Moral or Ethical Experts? The Role of Bioethicists in a Democratic Society

"It is often believed that if bioethicists are to play the role of experts, the nature of their expertise must be explained and the authority of their advice justified. This presentation will be a moderate challenge to this view. It will be contended that the nature of bioethical expertise and the source of bioethicists’ authority depends on the kind of advice that is expected from them. If one expects a moral advice, i.e. a self-standing instruction about what to do in a given situation, it is indeed hardly possible to identify a moral expert in a rational way, and so to take their advice as authoritative. If, however, the counsel sought is to be an ethical advice, that is, a recommendation guided by a particular normative context, bioethicists can be sufficiently good experts and their instructions can enjoy a significant authority. Since bioethics is a field of research and social practice which developed in a democratic society, the bioethicist’s advice presupposes the normative framework of the values and ideals of democracy such as mutual recognition and respect, liberty and equality. Accordingly, although a bioethicist is not to be expected to be a moral expert (this role belongs, for example, to spiritual or religious leaders), she can be an ethical expert, who – on the ground of her knowledge of the values and ideals of a democratic society, ethical theory and, among other things, social theory and law – can offer a reliable advice which addresses a particular problem. The expert status of a bioethicist and the authority of her advice derives crucially from the values and ideals of a democratic society and her ethical knowledge, rather than from a moral insight into a realm of context-independent values. "

The Reprehensible (Makruh)

The reprehensible (makruh) is an in-between category that exists between the halal and haram, and it basically pertains to moral advice rather than a legal category. Makruh (lit. disliked, from the root word kariha) refers to an act, object, or conduct that should be avoided, but whose perpetrator is not liable to punishment and does not incur moral blame. Certain foodstuffs may be strictly halal but should be avoided if harmful to health, rotten, or presented in doubtful situations. The leading schools are in agreement that one who avoids makruh merits praise and gains closeness to God. Makruh is often described as the lowest degree of prohibition, and in this sense it is used as a convenient category the jurists have employed for matters that fall between the halal and haram.

Advising Duos and Joint Agency

This final chapter aims to show that the actions of those who trust moral advice can have moral worth. Some adviser-advisee duos are joint agents. The activity of this joint agent displays moral understanding, autonomy, and all the other goods had by individual moral agents. To show this, this chapter argues 1) that highly informal duos can exhibit joint agency, 2) that joint agents can be constituted by individuals whose contributions are highly idiosyncratic, 3) that a commander and a commandee can exhibit joint agency, 4) that an adviser and an advisee can likewise exhibit joint agency, and finally 5) that their actions can be morally evaluated and have moral worth. This chapter ends with a conclusion about the value of studying plural agency.

Favole allegoriche dal Manoscritto Vaticano Arabo 594

Scrolling through Elenco dei manoscritti arabi islamici della Biblioteca vaticana (The List of Islamic Arabic manuscripts in the Vatican Library) by Giorgio Levi Della Vida (1935, p. 65), I was intrigued by manuscript Vat. Ar. 594, entitled Riwāyāt ḍiḥkiyya (Humorous Tales), dating back to the 17th century. After examining its content, I was attracted to: a) its predominant use of Egyptian; b) its avant-garde intent to teach (what’s more, in Italy), the vernacular rather than classic or standard Arabic for communication purposes; c) I was amused by the ironic, moral and satirical nature of the text and its dialogue reworkings; d) I was struck by the originality of the description of its protagonists that unfold and end with sui generis moral advice. For these reasons, I decided to study his fables (143r-187v), setting myself three main objectives: to illustrate a) the representations of the protagonists; b) some characteristic linguistic elements of 17th century Egyptian; c) Italian-inspired avant-garde use of colloquial neo-Arabic for language teaching purposes, found in the works written in Rome at San Pietro in Montorio school.

Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect

This chapter argues that deferring to the feelings of an exemplar of virtue is sometimes the best way to figure out what the morally right thing to do is in a given practical situation. It stresses that ordinary people are sometimes warranted in deferring to an exemplar of virtue about what should be done in some practical situation. It also points out that the authority of an exemplar of virtue's advice is partly constituted by the proto-authority of the emotional response to the agent's situation. The chapter explores the proposition that moral deference is sometimes warranted, clarifying that the prescription or advice to which deference is warranted concerns the requirements of some virtue. It emphasizes that critics of moral deference distinguish accepting moral advice from moral deference proper.

Moral Advice and Joint Agency

There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral worth. The basic idea is that an advisor and an advisee can together constitute a joint agent, and that this joint agent’s action can indeed have moral worth. So while the advisee himself might not do the right thing for the right reason (this because all alone he lacks the right reason), and while the advisor herself might not do the right thing for the right reason (this because all alone she does not do the right thing), they together do the right thing for the right reason.

Introduction

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 8

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This eighth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults. This volume features chapters by Ben Bramble, Samantha Brennan, Talbot Brewer, Dale Dorsey, Patricio A. Fernandez, Guy Fletcher, Christine M. Korsgaard, Chelsea Rosenthal, Grant J. Rozeboom, Roy Sorensen, Julie Tannenbaum, and Alex Worsnip.

7. Stoicism, then and now

‘Stoicism, then and now’ describes how, despite the contrast between the contemporary reception of Stoicism and the study of the ancient school that inspires it, by looking at the history of Stoicism’s influence since its rediscovery in the Renaissance we have seen one way these approaches can be brought into contact with each other: the prominence of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (and to a lesser degree Seneca) in the contemporary reception of Stoicism has made it natural to focus primarily on its potential as a source for moral advice and self-improvement. But what about Stoic physics? How does the modern Stoic deal with the now obsolete science of our world?