Fairness as Successful Competition

In this paper, I introduce a novel view of fairness: I explain fair sport competition through the notion of successful competition. I begin by analysing successful competition. I propose that competitions can be successful, both internally and externally. Internally successful competition is connected to the internal purpose of competition and has two senses: narrow and wide. Competition was internally successful in the narrow sense if three criteria of ‘betterness’ – official result, ideally adjudicated result, and display of athletic skills – were congruous in that competition. Competition was internally successful in the wide sense if the three aforementioned criteria of betterness were congruous and the competition also embodied ‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’. Externally successful competition is connected to the external purposes of competition. Financial gain is an example of an external purpose. I argue that competition was fair if it was internally successful in the narrow sense, that is, if the three criteria of betterness were congruous in the competition.

“Remaining” as the Natural Expression of the Ontological Monism in Proclus and Pseudodionysius the Areopagite

This study is a comparative investigation of Proclus’ and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s positions about “remaining” as demonstrative of the ontological monism. Focusing the attention, first of all, to the Neoplatonist philosopher, who represents polytheism, it comes that “remaining” indicates the state of standstill and unchangeability of those beings which are able to function as productive principles. Thus, a transcendental and a productive plane are identified, a parameter which combines the apophatic with the affirmative approaches. The theory about “unparticipated-participated-participating” brings to the light a middle phase between “remaining” and “procession”, in order the relation “one-multitude” to develop. In Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, “remaining” appears in two planes: a) the transcendent One, which does not take part in the production process, b) the One which includes all the beings in the form of archetypical reasons. Note that this is not an eternal co-existence or an ontological identification of the beings with the One’s substance or a transition from the first One to the second, as Proclus suggests. Pseudo-Dionysius just describes the providential function of the One, which is manifested owing to its goodness. In conclusion, the main difference between the two thinkers is how they conceive the notion of “metaphysical multitude”: in Proclus, it indicates a hierarchy of beings, while, in Pseudo-Dionysius, it expresses the inner richness of the unity. In both the worldviews though, the ontological prospect which is formed is actually an optimistic one.

Place and Psychoanalysis

In this article, we highlight the importance of psychoanalysis and the Heideggerian concept of ‘place’ for each respective domain of inquiry. In particular, the writings of Jung and Lacan can unconceal and reveal new dimensions of Jeff Malpas’s work on place. Alternatively, Malpas can extend the work of these psychoanalysts by showing new dimensions of their ideas through an analysis of ‘place’. Ultimately, this article sets up a number of possibilities for future research through this novel interaction and engagement between the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis. One of these possibilities is in genomics and genetic determinism, which we briefly acknowledge throughout.

On the Concept of Truth

We show in this paper how three continental philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida respectively) respond negatively to the analytic correspondence theory of truth using different notions developed by them (i.e. the notion of Intentionality by Husserl, the notion of Dasein by Heidegger, and the notion of Trace by Derrida). We show that despite the fact that the three philosophers are united against the analytic correspondence theory of truth, there are still deep differences between them which stem from the different tools they use to articulate the concept of truth. Also, we argue that Husserlian truth has an advantageous position over the other concepts of truth presented.