How to Deal with the Free Will Issue: The Roles of Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Science

Author(s):  
Mario De Caro
2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.


Author(s):  
Sukron Kamil

The relation between Islam and modernity as modern civilization is frequently faced contradiction. The disclaimer of a secular state for instance, leads to the debate by which the articulation of some Muslims who reject it is much more than those who accept it. Another example is humanism such as religious freedom and capitalism, although the disclaimers of these two issues are softer than those who denied the nation-state. However, the conceptual analysis points out that Islam is compatible with modernity as modern civilization. The main reason is that Islam was first emerged as a critic against the previous religion that was not engage the social transformation for the Arab society before Islam. Islam is also encouraged contemporary thought and social reform with the concept of ishlah (reform) and tajdid (renewal). If this case is measured based on the dimension of modernity, it obvious that Islam Islam as a teaching/conceptual frame/mindset in this article does not have conflict with it. Islam is in line with the nation state, secular country or secularism itself, democracy as political system, rationalism and empirical science, and capitalism. This paper is expected to strengthen the Integration of Islam as society with the modernity as modern civilization in the East and West countries.


Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer

Chapter 8 argues that neo-positivists can endorse scientistic views of conceptual-analysis questions—i.e., questions like ‘What is free will?’, ‘What is a person?’, and so on. Very roughly, scientism about a question Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some aspect of physical reality. This chapter argues for scientism about conceptual-analysis questions by arguing that these questions are completely settled by physical-empirical facts about us—in particular, by psychological facts about what we mean by our words. This is an important part of the neo-positivist argument; for in connection with almost all metaphysical questions, one of the main subquestions that neo-positivists need to address is (or is something like) a conceptual-analysis question. So if neo-positivists can endorse scientistic views of all conceptual-analysis questions, then this simplifies things for them considerably (it makes it much easier for them to motivate neo-positivist views of specific metaphysical questions).


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.


1994 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. A. Sappington
Keyword(s):  

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Boag
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno G. Breitmeyer
Keyword(s):  

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