scholarly journals Belief Revision in the Situation Calculus Without Plausibility Levels

2006 ◽  
pp. 504-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Demolombe ◽  
Pilar Pozos Parra
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Situation Calculus

scholarly journals Belief revision and projection in the epistemic situation calculus

2017 ◽  
Vol 251 ◽  
pp. 62-97
Author(s):  
Christoph Schwering ◽  
Gerhard Lakemeyer ◽  
Maurice Pagnucco
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Situation Calculus ◽  
Epistemic Situation

Changing Beliefs about Domain Dynamics in the Situation Calculus

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toryn Q. Klassen ◽  
Sheila A. McIlraith ◽  
Hector J. Levesque
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Situation Calculus ◽  
Action Effects ◽  
The World ◽  
Domain Dynamics

Agents change their beliefs about the plausibility of various aspects of domain dynamics -- effects of physical actions, results of sensing, and action preconditions -- as a consequence of their interactions with the world. In this paper we propose a way to conveniently represent domain dynamics in the situation calculus to support such belief change. Furthermore, we suggest patterns to follow when writing the axioms that describe the effects of actions, and prove how these patterns can control the extent to which observations change the agent's beliefs about action effects. We also discuss the relation of our work to the AGM postulates for belief revision. Finally, we show how beliefs about domain dynamics can be incorporated into a form of regression rewriting to support reasoning.

Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision.

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2319-2332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Hagá ◽  
Kristina R. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Learning Perceptions

Dyadic Obligations over Complex Actions as Deontic Constraints in the Situation Calculus

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Claßen ◽  
James Delgrande
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Situation Calculus ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Planning Techniques ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Reasoning About Action ◽  
The Given

With the advent of artificial agents in everyday life, it is important that these agents are guided by social norms and moral guidelines. Notions of obligation, permission, and the like have traditionally been studied in the field of Deontic Logic, where deontic assertions generally refer to what an agent should or should not do; that is they refer to actions. In Artificial Intelligence, the Situation Calculus is (arguably) the best known and most studied formalism for reasoning about action and change. In this paper, we integrate these two areas by incorporating deontic notions into Situation Calculus theories. We do this by considering deontic assertions as constraints, expressed as a set of conditionals, which apply to complex actions expressed as GOLOG programs. These constraints induce a ranking of "ideality" over possible future situations. This ranking in turn is used to guide an agent in its planning deliberation, towards a course of action that adheres best to the deontic constraints. We present a formalization that includes a wide class of (dyadic) deontic assertions, lets us distinguish prima facie from all-things-considered obligations, and particularly addresses contrary-to-duty scenarios. We furthermore present results on compiling the deontic constraints directly into the Situation Calculus action theory, so as to obtain an agent that respects the given norms, but works solely based on the standard reasoning and planning techniques.

Children change their answers in response to neutral follow-up questions by a knowledgeable asker

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
New Information ◽  
Common Practices ◽  
Parent Child

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.

Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision

Noûs ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision
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