OTHER MINDS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFIABILITY (1951)

2006 ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
ALFONS KEUPINK ◽  
SANFORD SHIEH
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds

Skill-based engagement with a rich landscape of affordances as an alternative to thinking through other minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Erik Rietveld
Keyword(s):  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Middle Way ◽  
Internalist Account

Abstract Veissière and colleagues make a valiant attempt at reconciling an internalist account of implicit cultural learning with an externalist account that understands social behaviour in terms of its environment-involving dynamics. However, unfortunately the author's attempt to forge a middle way between internalism and externalism fails. We argue their failure stems from the overly individualistic understanding of the perception of cultural affordances they propose.

Other Bodies, Other Minds

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Oatley
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds

Reflections on taoist views of "other minds": Toward a theory of anti-culture

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantine Hriskos ◽  
Hong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds

Einfühlen und Verstehen

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-243
Author(s):  
Verena Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Many

How do we understand other minds? The current debate uses the iridescent term “empathy” to explain our quite different mindreading capacities. Since no alternatives seemed to be available the discussion has been mostly in a deadlock between “simulation theory” and “theory theory”. Only recently the relevance of phenomenological findings on the issue has been brought forward. In this paper Husserl’s two concepts of “Einfühlung”, as developed in the second volume of his Ideas, are set against the background of the latest discussion. Husserl’s explanation of empathy in terms of analogical experience highlights the transcendental role of empathy in the context of constitution. At the same time it may solve some of the many riddles left by the recent debate.

Literalism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carrie Figdor
Keyword(s):  
Initial Response ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Additional Argument ◽  
Contemporary Science

Chapter 4 elaborates and provides an initial defense of Literalism. Updated versions of the inference to the best explanation argument for other minds provide a familiar framework for thinking about the plausibility of Literalism, as well as an additional argument for it as the default interpretation of the predicates as they are used in contemporary science. The chapter articulates what Literalism does not claim and what would falsify it. It also presents a series of initial objections to Literalism by means of a dialogue between the Literalist and an imaginary interlocutor, the Implicit Scare Quoter. The ISQ represents the broad range of intuitive objections to Literalism that follow from the initial response that the uses involve implicit scare quotes, indicating an implicit difference in meaning. The dialogue shows the strength of the Literal position in response to common objections.

Austin’s Critical Method

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds ◽  
Critical Method ◽  
Consensus View ◽  
Proper Account

Begins with Barry Stroud’s reconstruction of Descartes’s dream argument; lays out the critique of the argument that emerges from what Austin wrote in “Other Minds”; describes the long-standing consensus on how, and why, Austin’s way with skepticism goes wrong; shows how poorly this consensus view, of why Austin wrote as he did, fits with what Austin said about why he wrote as he did; explains how Austin’s requirement, that our epistemology be faithful to what we would ordinarily say and do, is properly to be understood, and why he endorsed it; defends Austin’s fidelity requirement against the charge that it fails to take proper account of (i) our failure to agree on what we would ordinarily say, (ii) the pragmatic factors that influence what we ordinarily say, (iii) the attitude of philosophical detachment with which epistemology is conducted, and (iv) the role intuitions play in epistemology.

Our Knowledge of Other Minds

1939 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-317
Author(s):  
C. D. Hardie
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document