The Mode of Infinite Regression

This chapter analyses the mode of infinite regression. It argues that the main interpretations that have been given of the mode have been dogmatic ones, that is to say they have been interpretations which capture perfectly well how a dogmatic philosopher might come to suspend judgement on the basis of the mode but not how a sceptic might do so. The chapter concludes by suggesting a way in which the sceptic might come to suspend judgement on the basis of the mode by interpreting it in light of the sceptic’s method of equipollence.

The Mode of Relativity

This chapter distinguishes between three different versions of the mode of relativity which can be extracted from Sextus’ text. It argues that only one of these versions is non-trivial and that this non-trivial version is incompatible with the mode of disagreement. Given the centrality of the mode of disagreement to making sense of the sceptic’s practice if the Sextan interpreter is faced with a choice between rejecting relativity or disagreement, it is argued that relativity should be the mode that is jettisoned.

The Mode of Disagreement

This chapter distinguishes between two different principles (consistent with Sextus’ text) that connect the phenomenon of disagreement with the suspension of judgement and—correspondingly—two different versions of the mode of disagreement. It argues that one version, which turns on the phenomenon of peer disagreement, is a dogmatic version of the mode insofar as only the sceptic’s dogmatic opponent can come to suspend judgement on the basis of it. The other version, which turns on the phenomenon of evidentially undecided disagreement, is a version of the mode on the basis of which a sceptic might come to suspend judgement. This is because it is one and the same thing to suspend judgement on the basis of an evidentially undecided disagreement as it is to suspend judgement on the basis of a pair of equipollent arguments.

The Mode of Reciprocity

This chapter offers an account of the mode of reciprocity. It identifies the type of priority on which the mode turns and—similarly to Chapter 3—argues that the standard way in which the mode has been interpreted has been a dogmatic one and offers a version of the mode according to which the sceptic might come to suspend judgement by interpreting the mode in light of the sceptic’s method of equipollence.

Introduction

This book has as its focus a particular type of philosophical scepticism and a particular aspect of that particular type of scepticism. The type of scepticism in question is Pyrrhonian scepticism and the particular aspect of that type of scepticism is its Agrippan aspect.1...

The Modes Combined

This chapter examines how all of the Agrippan modes (bar relativity for the reasons given in Chapter 5) work in combination with one another. Sextus provides us with two such sceptical ‘nets’ in the Outlines each of which is analysed. A third net of Jonathan Barnes’s invention is also analysed, as well a fourth, modified version of Barnes’s net. The conclusion drawn is that all four combinations are underscored by a variety of theoretical assumptions which the sceptic is not in a position to make.

The Mode of Hypothesis

This chapter offers an elucidation of the mode of hypothesis. Both the nature and the function of Sextan hypothesizing are clarified—its nature by unpacking Sextus’ characterization of the phenomenon at PH 1.168 and its function by comparing it to the kinds of function hypotheses can have in Platonic and Aristotelian contexts. A distinction is then drawn between dogmatic and sceptical hypotheses, following which three versions of the mode of hypothesis are extracted from Sextus’ text. It is argued that the third version is the basic version of the mode. This version of the mode, moreover, is shown to be a limiting case of the sceptic’s method of equipollence and therefore a mode on the basis of which the sceptic can come to suspend judgement.