scholarly journals A Behavioral Framework for Information Representation in the Brain

Author(s):  
Frédéric Alexandre
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe G. Schyns ◽  
Robin A.A. Ince

AbstractA fundamental challenge in neuroscience is to understand how the brain processes information. Neuroscientists have approached this question partly by measuring brain activity in space, time and at different levels of granularity. However, our aim is not to discover brain activity per se, but to understand the processing of information that this activity reflects. To make this brain-activity-to-information leap, we believe that we should reconsider brain imaging from the methodological foundations of psychology. With this goal in mind, we have developed a new data-driven framework, called Stimulus Information Representation (SIR), that enables us to better understand how the brain processes information from measures of brain activity and behavioral responses. In this article, we explain this approach, its strengths and limitations, and how it can be applied to understand how the brain processes information to perform behavior in a task.“It is no good poking around in the brain without some idea of what one is looking for. That would be like trying to find a needle in a haystack without having any idea what needles look like. The theorist is the [person] who might reasonably be asked for [their] opinion about the appearance of needles.” HC Longuet-Higgins, 1969.


eNeuro ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. ENEURO.0533-19.2020
Author(s):  
Michael G. Müller ◽  
Christos H. Papadimitriou ◽  
Wolfgang Maass ◽  
Robert Legenstein

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaia Tavoni ◽  
Ulisse Ferrari ◽  
Francesco Paolo Battaglia ◽  
Simona Cocco ◽  
Rémi Monasson

Cell assemblies are thought to be the units of information representation in the brain, yet their detection from experimental data is arduous. Here, we propose to infer effective coupling networks and model distributions for the activity of simultaneously recorded neurons in prefrontal cortex, during the performance of a decision-making task, and during preceding and following sleep epochs. Our approach, inspired from statistical physics, allows us to define putative cell assemblies as the groups of co-activated neurons in the models of the three recorded epochs. It reveals the existence of task-related changes of the effective couplings between the sleep epochs. The assemblies which strongly coactivate during the task epoch are found to replay during subsequent sleep, in correspondence to the changes of the inferred network. Across sessions, a variety of different network scenarios is observed, providing insight in cell assembly formation and replay.


2022 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inês Hipólito

This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must literally exist the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). Computational models are important tools to test a theory about how the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) has been generated. While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally entail the properties construed in the model (e.g., information, representation). While this is an assumption present in computationalist accounts, it is not held across the board in neuroscience. In the last section, the paper offers a dynamical account of neurocognitive activity with Dynamical Causal Modelling (DCM) that combines dynamical systems theory (DST) mathematical formalisms with the theoretical contextualisation provided by Embodied and Enactive Cognitive Science (EECS).


2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1799) ◽  
pp. 20190705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe G. Schyns ◽  
Jiayu Zhan ◽  
Rachael E. Jack ◽  
Robin A. A. Ince

The information contents of memory are the cornerstone of the most influential models in cognition. To illustrate, consider that in predictive coding, a prediction implies that specific information is propagated down from memory through the visual hierarchy. Likewise, recognizing the input implies that sequentially accrued sensory evidence is successfully matched with memorized information (categorical knowledge). Although the existing models of prediction, memory, sensory representation and categorical decision are all implicitly cast within an information processing framework, it remains a challenge to precisely specify what this information is, and therefore where , when and how the architecture of the brain dynamically processes it to produce behaviour. Here, we review a framework that addresses these challenges for the studies of perception and categorization–stimulus information representation (SIR). We illustrate how SIR can reverse engineer the information contents of memory from behavioural and brain measures in the context of specific cognitive tasks that involve memory. We discuss two specific lessons from this approach that generally apply to memory studies: the importance of task, to constrain what the brain does, and of stimulus variations, to identify the specific information contents that are memorized, predicted, recalled and replayed. This article is part of the Theo Murphy meeting issue ‘Memory reactivation: replaying events past, present and future’.


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