Scalable Algorithms for Identifying Stealthy Attackers in a Game‐Theoretic Framework Using Deception

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Anjon Basak ◽  
Charles A. Kamhoua ◽  
Sridhar Venkatesan ◽  
Marcus Gutierrez ◽  
Ahmed H. Anwar ◽  
...  
2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.


2018 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
O. Yu. Bondarenko

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.


2012 ◽  
Vol E95.B (10) ◽  
pp. 3345-3348
Author(s):  
Jiamin LI ◽  
Dongming WANG ◽  
Pengcheng ZHU ◽  
Lan TANG ◽  
Xiaohu YOU

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