Nassim Taleb: Statistical Concepts and their Philosophical Interpretation

Nassim Nicholas Taleb is an American statistician, mathematician, trader, and essayist of Lebanese descent who, for the most part, adheres to philosophical scepticism. In his works, he primarily considers the problems of chance and probability. Taleb is the author of a number of bestsellers, his book «Black Swan», was included in the review of «The Sunday Times» in the list of the most influential books written after World War II. N. Taleb in his publications adheres to methodological and practical approaches within the modern paradigm of interdisciplinarity, combining, synthesizing scientific vision and tools from different fields of knowledge, primarily in the field of statistical analysis and interpretation of large arrays of statistics. The purpose of this article is to try to highlight some key ideas in the field of statistical methodology and practice, which personally developed or reinterpreted this famous researcher, as well as consideration of individual socio-philosophical views that underlie his diverse scientific and scientific activities. The article considers and analyzes the methodological basis of the concept of rare statistically probable events («black swan»), classification of systems with the separation of «antifragile» subsystems, statistical issues on the use of big data, questions about the possibilities and limitations of forecasting based on time series, some sociological and historiosophical approaches of N. Taleb, as well as theoretical and methodological principles of his concepts in general, which are based on the ideas of philosophical scepticism. Diverse ideas, concepts, approaches, visions, which were expressed by N. Taleb regarding statistics and other sciences in the pages of his books, scientific articles, essays, numerous interviews, etc., in our opinion, need a more in-depth, multifaceted study. Such explorations can be useful and productive for theoretical science and practical application in modern Ukraine, including in the field of statistics.

Haunted by Horrors: Image and Superscription and Spartacus

Mitchell himself confessed that he was vexed to a near-pathological extent by ‘horrors’ – incidences of human cruelty in past and present – which provided the emotional and ethical drive for his writing. This chapter explores the two novels that most acutely highlight this aspect of the author’s mindset. Image and Superscription, his bracing picaresque novel of Rebirth, is presented as an unsuccessful attempt to dramatise and come to terms imaginatively with mankind’s propensity for cruelty. While visceral scenes depicting human brutality in contemporary times are overstated, however, the graphic treatment of historical atrocities points forward to the success of Spartacus. The historical novel dealing with the legendary uprising of the slaves against the Roman Republic is adjudged a triumph in conception and execution. It is appraised as both a realistic account of an inspirational historical event and an emblem of revolutionary ardour. Further, Mitchell’s permeating humanism is productively allied with a deeper lying philosophical scepticism to sustain a sanguine vision of humankind’s destiny.

Wittgenstein and Derrida on the Possibility of Meaning: Hierarchy or Non-Hierarchy, Simple or Non-simple Origin, Deferral or Non-Deferral

Meaning understood in terms of teachability and learnability is crucial to Wittgenstein’s later work. As regards the resolution of philosophical problems – and epistemological problems in particular - this approach seems to posit a hierarchy of meaning that excludes endless deferral. This is the basis of Wittgenstein’s attack on philosophical scepticism. Derrida’s approach to language seems to require both non-hierarchy and endless deferral. Consequently fundamental to his concept of origin is identity and difference simultaneously, irreducibly, non-simply. One question is whether it is possible for there to be a compromise between the two philosophers: a hierarchy of meaning that does not in principle exclude endless deferral.

Introduction

This book has as its focus a particular type of philosophical scepticism and a particular aspect of that particular type of scepticism. The type of scepticism in question is Pyrrhonian scepticism and the particular aspect of that type of scepticism is its Agrippan aspect.1...

Comments on Penelope Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?

I here offer a discussion of some of Penelope Maddy’s responses to philosophical scepticism in her recent book, What Do Philosophers Do? Among other things, I suggest that philosophers who take an interest in human knowledge are not primarily concerned with whether anyone knows anything about the world, but rather with understanding how we know the things we do in the face of the difficulties that seem naturally to arise in the explanations they come up with.

