Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes the argument and assesses potential for future cultural conflicts in world politics. Cultural and political divides come from different sources, but in times of acute interstate competition culture and politics tend to reinforce each other, exacerbating international tensions. Future competition for values is not likely to take the form of a new Cold War yet the intense rivalry for power and rules means a continuous culture wars in world politics. Russia is not doomed to be the United States’ Dark Double. US-Russia relations may gradually become less dependent on presenting each other as potential ideological threats if the two nations learn to reframe bilateral relations in value-free terms.

Russia Fights Back

The chapter argues that Russia is partly responsible for its hostile perception by the US media. The Kremlin’s actions, including laws preventing gays and lesbians from speaking publicly, criminal trials against some of government’s critics, corruption, election falsifications, and assertive foreign policy, have contributed to such perceptions. The issue is the proportion and nuances of such criticism. The chapter assesses US media presentations as distortions of reality and questions the prudence of presenting other nations’ values as fundamentally threatening to those of America, particularly when they do not result in egregious examples of violence. The chapter also discusses Russia’s reactions to its presentation in the United States and argues that Russia’s anti-Americanism is reactive and dependent on pressure from the United States.

American “Universal” Values and Russia

Chapter 3 describes in greater detail the Russia discourse in American mainstream media. It identifies four media narratives of Russia—“transition to democracy” (1991–1995), “chaos” (1995–2005), “neo-Soviet autocracy” (2005–2013), and “foreign enemy” (since 2014). The space for debating Russia in the media has narrowed considerably since the mid-2000s, when Russia’s political system began to be viewed as a nondemocratic and increasingly anti-Western regime. Russia’s values were now viewed as incompatible with and inferior to those of the United States, which rendered relations with the Kremlin difficult, if not impossible. In the 2010s, US officials adopted this view partly from media influence and partly out of their own frustration with the Kremlin’s policies.

Russophobia in the Age of Donald Trump

The chapter extends the argument about media and value conflict between Russia and the United States to the age of Donald Trump. The new value conflict is assessed as especially acute and exacerbated by the US partisan divide. The Russia issue became central because it reflected both political partisanship and the growing value division between Trump voters and the liberal establishment. In addition to explaining the new wave of American Russophobia, the chapter analyzes Russia’s own role and motives. The media are likely to continue the ideological and largely negative coverage of Russia, especially if Washington and Moscow fail to develop a pragmatic form of cooperation.

Fears of Russia, Suppressed and Revealed

The chapter discusses national fears and the role of media in the context of the United States’ views of Russia. It develops a framework for understanding the US perception and describes fears of Russia in the media as rooted in substantive differences between national visions of the American dream and the Russian Idea and polarizing political discourses stemming from tensions in the two countries’ relations. The chapter further analyzes the role of US government and explains its ability to influence media perception of Russia after the Cold War by setting the agenda, signaling the appropriate tone and frames of coverage, and directly engaging with the general public.

Values and Media in US-Russia Relations

The chapter introduces the topic of the US-Russia relationship for understanding the role of values and media in cooperation and conflict between nations. These relations reflect nationwide beliefs as accentuated and radicalized by different media systems. Western nations have built competitive political systems with checks and balances and popular elections of public officials, whereas many non-Western societies, including Russia, have relied on a highly centralized authority of the executive. Over the last thirty years, US-Russia relations in the realm of values went full circle from confrontation between “communism” and “capitalism” under the Cold War to convergence, growing divergence, and then a return to confrontation that a number of observers view as a new cold war. These changes should be explained by the media’s ethnocentrism and interstate tensions that were construed by the media as challenging dominant national values.