Accepting Moral Testimony

This chapter clarifies the putatively problematic phenomenon: what it is to accept moral testimony, and what seems to be the basic problem with it. It argues that you accept testimony that p, just in case 1) you believe the testimony that p for a testimonial reason, and 2) either a) the testimonial reason to believe p in fact makes the difference whether you believe p, or b) would alone be enough for you to believe p were there no nontestimonial reasons to believe (or disbelieve) p. To identify what seems to be the basic problem with accepting moral testimony, we need to understand how morality fits in to this formula. Philosophers often claim that accepting pure moral testimony is problematic. This chapter distinguishes three different ways of understanding purity and identifies the specific sense of purity that characterizes the alleged problem.

Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Solidarity

This chapter contains two more arguments against pessimism about moral testimony. First, it argues that epistemic justice sometimes requires you to accept moral testimony, despite the fact that doing so seems to clash with autonomy. Both good and bad experiences teach a person what matters, and how much things matter. Those who systematically suffer have moral knowledge that others tend to lack, and whose testimony is routinely dismissed. Epistemic justice demands that we trust their moral testimony. Second, this chapter argues that prioritizing individual autonomy is in tension with another plausible claim: that epistemic solidarity is an important good. When you accept moral testimony, you and the speaker may thereby benefit from the epistemic solidarity that the two of you now stand together in, and that this epistemic solidarity is a moral good, a good you would forego by declining moral testimony on the grounds that to do so would compromise your own autonomy.

Advising Duos and Joint Agency

This final chapter aims to show that the actions of those who trust moral advice can have moral worth. Some adviser-advisee duos are joint agents. The activity of this joint agent displays moral understanding, autonomy, and all the other goods had by individual moral agents. To show this, this chapter argues 1) that highly informal duos can exhibit joint agency, 2) that joint agents can be constituted by individuals whose contributions are highly idiosyncratic, 3) that a commander and a commandee can exhibit joint agency, 4) that an adviser and an advisee can likewise exhibit joint agency, and finally 5) that their actions can be morally evaluated and have moral worth. This chapter ends with a conclusion about the value of studying plural agency.

Epistemic Problems of Moral Testimony

This chapter discusses various arguments emphasizing epistemic problems with accepting moral testimony. It is often thought that there are various barriers that prevent a hearer from acquiring knowledge of moral truths on another person’s testimony. This chapter argues that none of these barriers are insurmountable. Although there indeed are various pitfalls to accepting testimony, none are peculiar to accepting moral testimony. In particular, it is possible to identify people who already have moral knowledge even if you yourself lack this knowledge. To do this, you need a theory of error—that is, some grasp of why another person might be better positioned to know moral truths than you yourself are. Armed with such a theory, it becomes possible to acquire moral knowledge through testimony.

The Nature of Advice

This chapter distinguishes advice and moral testimony, distinguishes advice from command, and explains what it is to trust advice. One who accepts moral testimony believes something he might not otherwise believe, while one who trusts advice does something he might not otherwise do. Trusting advice is more directly practical than is accepting moral testimony. Advice is apt only if it directs the advisee to do what he, in some sense, already had reason to do; there is no parallel constraint on command. However, advising someone to do something can generate new reasons for them to do what they already had reason to do. Moreover, advice is apt only if the advisee would, upon hearing it, have some motivation to do what’s advised.

Moral Testimony and the Value of Moral Understanding

This chapter addresses a distinct worry about accepting moral testimony: if you cannot gain moral understanding by means of moral testimony, it is better to believe moral truths for nontestimonial reasons than for testimonial reasons. There are two distinct sorts of reasons trusting moral testimony might be unable to deliver moral understanding. The first turns on the thought that it is intrinsically bad to lack moral understanding, and so if moral testimony cannot deliver moral understanding, then forming one’s moral views on the basis of testimony is problematic. The second reason for concern relies on the thought that a lack of moral understanding is fundamentally a practical worry: those who lack moral understanding cannot act as well as those who do understand. This chapter addresses the worry about moral understanding on multiple fronts. It argues that one can indeed get moral understanding from moral testimony: when you are unsure whether some action would be wrong, but are aware of the relevant considerations, testimony whether the action would be wrong can fill this epistemic gap, putting you in a position to have quite a bit of moral understanding. Next, this chapter questions whether any residual unavailable moral understanding is as important as pessimists about moral testimony typically make it out to be. The partial understanding that moral testimony affords is nearly as valuable as complete understanding is. Moreover, even if there is something virtuous about understanding morality entirely on one’s own, there might also be something virtuous about being epistemically dependent upon the moral testimony of others, a topic explored in the next two chapters.

Introduction

When we don’t know what to do, we often go to others for help, and we sometimes trust what they say. Pessimists about moral testimony think that there is something problematic about relying upon others for forming our views about what’s right and wrong. They think it is much better to grasp moral truths by oneself. This book argues for exactly the opposite view: it is better to be guided by others than to grasp moral truths by oneself. This Introduction gives a very concise chapter-by-chapter overview of the book.

Autonomy and Moral Testimony

This chapter examines whether accepting moral testimony is incompatible with being autonomous, and argues that it is not; in fact, accepting moral testimony turns out to be an exercise of autonomy. One might think that one should not accept testimony about things knowable a priori, but this chapter argues there are counterexamples to this generalization. It is also reasonable to think it violates autonomy to believe moral truths for only testimonial reasons, but this is true of many nonmoral truths as well, and so presents no peculiar problem for moral testimony. Next, this chapter argues that our moral views are already shaped in unbeknownst ways by others. It is more autonomous to take some control over how your moral views are shaped by others than for their influence over you to happen entirely behind your back.