trial by Jury: The Early Reform Era

Ever since the official promulgation of the judicial reform statutes of 1864 in late imperial Russia, a scholarly commonplace has been the reform's contribution to the remarkable emergence of several generations of brilliant Russian trial lawyers and an internationally famous tradition of outstanding judicial oratory during the half-century preceding the Bolshevik revolution. This impressive display of judicial learning and courtroom artistry occurred in the context of Western-style trial by jury, the reform's most daring innovation. Introduced in 1866 after two years of energetic preparation, Russia's system of trial by jury bequeathed to scholars the most powerful emblem of the post-1864 Russian legal order: the courtroom confrontation between the defense attorney (zashchitnik) and the state's prosecutorial agent, the procurator (prokuror). In this judicial clash, the defense counsel has represented the eloquent, keen-witted, Western-educated champion of the individual and even the “defender of public interests.” The procuratorial representative has come to embody the interests of a regime whose relentless and often undisguised statism belied the reform statutes' open proclamation of the principles of legality and the “rule of law.”