Equity’s Own Room

Equity ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-76
Author(s):  
Irit Samet
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Mode Of Action ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Unique Mode ◽  
Ex Post

This chapter explains why Equity should be kept as an independent vibrant body of law. It opens by discussing two strands of the opposition to the dualist system of Equity and Common Law: the fusion project, which advances the idea that the differences between Equity and Common Law ought to be ironed out so as to create one seamless cloth of private law; and the ‘conscionability scepticism’, which rejects the standard of conscience—the most familiar characteristic of Equity. The chapter analyses both views in terms of the Rule of Law (ROL) ideal and goes on to argue that Equity promotes a legal virtue that is neglected by Common Law’s fixation on the ROL ideal: the ‘Accountability Correspondence’. I then attempt to show how Equity reintroduces an essential equilibrium between Accountability Correspondence and the ROL, and the dangers of neglecting to promote such equilibrium. The chapter then explains why the characteristics most associated with Equity, namely, the use of flexible, ad hoc, ex post morally freighted principles, are necessary for the attainment of this goal. Next, I contend that the standard of conscionability—the epitome of Equity’s unique mode of action, is not at all as hostile to the ROL ideal as many conscionability sceptics claim.

Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Equity

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Social Goals ◽  
Private Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Order Constraint ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Law

A late-comer to the field of private law theory, the inquiry into the foundations of the law of Equity raises some fundamental questions about the relationships between law and morality, the nature of rights, the extent to which we are willing to compromise on the Rule of Law ideal in order to achieve various social goals. In this volume, leading scholars in the field address these and the questions about underlying principles of Equity and its relationship to the common law: What relationships, if any, are there between the legal, philosophical, and moral senses of ‘equity’? Does Equity form a second-order constraint on law? If so, is its operation at odds with the rule of law? Do the various theories of Equity require some kind of separation of law and equity—and, if they do, what kind of separation? The volume further sheds light on some of the most topical questions of jurisprudence that are embedded in the debate around ‘fusion’.

Non-arbitrariness, rule of law and the ‘margin of appreciation’: Comments on Andreas Follesdal

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Internal Organization ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Principle Of Legality

AbstractCan citizens’ interest in non-domination be satisfied by the principle of legality and the guarantee of non-arbitrariness? This comment argues that the rule of law requires an internal organization of law that entails an additional positive law, through conventions, common law, judicial precedents or constitutions, which the sovereign cannot legally override. In the supranational context, the rule of law requires an equilibrium of consideration and respect between different legalities by avoiding a legal monopoly of a supreme authority and fostering the interaction among orders based on content-dependent reasons. The same applies to the relations between the ECtHR and member states. The margin of appreciation, taken as a reminder of the complexities of international institutional relationships, embodies a non-domination caveat to consider (the reasons from) the ‘normativities’ of different orders. Nonetheless, as an argumentative tool of the Court, it allows for an often-disputed discretion. Accordingly, better refined guidelines and justifications are required.

Inherent Jurisdiction and the Limits of Civil Procedure

2020 ◽  
pp. 269-290
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Procedural Law

This chapter considers the modern scope and limitations on the use of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in common law jurisdictions. It considers the underlying juridical basis for the jurisdiction, and the underlying theories, namely that residuary powers were vested in the High Court in England and Wales by the Judicature Acts, and that all courts have inherent powers to prevent abuse of process. It considers the ramifications of the distinction between inherent jurisdiction and inherent powers. Changes in the legal landscape since the seminal articles by Master Jacob and Professor Dockray, including the codification of civil procedure in many common law jurisdictions, and modern understanding of the rule of law and the separation of powers, are considered. It is argued that while existing applications of the inherent jurisdiction should be retained, it is no longer acceptable for the English High Court, and equivalent courts in other jurisdictions, to generate new procedural law by resorting to the inherent jurisdiction.

