Conceptual Analysis

Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer

Chapter 8 argues that neo-positivists can endorse scientistic views of conceptual-analysis questions—i.e., questions like ‘What is free will?’, ‘What is a person?’, and so on. Very roughly, scientism about a question Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some aspect of physical reality. This chapter argues for scientism about conceptual-analysis questions by arguing that these questions are completely settled by physical-empirical facts about us—in particular, by psychological facts about what we mean by our words. This is an important part of the neo-positivist argument; for in connection with almost all metaphysical questions, one of the main subquestions that neo-positivists need to address is (or is something like) a conceptual-analysis question. So if neo-positivists can endorse scientistic views of all conceptual-analysis questions, then this simplifies things for them considerably (it makes it much easier for them to motivate neo-positivist views of specific metaphysical questions).

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.


BIODIK ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-331
Author(s):  
Iman Ridwan ◽  
Sri Anggraeni ◽  
Bambang Supriyatno

The student’s worksheet is particularly helpful for students in practical activities to stimulate a whole concept formation that previously had been obtained from either the literature or the delivery of the teacher in the class. This study aims to explain the analyses and trials of several imputations that refer to KTSP curriculum and the 2013 curriculum. The research method used is a quantitative description. The research method used in this study is a quantitative descriptive method. The sample in this study amounts to five student worksheets of the urine tested chosen using an alcoholological sample. The research tools used in this study are the features of conceptual analysis, durations, and knowledge construction, the completeness of the components of the lto-to, and the finder of lt-based vee diagrams adapted from novak and gowin (1984). Research shows that the conceptually student worksheet urine test has not yet contained content and trained competence (knowledge and skills) in accordance with the demands of the 2013 curriculum. Procedurally, the analyzed student’s worksheet of urine tests may be well performed, but it is largely irrelevant to the practical purposes and basic competence demands in the curriculum. From the standpoint of the construction of knowledge, the analysis of student’s worksheet urine test has not helped learners to reconstruct their knowledge in its entirety of concepts, principles, and theories through the various facts that result. Judging from its structure, almost all of student’s worksheet tested of urine tests has the components of a complete vee diagram, though with the difference in quality indicated by the score score of each of the components of the vee diagram. Based on the problems found, the lentine requires reconstruction from the conceptual side, procedural, construction of knowledge, as well as its structure. Abstrak. Lembar Kerja Peserta Didik (LKPD) sangat bermanfaat bagi siswa dalam kegiatan praktikum untuk menstimulasi pembentukan konsep secara utuh yang sebelumnya sudah didapatkan baik dari studi literatur atau penyampaian dari guru di dalam kelas. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan analisis serta uji coba dari beberapa LKPD praktikum yang mengacu pada kurikulum KTSP dan kurikulum 2013. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah deskriptif kuantitatif. Metode penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode deskriptif kuantitatif. Sampel dalam penelitian ini berjumlah 5 LKPD Uji Urin yang dipilih dengan menggunakan teknik purposive sampling. Instrumen penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah rubrik analisis konseptual, prosedural, dan konstruksi pengetahuan, rubrik kelengkapan komponen LKPD, dan rubrik penskoran komponen LKPD berdasarkan Diagram Vee yang diadaptasi dari Novak dan Gowin (1984). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa secara konseptual LKPD Uji Urin yang dianalisis belum memuat konten dan melatih kompetensi (pengetahuan dan keterampilan) yang sesuai dengan tuntutan Kurikulum 2013. Secara prosedural, LKPD Uji Urin yang dianalisis dapat dilaksanakan dengan baik, tetapi sebagian besar belum relevan dengan tujuan praktikum dan tuntutan kompetensi dasar di kurikulum. Dari segi konstruksi pengetahuan, LKPD Uji Urin yang dianalisis belum membantu peserta didik untuk mengonstruksi pengetahuannya secara utuh yang terdiri dari konsep, prinsip, dan teori melalui berbagai fakta yang dihasilkan. Ditinjau dari strukturnya, hampir seluruh LKPD Uji Urin yang dianalisis memiliki komponen Diagram Vee lengkap, meskipun dengan perbedaan kualitas yang ditunjukkan oleh capaian skor dari masing-masing komponen Diagram Vee. Berdasarkan permasalahan-permasalahan yang ditemukan, LKPD Uji Urin memerlukan rekonstruksi dari sisi konseptual, prosedural, konstruksi pengetahuan, maupun strukturnya.


Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer

Chapter 7 explains how the non-factualist views established in the first part of this book fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism. This chapter formulates neo-positivism, explains why neo-positivism isn’t self-refuting, and explains how we could argue for neo-positivism. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view is that every metaphysical question decomposes into subquestions, and in connection with each of these subquestions, we can endorse one of the following three anti-metaphysical views: non-factualism, scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense captured by the Chapter-6 view modal nothingism.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 2047-2062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hisanori Itoh

Abstract The physical reality of the Arctic Oscillation (AO; or northern annular mode) is considered. The data used are mainly the monthly mean sea level pressure (SLP). A schematic figure is first presented to illustrate the relationship between the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO)–Pacific–North American Oscillation (PNA) system and the AO–negative correlation mode between the Atlantic and the Pacific (AO–NCM) system. Although the NAO–PNA (apparent AO–NCM) and true AO–NCM systems give rise to the same EOFs, the probability density functions for the time coefficients of the two leading modes are different. Therefore, the discrimination of the two systems is possible. Several pieces of evidence indicate that, in the real world, the NAO–PNA and the AO–NCM are located on almost the same plane in phase space. This means that the NAO–PNA and AO–NCM systems have the same variations on the plane in common, implying that when the NAO–PNA system is real, the AO–NCM is unlikely to be real. Simple independent component analysis is carried out to distinguish between the true and apparent AO–NCM systems, indicating that the NAO and PNA are independent oscillations, that is, true ones. The analysis is extended to the winter mean SLP field, for which the EOF shows the NAO–PNA but not the AO–NCM. This may be due to the fact that the winter mean NAO and PNA patterns have little spatial correlation. Calculations using randomly selected samples also indicate that when the NAO and PNA patterns have little spatial correlation, the AO never appears as EOF1. All the preceding results show that almost all characteristics of the AO–NCM can be explained from those of the NAO–PNA. Hence it is concluded that the AO, which is extracted by EOF analysis from the temporarily independent but spatially overlapping variations of the NAO and PNA, is almost apparent.


Author(s):  
Tim Bayne

Evil represents the most serious challenge to belief in God. Philosophers of religion typically distinguish between two versions of the problem of evil: the logical and the evidential problem. ‘The problem of evil’ focuses on theists who provide two types of response to the problem without modifying the classical theistic conception of God: defences and theodicies. Almost all responses involve an appeal to the ‘greater good strategy’, including soul-making, natural law, and free will. A very different approach to the problem of evil is the sceptical response, which aims only to make plausible the idea that we can’t tell whether or not the evils of the world are absorbed.


Author(s):  
Roger Penrose ◽  
Martin Gardner

In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.


Author(s):  
Nicolas Gisin

Abstract It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Ghassan el Masri (غسان المصري)

Abstract This paper advances the claim that an investigation into the significance of Qurʾānic terms must consider the semantic etymology of the elements under investigation, especially terms that have developed into technical concepts in Islamic theology and philosophy like the ethical variety investigated in this volume. The present article will give some of the salient reason for this imperative and demonstrate the value of semantic etymology in understanding the anthropological dimensions of theological concepts. Semantic etymology, the practice of uncovering the ‘original’ imposition of a word-thing relation (aṣl al-waḍʿ) by deducing the meaning of a word from the meaning of other words sharing the same lexeme was more than a descriptive linguistic science in the Arab-Islamic tradition. In late antiquity the Greek and Latin science of etymologia, like the Arabic ishtiqāq al-maʿná (later ʿilm al-waḍʿ), was a fully-fledged instrument of conceptual analysis for the reader and a powerful tool of discursive authority for both author and reader. Semantic etymology offers an account, not only of the original word-thing relation, but also the essential nature of the object. In our current moment in the history of philosophy where ‘essences’ and ‘essential qualities’ have lost almost all currency, the article opens the door for a reconsideration of the worth of ‘etymologies’ as sound and useful anthropological and philosophical objects of analysis.


Author(s):  
Keith D. Farnsworth

Using insights from cybernetics and an information-based understanding of biological systems, a precise, scientifically inspired, definition of free-will is offered and the essential requirements for an agent to possess it in principle are set out. These are: a) there must be a self to self-determine; b) there must be a non-zero probability of more than one option being enacted; c) there must be an internal means of choosing among options (which is not merely random, since randomness is not a choice). For (a) to be fulfilled, the agent of self-determination must be organisationally closed (a `Kantian whole'). For (c) to be fulfilled: d) options must be generated from an internal model of the self which can calculate future states contingent on possible responses; e) choosing among these options requires their evaluation using an internally generated goal defined on an objective function representing the overall `master function' of the agent and f) for `deep free-will', at least two nested levels of choice and goal (d-e) must be enacted by the agent. The agent must also be able to enact its choice in physical reality. The only systems known to meet all these criteria are living organisms, not just humans, but a wide range of organisms. The main impediment to free-will in present-day artificial robots, is their lack of being a Kantian whole. Consciousness does not seem to be a requirement and the minimum complexity for a free-will system may be quite low and include relatively simple life-forms that are at least able to learn.


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