Pyrrhonism and the Value of Law

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.

Pyrrhonian Scepticism in Thomas Elyot's Defence of Good Women (1540)

This article discusses the first known mention of Pyrrhonian Scepticism in the English language, which occurs in Thomas Elyot’s 1540 Defence of Good Women. The article inquires into the sources of Elyot’s knowledge of Pyrrhonism and into his motivations for mentioning Pyrrhonists in a text on the social and political status of women. I conclude that, on the balance of evidence, the most likely source of Elyot’s ideas on Pyrrhonism is Galen’s De Temperamentis. Furthermore, I argue that the rejection of a straw man version of Pyrrhonism serves as a tool of authorial positioning for Elyot, and in particular as a means of reassuring his reader that the Defence is not intended ironically. Elyot chooses Pyrrhonism as a philosophical position representing bad faith arguments, and he likely does so because of the hostile treatment of Pyrrhonism in Galen’s works, and especially in De Temperamentis.

Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?

In this article, I tackle an heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to scientific definitions. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions.

The Sceptical Inquirer

This article treats of whether scepticism, in particular Pyrrhonian scepticism, can be said to deploy a method of any kind. I begin by distinguishing various different notions of method, and their relations to the concept of expertise (section 1). I then (section 2) consider Sextus’s account, in the prologue to Outlines of Pyrrhonism, of the Pyrrhonist approach, and how it supposedly differs from those of other groups, sceptical and otherwise. In particular, I consider the central claim that the Pyrrhonist is a continuing investigator (section 3), who in spite of refusing to be satisfied with any answer (or none), none the less still achieves tranquillity, and whether this can avoid being presented as a method for so doing, and hence as compromising the purity of sceptical suspension of commitment (section 4). In doing so, I relate—and contrast—the Pyrrhonists’ account of their practice to the ‘Socratic Method’ (section 5), as well as to the argumentative practice of various Academics (section 6), and assess their claim in so doing to be offering a way of instruction (section 7). I conclude (section 8) that there is a consistent and interesting sense in which Pyrrhonian scepticism can be absolved of the charge that it incoherently, and crypto-dogmatically, presents itself as offering a method for achieving an intrinsically desirable goal.

Hegels negative Dialektik

Hegel’s approach to ancient scepticism is often discussed only in the context of epistemological questions. But it is also of crucial importance for his practical philosophy. Hegel draws on central figures of Pyrrhonian scepticism in order to subject Kant’s antinomies – i. e., Kant’s cosmology – to a fundamental revision. He radicalises Kant’s sceptical method to “self-completing scepticism”. At the same time he gives Kant’s concept of the world a practical twist: In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, world means an inhabited sphere in which powers and counter-powers are in conflict with each other. In doing so, he opens up the tradition of negativist thinking in political philosophy, which ranges from Marx and Adorno to the current theories of radical democracy. When Hegel calls Pyrrhonian skepticism a “negative dialectic”, he thereby marks what he views as a deficit: the inferiority of Pyrrhonian skepticism to speculative philosophy. However, it is precisely the practical dimension of Hegel’s dialectic that suggests that the sceptical motives of his thinking should be given great weight. This can be seen most clearly in Hegel’s concept of Bildung, which defines emancipation processes as the reactivation of open power relations in static conditions of domination.

Relativity against dogmatism in Sextus Empiricus

Sextus often tells us that relativity underpins Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Some scholarship focuses on the role of relativity in overarching Pyrrhonist sceptical strategies. Much less scholarship addresses relativity in Sextus’ criticism of particular dogmatic concepts. This chapter argues that Sextus invokes conceptual relativity—a version of constitutive relativity—in his treatment of three dogmatic concepts: signs, causes, and demonstration. However, as a Pyrrhonist, Sextus would likely resist committing himself to a certain concept of relativity, even a conceptual one. This chapter argues that Sextus employs conceptual relativity dialectically against his dogmatic opponents. First, the chapter sets up the two readings of Sextus’ view of relativity. The chapter then presents direct and indirect evidence that the conceptual view is present in Sextus.

A New Epistemology

This chapter explores Hume’s considered treatment of scepticism in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding in EHU 12. It finds a two-tiered epistemology in this section. First, Hume’s dismissal of antecedent scepticism suggests that he accords our faculties default authority (EHU 12.3). Having done so, we use these faculties to reflexively investigate themselves; those that are found wanting will be dismissed in line with Hume’s consequent scepticism (EHU 12.5). Pyrrhonian scepticism is founded on a problematic methodology: it either over-generalises discovered unreliability in our faculties, or ventures into enquiries for which our faculties are entirely unsuited. Thus, Hume rejects it in favour of his own mitigated scepticism, which recommends staying within the limits of our faculties. The chapter then argues against the sceptical interpretation of EHU 12, before pointing to various parallels between this account and EHU 1, EHU 5, and Part 1 of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Hume and the Legacy of Pyrrhonian Scepticism

The last chapter of Part One’s historical quartet traces the development of Pyrrhonism across medieval, Renaissance, and early modern philosophy. Extending the work of Charles B. Schmitt, Richard H. Popkin, Luciano Floridi, et al., the chapter assesses the sceptical thought of Montaigne and devotes subsequent sections to the Pyrrhonian dimensions of work by François de La Mothe le Vayer, Pierre Gassendi, Pierre Bayle, and Pierre-Daniel Huet. Because Hume is typically understood to be anti-Pyrrhonian, Chapter Four develops a three-plank justification for attributing deeply Pyrrhonian dimensions to his work. Plank one is bibliographic and argues that Hume enjoyed access to Pyrrhonian texts and likely used them. Plank two argues for a hermeneutic of suspicion when reading Hume, largely grounded in the hostility he and others faced on account of their supposed scepticism. Plank three is conceptual and argues that Hume’s work exhibits philosophical qualities remarkably similar to those of historical Pyrrhonism. Synthesizing the results of Part One of Hume’s Scepticism, Chapter Four closes with a twelve-point General Framework defining scepticism generally.

Hume and Ancient Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Chapter Three charts the development of ancient Pyrrhonism, from its origins with Pyrrho of Elis through Timon of Phlius and Aenesidemus, concluding with the chronicling work of Sextus Empiricus. The chapter unpacks the conceptual apparatus of Pyrrhonism in some detail, including: scepticism as practice (agogê), its Fourfold way of observing appearances (phainomena), its observance (teresis) of the pre-theoretical understandings (prolepsis) of common life (ho bios ho koinos), its argumentative modes (tropoi, both Aenesidemus’ ten and Agrippa’s five tropes), its suspension of judgment (epochê), its practice of balancing oppositions (isosthenia), its non-assertive silence (aphasia) about what is hidden (ta adêla), its critiques of causality, its Apelletic method, its critical and inquiring openness (zetesis), its quasi-goal of tranquillity (ataraxia), and its anti-Platonic ideas about recollection. The chapter closes with a seven-point General Framework defining Pyrrhonian Scepticism.