Mersenne, Marin (1588–1648)

Marin Mersenne represents a new seventeenth-century perspective on natural knowledge. This perspective elevated the classical mathematical sciences over natural philosophy as the appropriate models of what can be known, of how it can be known and of the cognitive status of that knowledge. His early publications had the apologetic aim not only of combating various forms of heresy, but also of opposing philosophical scepticism, which was widely regarded in Catholic France of the early seventeenth century as undermining the certainty of religious dogma. To that end, Mersenne stressed the certainty of demonstrations in sciences such as optics, astronomy and mechanics, all of which stood as ‘mathematical’ sciences in the classifications of the sciences stemming from Aristotle. Mersenne’s stress on the mathematical sciences contrasted them with natural philosophy in so far as the former concerned only the measurable external properties of things whereas the latter purported to discuss their inner natures, or essences. In accepting the considerable degree of uncertainty attending knowledge of essences, and juxtaposing it to the relative certainty of knowledge of appearances, Mersenne adopted a position (since called ‘mitigated scepticism’) that combated scepticism by lowering the stakes: in accepting that the essences of things cannot be known, he agreed with the sceptics; but in asserting that knowledge of appearances can, by contrast, be had with certainty, he rejected the apparent intellectual paralysis advocated by the sceptics. In furthering this programme, Mersenne embarked on a publication effort relating to the mathematical sciences, combined with a massive lifelong correspondence on largely philosophical as well as religious topics with a wide network of people throughout Europe.

Herbert, Edward (Baron Herbert of Cherbury) (c.1583–1648)

Responding, on the one hand, to religious conflicts over the question of the locus and interpretation of authority for deciding what constitutes authentic belief and, on the other hand, to general philosophical scepticism, Herbert of Cherbury wrote De Veritate (On Truth) in an attempt to determine the character and circumstances of true understanding. In this work, first published in 1624, he sought to enable people to decide for themselves, by the use of their reason, what they ought to hold. According to his thesis the touchstone for such decisions is provided by certain fundamental truths, the ‘common notions’, which all people recognize to be true once they have become aware of them. In two later works, De Religione Gentilium (On the Religion of the Heathens) (1663) and A Dialogue between a Tutor and his Pupil (1768), both published after his death, Herbert attempted to show that his position is not falsified by the evidence of wide differences among religions. His other writings include an important history of Henry VIII based on research into state papers, an autobiography that tells the story of his life up to 1624, and some poems. While this courtier, adventurer and diplomat was something of a failure as a public figure, and while he is commonly held to have essayed views about innate notions that were to be refuted by Locke’s Essay, his writings provide pioneering studies in England in the genres of metaphysics, comparative religion and autobiography. Religiously he has been persistently maligned as ‘the father of English deism’ although closer consideration suggests that this reputation is not justified. He is, rather, to be considered an independent thinker who wanted to identify a form of religious belief that was rationally warranted and universally perceivable.

Scepticism and the Senses

This chapter considers some lessons that can be learned from philosophical scepticism and some strategies to be pursued in understanding human knowledge in the right way. It examines the conception of perceptual experience and what is needed for a more accurate—and hence more trouble-free—account of what we can and do in fact perceive. It also discusses René Descartes’s sceptical argument and his notion of perceptual knowledge before concluding with an explanation of what it calls propositional perception to account for knowledge of the world. It argues that we can perceive particular objects without believing or knowing anything about them. It is only with such ‘propositional’ objects of perception that direct perceptual knowledge of the world is possible, since knowledge is knowledge of what is so.

Are Children’s Rights Important?

This paper explores the nature and justificatory basis of children’s rights with a view to determining whether children’s rights are important. Although children’s rights are frequently invoked in legal and political discourse, they often generate controversy: their practical and theoretical significance is sometimes challenged. Many states acknowledge children’s rights and yet fail to secure many of the most basic interests of children putatively protected by their rights. Moreover, the suggestion that children are the bearers of genuine moral rights is sometimes met with philosophical scepticism. This chapter distinguishes different forms of scepticism about children’s rights and explores whether doubts about the theoretical and practical importance of children’s rights can be vindicated. I argue that reticence about children’s rights is not justified. Given a proper construal of children’s rights it is appropriate both to treat children as genuine bearers of rights and to view their rights as morally and politically important.