Exchange Rate Intervention and Imperfect Capital Mobility

1987 ◽  
pp. 99-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald V. Coes
2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mansor H. Ibrahim

The paper assesses the international transmission of inflation for a small economy, Malaysia, over three sample periods marked by different degrees of exchange rate flexibility. Contradicting to conventional wisdom of less pronounced foreign nominal influences under the flexible exchange rate regime, this research finds evidence that the inflation transmission from the US to Malaysia is strongest during the period marked by increasing exchange rate flexibility (i.e. 1993-1998). This research also observes significant inflation effects of exchange rate depreciation during the same period. While this research observe less pronounced impacts of the US during the limited exchange rate flexibility period (i.e. 1988-1999), the US influences are virtually absent during the recent fixed regime (i.e. 1998-2005). This research believes that the intensity of capital flows across the three periods might have explained the results.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masimba Aspinas Mutakaya ◽  
Eriyoti Chikodza ◽  
Edward T. Chiyaka

This paper considers an exchange rate problem in Lévy markets, where the Central Bank has to intervene. We assume that, in the absence of control, the exchange rate evolves according to Brownian motion with a jump component. The Central Bank is allowed to intervene in order to keep the exchange rate as close as possible to a prespecified target value. The interventions by the Central Bank are associated with costs. We present the situation as an impulse control problem, where the objective of the bank is to minimize the intervention costs. In particular, the paper extends the model by Huang, 2009, to incorporate a jump component. We formulate and prove an optimal verification theorem for the impulse control. We then propose an impulse control and construct a value function and then verify that they solve the quasivariational inequalities. Our results suggest that if the expected number of jumps is high the Central Bank will intervene more frequently and with large intervention amounts hence the intervention costs will be high.


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