Royal Bank of Canada (Montreal, Quebec)

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 326-326
Keyword(s):  
Bank Of Canada

scholarly journals Identifying a policymaker's target: an application to the Bank of Canada

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Rowe ◽  
James Yetman
Keyword(s):  
Bank Of Canada

National Bank of Canada

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-323
Keyword(s):  
Bank Of Canada ◽  
National Bank

scholarly journals “WAIT-AND-SEE” MONETARY POLICY

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 1793-1814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaowen Lei ◽  
Michael C. Tseng
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Taylor Rule ◽  
Adjustment Costs ◽  
Optimal Timing ◽  
Bank Of Canada ◽  
Wait And See ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
Better Than

This paper develops a model of the optimal timing of interest rate changes. With fixed adjustment costs and ongoing uncertainty, changing the interest rate involves the exercise of an option. Optimal policy therefore has a “wait-and-see” component, which can be quantified using option pricing techniques. We show that increased uncertainty makes the central bank more reluctant to change its target interest rate, and argue that this helps explain recent observed deviations from the Taylor Rule. An optimal wait-and-see policy fits the target interest rates of the Fed and Bank of Canada better than the Taylor Rule.

Monetary Policy, Accountability and Legitimacy: A Review of the Issues in Canada

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Business Community ◽  
Working Relationships ◽  
Policy Network ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Bank Of Canada ◽  
Governing System ◽  
Implementation Of Monetary Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The One

AbstractMonetary policy in Canada is formulated and implemented in a state-directed policy network dominated by the Bank of Canada. State-directed networks embody a tension between democratic accountability and legitimacy on the one side and maintaining support from the business community on the other. This article assesses this tension in Canadian monetary policy, focussing on the relationships between the Bank of Canada and other actors. As a central bank, the Bank of Canada possesses a unique constitutional status, being tied to the government through a directive power of the minister of finance. The Bank has also developed close working relationships with financial institutions for the implementation of monetary policy. In reviewing these relationships, the article identifies problems related to the Bank's political accountability and its ability to maintain legitimacy. The article then reviews some reforms that might address these problems: making the Bank more independent, subjecting it to closer control by the minister of finance and endowing it with a council-based internal governing system.

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