Prudential Normativity

Dear Prudence ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 167-188
Author(s):  
Guy Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Prudential Value

In earlier chapters, it was argued that prudential discourse is normative, like moral discourse. If that is true, then we should expect to be able to take resources from metaethics and fruitfully apply them to meta-prudential questions and vice versa. This chapter tries to do precisely that. In particular, it aims to show how various long-standing debates about prudential value can be enhanced by importing ideas from metaethics and how bringing these two lines of inquiry together generates a number of significant benefits both inside and outside of theorizing about prudential normativity.

Prudential Normativity, Moral Scepticisms, and Metaethics

Dear Prudence ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Guy Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Moral Debate ◽  
Companions In Guilt ◽  
Moral Scepticism

In earlier chapters it was argued that prudential value gives agents normative, prudential reasons and that prudential judgements are normative judgements on a par with moral judgements. This chapter spells out some ramifications of these theses by examining four different areas of inquiry about morality and moral discourse, showing how the theses hitherto defended in this book affect them. It begins with the form of moral scepticism found within the ‘why be moral?’ debate. It then examines hermeneutic moral error theory and proposes a companions-in-guilt argument based on the normativity of prudential discourse. Third, it examines arguments given within the literature on revisionary metaethical views, pointing out and questioning their commitment to prudential justifications. Finally, it is shown how the normativity of prudential properties applies to a central debate about thick concepts, that between reductionists and non-reductionists about such concepts.

scholarly journals Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanya de Villiers-Botha
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Substantive Theory ◽  
Prudential Value

AbstractIn recent attempts to define “harm,” comparative accounts of harm, specifically counterfactual comparative accounts, have been touted as the most promising approaches to defining the concept. Nevertheless, such accounts face serious difficulties. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that non-comparative approaches to defining harm have not been sufficiently explored. I develop such an account and claim that it avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts while not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being, which is taken as a key failing of non-comparative accounts. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse.

scholarly journals Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-38
Author(s):  
Tanya de Villiers-Botha
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Substantive Theory ◽  
Prudential Value

AbstractIn recent attempts to define “harm,” comparative accounts of harm, specifically counterfactual comparative accounts, have been touted as the most promising approaches to defining the concept. Nevertheless, such accounts face serious difficulties. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that non-comparative approaches to defining harm have not been sufficiently explored. I develop such an account and claim that it avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts while not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being, which is taken as a key failing of non-comparative accounts. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse.

Sin or Slim?

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-109
Author(s):  
Hannah Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Cultural Knowledge ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Unhealthy Lifestyle ◽  
Women's Bodies ◽  
Lifestyle Choices ◽  
Popular Knowledge ◽  
Behavioural Condition ◽  
Fat Bodies ◽  
Theological Language

Is fat a sin? Popular ‘knowledge’ about obesity which frames fat as an avoidable behavioural condition would certainly suggest it can be blamed on the fat person. Discourses of health reproduced within public policy and media reporting assist in the pathologization of fat bodies, insisting that fat is the result of unhealthy lifestyle choices. It is, however, not simply medical interpretations of fat that facilitate this moral discourse. Religion also provides an important source of moral judgment. This paper draws on my qualitative research inside a UK secular, commercial slimming group to consider how the Christian moral language of sin functions within this setting to construct a politics of choice that holds the dieter personally responsible for her fat. Interpreting weight loss and weight gain as a measure of moral character, this theological language assists in the operation of ‘normative conformity’, conforming women’s bodies to cultural knowledge about fat.

On What Matters

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Previous Treatment ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Normative Naturalism ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Way ◽  
What Matters

This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity.

scholarly journals Remnant and the New Dark Age

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 372
Author(s):  
Edward Rommen
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
The Past ◽  
Personal Opinion

A new dark age has come upon us; as a result, Christianity and its churches in North America are no longer growing. One reason for this might be the widespread impression that Christians are hypocrites, saying they believe one thing while doing the opposite. However, that accusation would only be true if these believers actually believed the principles they are supposed to be violating. It is more likely that many Christians have, like those around them, abandoned truth in favor of personal opinion bringing moral discourse to a near standstill and intensifying the darkness by extinguishing the light of truth. Still, there is hope. In the past, it often was a faithful few, a remnant, who preserved the knowledge of that light and facilitated a new dawn. History shows us that the very movements that are today abdicating responsibility were once spiritual survivors themselves. They withdrew, coalesced around the remaining spark of truth in order to remember, preserve, and reignite. The thoughts and practices of these pioneers could guide the escape from today’s darkness.

Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Individual Good ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Good For

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?

An Analysis of Prudential Value

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Relationship

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.

Prostitution Regulation and Restriction: Dutch Dual Policy 1911–1949

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-130
Author(s):  
Mariëlle Kleijn
Keyword(s):  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Sex Industry ◽  
Colonial Policy ◽  
Mother Country ◽  
Long Term Consequences

This article explores the reasons and strategies behind the import of women for the sex industry in the Dutch Antilles, while in the mother country prostitution was restricted. It will show that the cultural justification claim was used to mask economic reasons to regulate prostitution. I also look at the long-term consequences of this policy. This article ties in with debates on migration and colonial policy regarding the regulation of sexuality built on a racist and moral discourse.

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