Rock-Paper-Scissors: Mixed Strategies in Zero-Sum Games

2018 ◽  
pp. 147-160
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Zero Sum

Mixed Strategies for Hierarchical Zero-Sum Games

2001 ◽  
pp. 65-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lina Mallozzi ◽  
Jacqueline Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Zero Sum

Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (03) ◽  
pp. 1750013 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. V. Baskov
Keyword(s):  
Finite Automata ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Computational Capacity ◽  
Zero Sum

We propose a generalization of the notion of bounded computational capacity equilibrium in repeated zero-sum games played by finite automata. We show that if the players’ mixed strategies are to contain automata of the same size, the equilibrium in our sense does not exist in general, and if the players are allowed to mix automata of different sizes, the equilibrium in our sense always exists.

Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1141-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Ordeshook
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Optimal Policies ◽  
Optimal Allocations ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Pareto Optimal Allocations

The core of welfare economics consists of the proof that, for certain classes of goods, perfectly competitive markets are efficient in that they provide Pareto optimal allocations of these goods. In this paper, the efficiency of competitive elections is examined. Elections are modeled as two-candidate zero-sum games, and three kinds of equilibria for such games are identified: pure, risky, and mixed strategies. It is shown, however, that regardless of which kind of equilibrium prevails, if candidates adopt equilibrium strategies, an election is efficient in the sense that the candidates advocate Pareto optimal policies. But one caveat to this analysis is that while an election is Pareto optimal, citizens can unanimously prefer markets to elections as a mechanism for selecting future policies.

scholarly journals The 3P Challenge: A Serious Game for Reflecting on Partnership in Public-Private Concessions

2020 ◽  
pp. 1087724X2098158
Author(s):  
Camilo Benitez-Avila ◽  
Andreas Hartmann ◽  
Geert Dewulf
Keyword(s):  
Process Management ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Serious Game ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Mixed Group ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Zero Sum

Process management literature is skeptical about creating legitimacy and a sense of partnership when implementing concessional Public-Private Partnerships. Within such organizational arrangements, managerial interaction often resembles zero-sum games. To explore the possibility to (re)create a sense of partnership in concessional PPPs, we developed the “3P challenge” serious game. Two gaming sessions with a mixed group of practitioners and a team of public project managers showed that the game cycle recreates adversarial situations where players can enact contractual obligations with higher or lower levels of subjectivity. When reflecting on the gaming experience, practitioners point out that PPP contracts can be creatively enacted by managers who act as brokers of diverse interests. While becoming aware of each other stakes they can blend contractual dispositions or place brackets around some contractual clauses for reaching agreement. By doing so, they can (re)create a sense of partnership, clarity, and fairness of the PPP contract.

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