FC31-05 - Mental disorder and moral responsibility

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.

Author(s):  
George Graham

The basic claims of the chapter are, first, that mental disorders are not best understood as types of brain disorder, even though mental disorders are based in the brain. And, second, that the difference between the two sorts of disorders can be illuminated by the sorts of treatment or therapy that may work for the one type (a mental disorder) but not for the other type (a brain disorder). In the discussion some of the diagnostic implications and difficulties associated with these two basic claims are outlined.


Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele

The introductory chapter discusses the interdisciplinary project that led to this volume, the ancient beginnings of theoretical work on self-control, and differences in philosophical and psychological approaches to investigating self-control. It also explains the volume’s organization. Part I of the volume addresses a fundamental question: What is self-control and how does it work? The remaining three parts take up, respectively, the following main topics: temptation and goal pursuit; connections between self-control, on the one hand, and morality and law, on the other; and, finally, connections between self-control and other phenomena or concepts, such as empathy, negligence, moral responsibility, and free will. Much of the chapter is based on abstracts written by the authors, summarizing their contributions to this volume.


1990 ◽  
Vol 157 (S9) ◽  
pp. 38-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Lock ◽  
Mohammed T. Abou-Saleh ◽  
Richard H. T. Edwards

Psychiatry's lack of understanding of the pathogenesis of mental disorders has resulted in the attempt, within the antipsychiatry movement, to persuade the world that mental disorder does not exist (Szasz, 1961). Progress towards understanding the underlying biological bases of psychiatric syndromes has been impeded by two factors: (a) a most effective physical barrier – the skull; and (b) dichotomous thinking of structure on the one hand and function on the other.


1887 ◽  
Vol 33 (142) ◽  
pp. 230-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Heimann

Certain therapeutic effects upon the human organism ascribed to cocaine,∗ occasioned me to make use of the drug in suitable cases of psychosis and psycho-neurosis. Stimulant action and exhilaration (Euphoria) on the one hand, and on the other depression of undue sensitiveness, these were the effects I looked for from the alkaloid. Unfortunately, I am able to record scarcely a single case of certain and permanent cure following the use of the drug.


1881 ◽  
Vol 27 (119) ◽  
pp. 384-391
Author(s):  
Alex. Robertson

Physicians who have had experience in doubtful cases of insanity know well how difficult it sometimes is to pronounce decidedly as to the presence or absence of mental unsoundness. On the one hand, the striking differences that are to be met with in intellectual and emotional characteristics within the sphere of mental health, and, on the other, the equally great diversity in the features of the various forms of disordered mind, occasionally render the problem one not easy of solution. Moreover, the decision in such cases often involves serious responsibility. This occurs more particularly when the question arises in relation to grave criminal charges, and where medical opinion is sought to aid in determining if vagaries of conduct and seeming delusions are to be considered evidences of real mental disorder, or are feigned for the purpose of screening the accused from the legitimate penalties of their crimes.


2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Jervis

SUMMARYSeveral discernible trends have changed the outlook of psychiatric resources available to the general public during the last 50 years in Western countries and particularly in Italy. Among these trends, two conflicting issues are here outlined. On the one side, evidence based medicine is the core of a methodological revolution, which asks for a deeper criticism of subjective judgements in clinical matters; on the other side, the study of emotions and attitudes has stressed the outstanding importance of conscious and unconscious expectations both in patients and in caregivers. Moreover, popular psychology has altered the way mental disorder is commonly perceived and treated. A comprehensive way of taking into account these three diverse trends seems to be still lacking.


Author(s):  
Rosaleen Howard

This chapter discusses the working of evidentiality in Quechua narrative performance from the central highlands of Peru. In the Quechua narratives analysed, the grammatical marking of source and status of knowledge, and discursive ways of expressing evidence for knowing what is known, are shown to vary strikingly according to performance related factors. On the one hand, narrators base discursively expressed evidence for knowledge, and the veracity and authenticity of the stories they tell, on lived experience. On the other hand, in Huamalíes Quechua the assertion of knowledge and affirmation of validity are grammatically marked by evidential, epistemic modality, and tense suffixes. Taken together, the performative dimensions of discursively expressed evidence, and grammatical choices around evidentiality, constitute the epistemological underpinning of stories about the past in Huamalíes Quechua; both are taken into account in the mixed methods approach to the analysis of Quechua narrative adopted here.


2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefaan E. Cuypers ◽  
Ishtiyaque Haji

Liberals champion the view that promoting autonomy — seeing to it that our children develop into individuals who are self-governing in the conduct of their lives — is a vital aim of education, though one generally accredited as being subsidiary to well-being. Our prime goal in this article is to provide a partial validation of this liberal ideal against the backdrop of a freedom-sensitive attitudinal hedonism — our favored life-ranking axiology.We propose that there is a pivotal connection between the concept of maximizing well-being and another concept central in the philosophy of education and in the literature on free agency: the concept of our springs of action, such as our desires or beliefs, being `truly our own' or, alternatively, autonomous. We suggest that it is the freedom that moral responsibility requires that bridges the overarching aim of securing well-being, on the one hand, and the subsidiary aim of promoting autonomy, on the other.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Shauna Marie Bowes ◽  
scott lilienfeld

Philosophers have long speculated that authoritarianism and belief in determinism are functionally related. To evaluate this hypothesis, we assessed whether authoritarianism and allied personality and political variables predict varieties of belief in determinism in three community samples (N1 = 566 to 20,010; N2 = 500; N3 = 419). Authoritarianism and allied variables manifested moderate to large positive correlations with both fatalistic and genetic determinism beliefs. Controlling for political conservatism did not meaningfully attenuate these relations. Further, openness was negatively related to fatalistic determinism beliefs and agreeableness was negatively related to genetic determinism beliefs. Taken together, our findings clarify the nature of relations between authoritarianism and general personality, on the one hand, and free will/determinism beliefs, on the other, and suggest intriguing intersections between worldviews and personality traits.


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