The Rule of Law and Good Governance

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Henk Addink
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Continental Tradition

The concept of the rule of law has different—common law and continental—historical roots and traditional perspectives. The common law tradition is more focused on limiting the powers of the state, whereas the continental tradition focuses on not just to limit but also to empower the government. But both systems have a focus on the rule of law. The rule of law in the classical liberal tradition is based on four elements: legality, division and balance of powers, independent judicial control, and protection of fundamental rights. The differences between rule of law and rechtsstaat are: different concepts of the state, mixed legal systems and different approaches of a constitution, and different perspectives on human rights. There are two levels of development: a model in which law is a way of structuring and restricting the power of the state, the second level is more subjective and has important individual positions. The concept of good governance related to these developments makes clear the need to broaden the concept of the rule of law.

20. Conspiracy

2020 ◽  
pp. 580-610
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
The Rule Of Law

This chapter examines the ways in which criminal law treats conspiracies. Some of the controversies examined include: whether it is necessary and/or desirable to criminalize conspiracies; the extent to which there can be a conspiracy under the Criminal Law Act 1977 if the parties have only agreed to commit the substantive offence subject to some condition; what must be agreed and who must intend what to happen for a crime of conspiracy; the mens rea of statutory conspiracies; and whether common law conspiracies are so vague as to infringe the rule of law.

The Lost European Aspirations of U.S. Constitutional Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 595-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Abernathy
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Many ◽  
The U.S

Most European and American attorneys and judges think the U.S.A. has its legal roots in English common law, and that is probably true for the many areas of U.S. law that are still controlled by the traditional common-law process of simultaneously making and applying law. Yet, with respect to constitutional law – America's greatest legal contribution to modern respect for the rule of law, the roots of the U.S. legal system are firmly planted in Europe, not England. The U.S. Constitution was inspired by French revolutionary ideas of rationalism in law; it was intended as an integrated document just like codes; and it has been interpreted by American judges to be not just a political document but binding law – law that is binding on all three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary. In fact that was the holding in Marbury v. Madison, the case decided exactly two hundred years ago.

Forty Years of Public Law

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 341-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Comprehensive Survey ◽  
Intellectual Revolution ◽  
Do So

It would be impossible in a short lecture to give a comprehensive survey of all the changes that have occurred in the last forty years in that branch of law known as “Israel common law”. I will not, therefore, try to do so. Instead, I wish to single out the most distinctive phenomenon in this area of law. I refer to the conceptual/intellectual revolution in the outlook of the court regarding the nature of its judicial function. The original view, according to which the sole function of the court in the area of public law is to decide disputes between citizens and public authorities, has been abandoned and replaced by an outlook that views the court as an institution responsible for the legality of public administration, or, as the court itself is accustomed to defining the matter, for the rule of law.I shall divide my discussion into two parts. In the first part I will briefly discuss the prominent changes that have occurred in the judicial decisions regarding public law in recent years, and the judicial philosophy underlying these changes.

The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency by David Dyzenhaus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 250pp. Page numbers in text are to this book.

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-483
Author(s):  
Jamie Cameron
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Action ◽  
The Common ◽  
Constitutive Properties ◽  
Principle Of Legality

What the rule of law means and how it constrains the exercise of state power raise issues which have been debated-without resolution-over the ages. Times of emergency bring fresh energy to the discussion, and David Dyzenhaus is one of many who have entered the fray to debate the balance between liberty and national security in the post 9/11 period. It has not been easy for those who place their trust in written constitutions to account for the way textual guarantees are diluted when the state is under threat. Rather than address that dilemma, Dyzenhaus sets his ideas apart by proposing a theory which maximizes the protection of rights in emergency circumstances, without straining the institutional capacities or legitimacy of the judiciary. This theory invokes the pedigree of the common law-and “common law constitutionalism”-and is grounded in the constitutive properties of the rule of law, or principle of legality. Dyzenhaus may not have answered the questions readers will want to ask, but he has opened up the middle ground between the competing supremacies yet more, by drawing common law constitutionalism and its rule-of-law pedigree into constitutional theories of review. More to the point, he has challenged the judiciary to draw on the moral resources of the law to make executive and legislative action as accountable as possible at all times, in emergencies as well as in normal times. Readers can and should engage, at many levels, with the complexity of his thought in this important book.

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