Psychometric development and validation of victim gaslighting questionnaire (VGQ): across female sample from Pakistan

Purpose Gaslighting a form of abusive manipulation both emotional and psychological is a growing phenomenon in recent times. However, as of yet, there is a scarcity of a valid and reliable instrument which can measure the severity of gaslighting in victims of interpersonal relationships abuse. The purpose of this study is the development of an instrument which can effectively measure gaslighting in victims and is psychometrically reliable and valid. Design/methodology/approach Since the aim of the study was the development of a scale first a sample of eight women who were victims of domestic abuse was taken for the focus group. Afterwards using purposive sampling a sample of 20 women for the pilot study and a sample of 150 women for the main study was taken with age range 18–40 (M = 23.38, S.D = 4.03). For the development of scale theoretical basis along with a focus group was conducted to establish an item pool. Afterwards, subject matter experts helped in establishing contend validity followed by Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP) method and maximum likelihood factor analysis (FA) was performed for the establishment of the factorial structure of the instrument. Findings Velicer’s MAP method and Maximum Likelihood FA suggested two factor structures including peer disagreement and loss of self-trust. Instrument displayed high alpha reliability of α = 0.934, with α = 0.927 and α = 0.854, for the subscale, respectively. Research limitations/implications Though all necessary steps were taken to minimize the limitations of the present study, however, some limitations do exist which needs to be addressed. The foremost limitation of the present scale is that it is being developed with only a female sample, however, the inclusion of a male sample in future studies can help in identifying whether men also are victims of gaslighting from peers and other family members or not. The second limitation is of validity though necessary validities have been established future studies should study on establishing further validities to further refine the instrument. Additionally, the scale has only been validated and tested on female samples future studies should be conducted on other specific groups or samples to develop norms. Moreover, testing the scale on other cultures could also help in establishing cross cultural validation of the instrument. Finally, though the scale assumes a higher level of scores suggests a higher level of victimization, a proper cutoff score can help in further identifying proper victims from the normal level of gaslighting. Practical implications The present instrument has its applicability in several domains the most important being in the criminal justice system as gaslighting comes under gaslighting and even in the UK is considered as a criminal offense. This instrument can help in determining the severity of gaslighting in victims. Likewise, it can be used in clinical settings for psychologists to identify possible cases of gaslighting victims which can enable them to provide specific help and treatment for them. Moreover, researchers can also benefit from the instrument as it can enable them to explore gaslighting with other possible variables which can help them explore the concept of gaslighting even further. Originality/value This paper is a novel study and has been completed with the purpose of evaluating the effects of gaslighting in victims of interpersonal relationships abuse as the earlier measures are either not psychometrically valid or cannot be generalized to a wider population. The present established scale is an effort to construct an instrument that can be used worldwide.

Responsibility, second opinions and peer-disagreement: ethical and epistemological challenges of using AI in clinical diagnostic contexts

In this paper, we first classify different types of second opinions and evaluate the ethical and epistemological implications of providing those in a clinical context. Second, we discuss the issue of how artificial intelligent (AI) could replace the human cognitive labour of providing such second opinion and find that several AI reach the levels of accuracy and efficiency needed to clarify their use an urgent ethical issue. Third, we outline the normative conditions of how AI may be used as second opinion in clinical processes, weighing the benefits of its efficiency against concerns of responsibility attribution. Fourth, we provide a ‘rule of disagreement’ that fulfils these conditions while retaining some of the benefits of expanding the use of AI-based decision support systems (AI-DSS) in clinical contexts. This is because the rule of disagreement proposes to use AI as much as possible, but retain the ability to use human second opinions to resolve disagreements between AI and physician-in-charge. Fifth, we discuss some counterarguments.

Transformative Experience and the Problem of Religious Disagreement

Chapter 6 considers how peer disagreement over religion presents an epistemological problem: How can confidence in any religious claims including their negations be epistemically justified? Here, it is shown that the transformative nature of religious experience poses a further problem: to transition between religious belief and skepticism is not just to adopt a different set of beliefs, but to transform into a different version of oneself. It is argued that this intensifies the problem of pluralism by adding a new dimension to religious disagreement, for we can lack epistemic and affective access to our potential religious, agnostic, or skeptical selves. Yet, access to these selves seems to be required for the purposes of decision-making that is to be both rational and authentic. Finally, the chapter reflects on the relationship between the transformative problem and what it shows about the epistemic status of religious conversion and deconversion, in which one disagrees with one’s own transformed self.

Disagreement and epistemic improvement

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.

A Faithful Response to Disagreement

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one's opinion on important matters. This article shows that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one's beliefs. And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn't already hold them.

Learning from Scientific Disagreement

The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion by providing a normative argument in the same direction; if we are correct, typical reasons for conciliation are absent in this kind of scientific disagreements.

Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible

Richard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland’s argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if moral judgments were beliefs, and beliefs track perceived evidence, then moral peer disagreement would not be intelligible. Hence, moral judgments are not beliefs. The argument is both novel and interesting, but this paper argues that it fails to establish the conclusion. Beliefs are plausibly analyzed as constituted by dispositions to respond to what is perceived as evidence, but dispositions can always be interfered with. Provided a background explanation of why the disposition is not manifested, peer intransigence is quite intelligible.