Managing Liability Risk in the Office Laboratory-Reply

JAMA ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 257 (6) ◽  
pp. 778
Author(s):  
Richard Belsey
Keyword(s):  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Farlee

ABSTRACT: Disclosure and monitoring policy are studied, where disclosure relates to information about the monitoring system. A moral hazard model is presented where employee monitoring occurs with some exogenous probability and the owner privately learns whether he will be monitoring before the employee chooses his productive action. Disclosure policy is an owner choice between revealing to the employee whether he will be monitoring before the action (Disclosure) or remaining silent (Secrecy). The results rely on the joint presence of risk aversion and limited liability. Risk aversion creates an efficiency/risk tradeoff where secrecy obtains risk-sharing benefits. Limited liability reduces these benefits, allowing preference for disclosure. Lower monitoring probabilities increase the risk premium required to obtain effort with secrecy. For small monitoring probabilities, disclosure is preferred even though less efficient production is achieved, because disclosure provides a greater risk-sharing benefit. For high monitoring probabilities, secrecy is preferred because it leads to greater efficiency despite a greater risk premium.


Orthopedics ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 919-920
Author(s):  
Robert E Booth

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Haffke

Purpose Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) carry out day-to-day anti-money laundering (AML) tasks while directors ultimately remain responsible for AML compliance. Therefore, directors’ expectations of what their MLROs do should ideally coincide with what their actual tasks to minimise liability risk. This paper aims to test for gaps between MLROs and their directors in terms of knowledge, expectations and performance of AML tasks. Likewise, it is researched whether MLROs and directors communicate well with regard to MLROs’ tasks. Design/methodology/approach This paper first develops a model for analysing the dyadic relationship between MLROs and their directors, based on the audit expectation-performance gap. Second, a paired electronic survey of MLROs and directors of German companies was conducted in autumn 2020, testing for participants’ knowledge, expectations and performance of possible AML tasks (n = 136 pairs). Findings While there is no knowledge or performance gap among MLROs and directors, expectations among them are partially unreasonable and their communication needs to be improved. Additionally, this study suggests that MLROs of German non-financial businesses are less knowledgeable, perform AML duties more poorly, and communicate less effectively with their directors. Practical implications Training of MLROs and communication with their directors need to be improved. Especially in the non-financial sector, action is urgently required. Originality/value This paper reports the results of the first paired survey of MLROs and their directors, offering unique insights into their relationship and the status of private AML efforts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 94-113
Author(s):  
Louise Marie Roth

This chapter analyzes changes over time in early-term births. Labor induction rates have risen over time and many experts speculate that at least half of inductions are elective. Popular accounts suggest that pregnant women are driving this by requesting inductions. Healthcare providers are also part of the story because they can refuse women’s requests, but hospitals and OB/GYN practices benefit enormously from scheduling births even though they pose medical risks. Analyses of early-term births in low-risk pregnancies reveal that providers are more likely to take unnecessary risks in states with tort reforms that limit their liability risk. This effect was strongest during the period before 2009, when the strength of professional recommendations against early elective induction had eroded.


2021 ◽  
pp. 150-188
Author(s):  
Louise Marie Roth

This chapter examines the effects of malpractice on cesarean deliveries in light of historical trends and changes in the standard of care. Nearly one third of births in the US involve a cesarean delivery, and cesareans are usually the first thing that people think about when they think about defensive obstetric medicine. While some popular accounts attribute the rise in cesareans to women’s requests, most maternity care providers and public health experts are skeptical of the idea that “choice” is driving the trend. This chapter highlights the ways that providers respond to three types of risk when they do cesarean deliveries: medical risk, iatrogenic risk, and legal risk. A culture of malpractice fear encourages obstetricians to prioritize legal risk, and they know that patients are more likely to sue them for not doing a cesarean than for doing an unnecessary one. Providers also described expedience, organizational efficiency, and changes in medical training as important causes of medically questionable cesareans. Analyses reveal that the odds of a cesarean are higher in states where providers face more liability risk, but the effect is extremely small. Professional guidelines, which changed over time, also mediate this effect.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document