D. Chalmers and J. Perry on Zombie Problem and the Content of Phenomenal Concepts

David Chalmers and John Perry both construe phenomenal concepts as irreducible to descriptive concepts of physical properties or properties, which logically supervene on them. But they draw different conclusions from this point. D. Chalmers in The Conscious Mind argues that the epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical properties shows that the former cannot be ontologically identified with the latter. J. Perry in Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness claims that we can identify phenomenal properties with physical ones without being committed to reductionism. In this paper I am going to examine Chalmers and Perrys views on meaning and necessity, especially with respect to identity statements, in order to find where exactly their ways of thinking about the content of phenomenal concepts.

Omissions, Moral Luck, and Minding the (Epistemic) Gap

This paper warns of two threats to moral responsibility that arise when accounting for omissions, given some plausible assumptions about how abilities are related to responsibility. The first problem threatens the legitimacy of our being responsible by expanding the preexisting tension that luck famously raises for moral responsibility. The second threat to moral responsibility challenges the legitimacy of our practices of holding responsible. Holding others responsible for their omissions requires us to bridge an epistemic gap that does not arise when holding others responsible for their actions—one that we might often fail to cross.

Moral Testimony and the Value of Moral Understanding

This chapter addresses a distinct worry about accepting moral testimony: if you cannot gain moral understanding by means of moral testimony, it is better to believe moral truths for nontestimonial reasons than for testimonial reasons. There are two distinct sorts of reasons trusting moral testimony might be unable to deliver moral understanding. The first turns on the thought that it is intrinsically bad to lack moral understanding, and so if moral testimony cannot deliver moral understanding, then forming one’s moral views on the basis of testimony is problematic. The second reason for concern relies on the thought that a lack of moral understanding is fundamentally a practical worry: those who lack moral understanding cannot act as well as those who do understand. This chapter addresses the worry about moral understanding on multiple fronts. It argues that one can indeed get moral understanding from moral testimony: when you are unsure whether some action would be wrong, but are aware of the relevant considerations, testimony whether the action would be wrong can fill this epistemic gap, putting you in a position to have quite a bit of moral understanding. Next, this chapter questions whether any residual unavailable moral understanding is as important as pessimists about moral testimony typically make it out to be. The partial understanding that moral testimony affords is nearly as valuable as complete understanding is. Moreover, even if there is something virtuous about understanding morality entirely on one’s own, there might also be something virtuous about being epistemically dependent upon the moral testimony of others, a topic explored in the next two chapters.

Can We Learn Anything from Brain Simulation?

If you figure out how machines learn, then you will figure out how the brain works, and what the brain’s functions are. Such an idea is widespread among philosophers and computer scientists who agree with a functionalist reductionist point of view of consciousness. This theory leads to hold that the more accurate the simulation of cognitive behavior is, the more the math behind it must be true – when true means what really happens in our brain. In this article, we aim to show that, on one hand, brain simulation is nothing more than just another simulation, and it offers very little help to understand – nor to produce – the vivid experiences (qualia) of cognitive functions. On the other hand, we would like to emphasize that when it succeeds at predicting a mechanism with less ambiguity and more accuracy than without a simulation nor direct observation, it really develops the knowledge of our brain. As long as brain simulation follows scientific principles, it should be regarded as valuable, even though the knowledge it brings to science must not be confused for the real phenomenon. Brain simulation, like all simulation, cannot fill any reality or epistemic gap. It is a consolation prize.

(Not) Part of the System: Resolving Epistemic Disconnect Through Archival Reference

Information seeking practices of conspiracists are examined by introducing the new archival user group of “conspiracist researchers.” The epistemic commitments of archival knowledge organization (AKO), rooted in provenance and access/secrecy, fundamentally conflict with the epistemic features of conspiracism, namely: mistrust of authority figures and institutions, accompanying overreliance on firsthand inquiry, and a tendency towards indicative mood/confirmation bias. Through interviews with reference personnel working at two state archives in the American west, I illustrate that the reference interaction is a vital turning point for the conspiracist researcher. Reference personnel can build trust with conspiracist researchers by displaying epistemic empathy and subverting hegemonic archival logics. The burden of bridging the epistemic gap through archival user education thus falls almost exclusively onto reference personnel. Domain analysis is presented as one possible starting point for developing an archival knowledge organization system (AKOS) that could be more epistemically flexible.

Scientific ignorance: Probing the limits of scientific research and knowledge production

The aim of the paper is to clarify the concept of scientific ignorance: what is it, what are its sources, and when is it epistemically detrimental for science. I present a taxonomy of scientific ignorance, distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic sources. I argue that the latter can create a detrimental epistemic gap, which have significant epistemic and social consequences. I provide three examples from medical research to illustrate this point. To conclude, I claim that while some types of scientific ignorance are inevitable and even desirable, other types of scientific ignorance are epistemically and ethically flawed and should be prevented.

Breathing and Breathlessness in Clinic and Culture: Using Critical Medical Humanities to Bridge an Epistemic Gap

A central tenet of critical medical humanities is the claim that biomedicine does not hold all the keys to understanding the experience of illness, how responses to treatment are mediated, or how outcomes and prognosis are revealed over time. We further suggest that biomedicine cannot wholly explain how illness may be expressed physiologically. So much that influences that expression derives from cultural context, emotional response, and how illness is interpreted and understood that this knowledge cannot be exhausted with the tools of biomedicine.