Conclusion

In this concluding chapter I discuss some findings from the analysis of three of Equity’s fundamental doctrines we explored: fiduciary law, proprietary estoppel, and clean hands. I wish to highlight the traits they share and consider the relationship between the legal ideals of efficiency and Accountability Correspondence which they exemplify. Drawing up the strings of the last three chapters will also reveal how the courts use the category of conscionability to ensure that the value of the Rule of Law is sacrificed only in cases where it is necessary to maintain a healthy balance with Accountability Correspondence, in a way that also serves efficiency. Finally, I wish to show how the discussions of the specific doctrines support the argument that the fusion project as a general solution to the friction between law and Equity ought to be rejected.

On Clean, Soiled, and Spattered Hands

This chapter examines the clean hands doctrine, according to which a claimant who knocks on the court’s door with a hand tainted by illegality or immorality will not be given her day in court. Instead of listening to her potentially successful claim, Equity resorts to its characteristic ad hominem, flexible, morally sensitive, and ex post approach to drive him/her away. The doctrine, despite its effect on a vast number of disputes, is under-theorised and fraught with lack of clarity. The chapter first considers the sources of the considerable legal anxiety caused by the way this powerful gatekeeper operates, before discussing the underpinnings of the three traditional justifications for keeping the clean hands gatekeeper in place: coherence, deterrence, and integrity. I then make the argument that by interpreting the integrity justification as a concept rooted in moral psychology, we can understand how the incommensurable justifications relate to each other and operate in judicial reasoning. I conclude by showing how the clean hands gatekeeper creates a ‘dirty hands’ type dilemma for judges and what they can do about it.

Fiduciary Law as Equity’s Child

This chapter challenges the argument that one of Equity’s most distinctive doctrines, fiduciary law, must be fused with a common law doctrine—the law of contract. In particular, it highlights the disadvantages of transforming the equitable duty of loyalty into an ordinary contractual obligation. The chapter first considers the ‘contractarian’ interpretation of fiduciary law according to which fiduciary duties are no more than a species of contractual obligations before explaining why, in contrast with the contractarian argument, Equity was right in claiming that the fiduciary relationship was essentially different from contract. After making the case of why fiduciary law should be treated as a sui generis equitable doctrine, the chapter examines two features of equitable fiduciary law that will change dramatically if the fusion suggestion is adopted (the language in which it is set and the way into the relationship) and shows the adverse consequences of moving in that direction. It concludes with the contention that the concept of ‘conscience’ still has an active role to play in the legal reasoning about fiduciaries.

Equity’s Own Room

This chapter explains why Equity should be kept as an independent vibrant body of law. It opens by discussing two strands of the opposition to the dualist system of Equity and Common Law: the fusion project, which advances the idea that the differences between Equity and Common Law ought to be ironed out so as to create one seamless cloth of private law; and the ‘conscionability scepticism’, which rejects the standard of conscience—the most familiar characteristic of Equity. The chapter analyses both views in terms of the Rule of Law (ROL) ideal and goes on to argue that Equity promotes a legal virtue that is neglected by Common Law’s fixation on the ROL ideal: the ‘Accountability Correspondence’. I then attempt to show how Equity reintroduces an essential equilibrium between Accountability Correspondence and the ROL, and the dangers of neglecting to promote such equilibrium. The chapter then explains why the characteristics most associated with Equity, namely, the use of flexible, ad hoc, ex post morally freighted principles, are necessary for the attainment of this goal. Next, I contend that the standard of conscionability—the epitome of Equity’s unique mode of action, is not at all as hostile to the ROL ideal as many conscionability sceptics claim.

Proprietary Estoppel

This chapter examines the importance of proprietary estoppel (PE) in terms of Equity’s mission of aligning moral responsibility with legal liability, focusing on PE claims that are based on a ‘common expectation’ that arises in the context of pre-contractual negotiations. It first considers what Thomas Scanlon calls Principle L (for Loss prevention) and how its tort-like exposition misses—or glosses over—the voluntary modus of the loss prevention obligation (LPO). It then explains how the legal enforcement of LPOs can be justified from the perspectives of justice and efficiency, and how the conscionability element enables the courts to balance the Rule of Law (ROL) and Accountability Correspondence in the regulation of the pre-contractual stage. It concludes with the argument that Equity, via the doctrine of PE, is redressing a significant failure in the Common Law to tackle behaviour that disregards both morality and efficiency.