scholarly journals DCCmutation update: Congenital mirror movements, isolated agenesis of the corpus callosum, and developmental split brain syndrome

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley P. L. Marsh ◽  
Timothy J. Edwards ◽  
Charles Galea ◽  
Helen M. Cooper ◽  
Elizabeth C. Engle ◽  
...  
Neurology ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 91 (9) ◽  
pp. e886-e887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy J. Edwards ◽  
Ashley P.L. Marsh ◽  
Paul J. Lockhart ◽  
Linda J. Richards ◽  
Richard J. Leventer

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (29) ◽  
pp. 5589-5603
Author(s):  
Giulia Avvenuti ◽  
Giacomo Handjaras ◽  
Monica Betta ◽  
Jacinthe Cataldi ◽  
Laura Sophie Imperatori ◽  
...  

1995 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Metcalfe ◽  
Margaret Funnell ◽  
Michael S. Gazzaniga

Six experiments explored hemispheric memory differences in a patient who had undergone complete corpus callosum resection The right hemisphere was better able than the left to reject new events similar to originally presented materials of several types, including abstract visual forms, faces, and categorized lists of words Although the left hemisphere is capable of mental manipulation, imagination, semantic priming, and complex language production, these functions are apparently linked to memory confusions—confusions less apparent in the more literal right hemisphere Differences between the left and right hemispheres in memory for new schematically consistent or categorically related events may provide a source of information allowing people to distinguish between what they actually witnessed and what they only inferred


1981 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Puccetti

AbstractContrary to received opinion among philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, conscious duality as a principle of brain organization is neither incoherent nor demonstrably false. The present paper begins by reviewing the history of the theory and its anatomical basis and defending it against the claim that it rests upon an arbitrary decision as to what constitutes the biological substratum of mind or person.It then moves on to provide a dynamic model for double consciousness in vertebrate brain organization, giving an evolutionary account that explains why, although each of the two cerebral hemispheres benefits from sensory input from the other for representation of the ipsilateral half of corporeal and extracorporeal space, it was important that conscious experience be confined to each rather than spanning the two. This interhemispheric duplication effect for sensory representation has been known for years but hitherto considered mysterious, or ignored on grounds that integration must be achieved at a higher level of processing.The paper then attempts to resolve a puzzle about split-brain patients in testing situations, namely why it is that in spite of the speaking hemisphere's denial of any independent perception and agency in the mute hemisphere, which would explain its role in cross-cuing, the latter never seems to resent this, but instead continues to be cooperative and helpful. It is suggested that on the hypothesis of mental duality this is understandable, for the nonverbal hemisphere would have known prior to the surgery that it is not generating linguistic behavior.Finally, the essay examines two kinds of bitemporal defects, one due to callosal and the other to chiasmal disruptions. On the present theory a bitemporal defect should be demonstrable in the former case when both eyes are open, because in the absence of a corpus callosum and other forebrain commissures the interhemispheric duplication effect is abolished; in the latter case interhemispheric duplication is preserved, and so the defect should be demonstrable only by testing each eye independently. This is indeed what the evidence indicates, so it appears that, contrary to the prevalent view, the function of the corpus callosum is not to integrate and unify conscious experience between the hemispheres but to duplicate this, in accord with the model of mental duality.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Schechter

The largest fiber tract in the human brain is the corpus callosum, which connects the two cerebral hemispheres. A number of surgeries severing this structure were performed on adults in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. After they are surgically separated from each other in this way, a “split-brain” subject’s hemispheres begin to operate unusually independently of each other in the realms of perception, cognition, and the control of action—almost as if each had a mind of its own. But can a mere hemisphere really see? Speak? Feel? Know what it has done? The split-brain cases raise questions of psychological identity: How many subjects of experience are there within a split-brain subject? How many persons? How many minds? Under experimental conditions, split-brain subjects often act as though they were animated by two distinct conscious beings, evoking the duality intuition. On the other hand, a split-brain subject seems like one of us—not like two of us sharing one body. Split-brain subjects thus also evoke the unity intuition.This book is devoted to reconciling these two apparently opposing intuitions. The key to doing so are facts about the way self-consciousness operates in split-brain subjects. A split-brain subject is composed of two conscious psychological beings that fail to recognize each other’s existence and indeed cannot distinguish themselves from each other. Instead, each must first-personally identify with the split-brain subject as a whole, and in so doing, the two make themselves into one person.


2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
T Fuchs ◽  
I Körte ◽  
B Kirmess ◽  
S Berweck ◽  
M Kiel ◽  
...  

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