Negative Cases: India in Goa, Libya in Chad and Mauritania in Western Sahara

The chapter investigates three cases of prolonged occupation from the post-colonial era that did not produce a settlement project: India in Goa (1961 onwards), Libya in Chad (1974-1992) and Mauritania in Western Sahara (1975-1979). The cases serve as “negative cases”.

Conclusion

The chapter investigates three cases of states that sought territorial expansion into a neighboring territory in the post-colonial era. They then occupied the sought-after territory for an extended period of time. However, their control did not produce a settlement project: India in Goa (1961 onwards), Libya in Chad (1974-1992) and Mauritania in Western Sahara (1975-1979). The cases serve as “negative cases”, to test the robustness of the model advanced in the earlier chapters. The analysis of the cases show that with one of the variables in the model missing, an occupier did not launch a settlement project in an occupied land.

Introduction

The introduction starts with the question that drives the book: why, and under what circumstances states launched settlement projects in occupied territories, during the era of decolonization. It explains what is meant by settlement projects: a sustained clusters of policies that allow states to strategically plan, implement and support the permanent. It offers a preliminary view of the answer: states embarked on these projects in order to secure permeant territorial expansion into contested territories. Specifically, the projects were aimed to help states manipulate expected interactions in the international arena that were to determine the future of these regions. The introduction highlights the contributions of the book and presents the plan of the book. It also presents the universe of cases, both post 1960 expansionist occupations, and within them, those that included a settlement project.

The Moroccan Settlement Project in Western Sahara (1975–) and the Indonesian Settlement Project in East Timor (1975–99)

The chapter investigates the Moroccan settlement project in the Western Sahara and the Indonesian settlement project in East-Timor (1975-1999). It uses the framework advanced in the book and shows that both projects were meant to secure permeant territorial expansion into occupied regions. Following the model, the chapter analyses the four variables that led to the launch of the settlement projects: Legally plausible case for expansion, American support, institutional capacity and a low level of local affinity to the occupying states. The section dealing with each case includes four parts: the why and how of occupation and expansion, the evolution of the settlement projects, the four variables that led to the projects, and then how these variables interacted to produce a settlement project. The chapter is concluded with some observations about the comparison between the two cases.

The Israeli Settlement Project in the West Bank and Gaza (1967–77)

The chapter explains the launch of the Israeli settlement project in Gaza and the West-Bank (Including East-Jerusalem) following Israel’s occupation of these regions in the 1967 Six-Day War. The chapter uses the theory advanced in the book and shows that Israel launched the settlement project in order to secure permanent territorial expansion into these areas. Israel believed that the future of these areas will be determined in a negotiation within the framework of UNSCR 242. The settlement project was meant to affect the outcome of these future talks. The chapter identifies the conditions for the launch of the project: US support and a legal ambiguity regarding the status of these areas, American support, and an institutional capacity to carry out such a project. The local population’s low level of affinity with Israel further contributed to the launch of the project.

Theory

The theory chapter explains how scholars analyse current-day post-colonial settlement projects. It shows that much of the focus in the literature is on internal explanations such as settler-driven or an audience costs perspective; or bicommunal/bilateral explanations such as social control or economic utilization.