Self-Cultivation and Self-Absorption

This chapter argues that self-cultivation, as a virtue, can be successfully distinguished from a morally problematic kind of self-absorption. Indeed, we need such a virtue in order to explain just those situations in which agents really should think about their own character, and not merely the goods that the traditional virtues are directed toward, when deciding what particular actions to undertake. In particular, we need such a virtue to give a plausible account of how an imperfectly virtuous agent should act when confronted with what I shall call a situation of moral risk. But while imperfectly virtuous agents confronting such a situation should think about their own character, that is not all they should think about. Introducing concerns about the character of the self at the level of explicit deliberation as the target of one virtue among others rightly captures this fact.

Neo-Aristotelian Suberogation

This chapter develops and defends the following account of neo-Aristotelian suberogation: an action is suberogatory iff it fails to hit the target of a relevant virtue, but is not overall vicious. This account implies that all true instances of suberogation are only trivially bad. Thus, pace influential defenders of suberogation, there are no instances of truly villainous suberogation. This chapter argues that this implication counts in favor of the account insofar as the supposed cases of villainous suberogation offered by those who defend its existence are, unlike those offered in defense of trivial suberogation, wholly unconvincing. So the account correctly identifies just those actions that are suberogatory as suberogatory, and gives a plausible explanation of their suberogatory status.

The Virtue of Self-Cultivation

This chapter gives a rigorous account of self-cultivation and argues that it is a virtue. Self-cultivation, it claims, is the following: the disposition to engage in those actions and have those affective responses that develop one’s abilities and character traits, when appropriate, because one values growth for its own sake, with pleasure and from an undivided motivational state. To show that self-cultivation, so conceived, is a virtue, the chapter argues that such a character trait is both useful and immediately agreeable, both to oneself and to others. The argument draws on research from psychology, as well as more traditional appeals to our own moral experience and to our reactions to characters from literature.

On the Very Idea of a Virtue of Self-Cultivation

This chapter begins with the observation that there is something about a virtue of self-cultivation that is, in Christine Swanton’s apt phrase, “seemingly paradoxical.” This seeming paradox calls for an explanation, and in this chapter, I take on this explanatory task. That is, I show as clearly as possible why it might seem paradoxical, or even impossible, to recognize a virtue concerned with self-improvement, and I argue that, nonetheless, this seeming is a mere seeming. The key issue for the neo-Aristotelian, I argue, is whether a disposition to self-cultivation can be an excellence for human beings. And, contrary to appearances, it can. Thus, there can be such a virtue after all.

Is Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation Even Possible?

This chapter considers and responds to five objections to the internal coherence of a neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation. I particular, it considers the objections that the account is incompatible with the doctrine of the mean, that it makes virtue optional, that supererogation requires a logical relation among ethical concepts that Aristotelians cannot make sense of, that it is problematically non-action-guiding, and that it is incompatible with Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous person is the measure of right action. In each case, it argues that the most plausible interpretation of the Aristotelian claim under discussion is compatible with the neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation defended in the book.

Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation

This chapter develops and defends the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: An action is supererogatory iff it is overall virtuous and either (1) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious, or (2) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious. This account is non-ad-hoc insofar as it is based on virtue ethical accounts of right and wrong action that are motivated from within the tradition, and thus fully deserving of the label “neo-Aristotelian.” And it is intuitively defensible: it correctly identifies both heroic and saintly actions as supererogatory and gives a plausible explanation of their status as supererogatory. It also correctly identifies those instances of more mundane supererogation as supererogation and explains their status as supererogatory.

Introduction

This introduction contrasts two different pictures of the relationship of virtue to human imperfection. On the first sort of picture, the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the second sort of picture, there can be actions that are right even if they are not maximally virtuous and there can be people who are profoundly virtuous even if they are not perfect. This book urges the attractions of a virtue ethics committed to the second sort of picture. Doing so allows it to make two major innovations: First, it will construct and defend neo-Aristotelian accounts of supererogation and suberogation. Second it will show that self-improvement itself can be morally excellent, and that the disposition to seek and engage in it, where appropriate, can itself be a virtue. The introduction lays out the plan of the book, previewing the argument for these claims.

On the Value of Recognizing Imperfect Virtue

Returning to the contrast with which this book began, this chapter urges the value of recognizing the existence of imperfect virtue. One advantage of recognizing the existence of imperfect virtue is that it allows us to construct an account of supererogation. A theory of supererogation makes room for both recognizing the truly extraordinary virtue that is often on display in supererogatory actions and recognizing that actions can be truly good and right even if they are not maximally virtuous. The former is important insofar as it allows us to give others their due and the latter important insofar as it avoids an inhuman and possibly counterproductive overdemandingness. But just as important, and far from encouraging a kind of complacency, the recognition that there can be genuine goodness short of perfection is precisely what opens up theoretical space for appreciating the goodness of striving toward an ideal. And striving toward an ideal is good; indeed, self-improvement itself can be morally excellent, and the disposition to seek and engage in it, where appropriate, can itself be a virtue. Thus, while the purity of vision represented by the insistence that the only virtue is perfect virtue has its undeniable attractions, such an insistence risks obscuring as much as it illuminates.