Détente, Human Rights and Anglo-American Relations

This chapter contextualizes Jimmy Carter’s promotion of a human rights agenda coupled to efforts to maintain superpower détente. By doing so, this chapter highlights how London often fought to restrain the president’s promotion of human rights for a mixture of reasons predicated upon geopolitical assumptions and the need to maintain British commercial interests. All told, the advent of the Carter administration created considerable unease in British policy making circles.

Conclusion

When analysing the Anglo-American relationship during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, it is evident that disagreement between the two countries on a number of international topics of mutual interest was a prominent aspect of the relationship. Many of these differences can be explained by virtue of the fact that the United States was a global power and the United Kingdom was simply not. As one author has suggested, ‘Small powers have a whole set of different priorities in their foreign policies than great powers.’...

The End of Détente

With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, superpower détente broke down. With it came a hardening of U.S. foreign policy towards Moscow. Efforts to implement a series of sanctions against Moscow are explored within this chapter and highlights how London decided to protect its narrow commercial interests against the wishes of Washington. This chapter also surveys Anglo-American cooperation and competition as it pertained to the boycott of the 1980 summer Olympic games, the Iranian hostage situation and the Trident nuclear weapons agreement between London and Washington.

Stresses and Strains

By 1978, Carter’s foreign policy was in a state of flux. Unsure of how to promote arms limitations agreements with the Soviet Union, balance the energy and economics difficulties that the United States, as well as tackle his increasingly difficult NATO allies, the president looked towards London and the government of James Callaghan for assistance. Carter found a willing partner in Callaghan but as this chapter demonstrates, there were considerable limits to just how useful London could prove in a time of economic malaise and decreased international power.

Thatcher Comes to Power

Margaret Thatcher’s coming to power threatened to bring with a radically different British foreign policy. In her public speeches prior to assuming office she had spoken about how superpower détente was akin to a policy of appeasement and should be abandoned. Her Conservative Party manifesto of 1979 hinted that the Anglo-American agreement on Rhodesia should be dropped and the Salisbury Accords accepted as a basis of a political solution in Rhodesia. Washington was troubled by Thatcher’s likely foreign policy trajectory. This chapter explores this first crucial year of Thatcher’s premiership and her handling of the Anglo-American relationship.

Introduction

In Britain we know how much we owe to America. We understand how close our countries are. America’s cause is, and always will be, our cause.1 We share a lot in common. Although our cars, or our automobiles, may drive on opposite sides of the highway, our people generally move in the same direction. And we share, or at least attempt to share, a common language. Sometimes we don’t succeed. But in the most important things, we do see issues and ideas, challenges, hopes, and expectations in the same way....

Embracing the Special Relationship, 1977–8

This chapter surveys the first year of Carter’s handling of the Anglo-American relationship. The new president brought a bold agenda to both foreign relations and to the Anglo-American relationship as he sought to bring about a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia as well as solve the “Troubles” inside Northern Ireland. Such efforts created difficulties with London, not least as both sides had competing ideas as to how best to balance concerns with morality and pragmatism in settling this questions. This chapter also demonstrates how the institutional aspects of the special relationship, those concerned with nuclear and intelligence cooperation continued to be maintained.