The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty: Risk Analysis of the Negotiated Discharge

2004 ◽  
pp. 287-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Monirul Qader Mirza
Keyword(s):  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
The Ganges

The Ganges water-sharing treaty: risk analysis of the negotiated discharge

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 57 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Monirul Qader Mirza
Keyword(s):  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
The Ganges

scholarly journals War or Peace on the Rivers of South Asia?

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-254
Author(s):  
Muhammad Imran Mehsud ◽  
Azam Jan ◽  
Tariq Anwar Khan
Keyword(s):  
South Asia ◽  
Water Relations ◽  
South Asian ◽  
The Other ◽  
The South ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
The Ganges

The renowned water expert, John Briscoe, predicted a bleak future for India-Pakistan water relations across the Indus attributing it to Pakistan’s downstream anxieties vis-à-vis upstream regional hegemon-India. Do the other co-riparian states of India share the same bleak future across the South Asian rivers of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna or are the water relations across these rivers peaceful as compared to the Indus? To answer this question, this study first explores India-Pakistan water disputes on the Indus and then analyses India-Bangladesh water disputes on the Ganges and Brahmaputra, India-Nepal, India-Bhutan, and Pakistan-Afghanistan water relations. The methodology adopted for this study is descriptive, historical, and analytical in its nature. The study concludes that India has not only failed to adopt a conciliatory approach towards Pakistan on the Indus but has generated mistrust amongst other neighbouring countries over water sharing due to its hegemonic hydro-behaviour. It recommends that India should adopt a conciliatory approach to have peaceful relations across the rivers of South Asia.

scholarly journals Political Altruism of Transboundary Water Sharing

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anik Bhaduri ◽  
Edward B Barbier
Keyword(s):  
Natural Extension ◽  
Water Diversion ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ganges River ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Political Relationship ◽  
Political Boundaries ◽  
The Ganges

Abstract In the paper, using a political altruism model, we make an attempt to explain why an upstream country might agree to a treaty that recognizes and enforces the water claims of a downstream country. In a natural extension of the standard economic model, it is possible to explain the above phenomena, by allowing for altruism between countries. The altruistic concerns of the countries are dependent on other country's willingness to have a good political relationship. If both the countries maintain favorable political relations with one another, then the upstream country will care about the impacts of its water diversion on the downstream country's welfare. The paper also illustrates the case of water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh. The Ganges River, like many other rivers in the world, ignores political boundaries. In Bangladesh, the final downstream country along the Ganges, freshwater availability depends on the share of water diverted by the upstream country, India. For decades, India and Bangladesh failed to resolve the water-sharing issues of the Ganges River. However, in 1996, both India and Bangladesh signed a major new agreement on water sharing (Ganges River Treaty) in an effort to resolve the dispute. Using the political altruism model developed in the paper, we examine why despite needing more water than is available under the treaty, India has adapted to shortages instead of resorting to conflict with Bangladesh.

Bangladesh-India Relations: The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond

1998 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiaq Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Water Sharing ◽  
The Ganges

Sharing the Ganges: a critical analysis of the water sharing treaties

Water Policy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
S Tanzeema
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
The Ganges

scholarly journals A critical review of the Ganges Water Sharing arrangement

Water Policy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-276
Author(s):  
Kazi Saidur Rahman ◽  
Zahidul Islam ◽  
Umme Kulsum Navera ◽  
Fulco Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Water Availability ◽  
Water Demand ◽  
Regional Cooperation ◽  
High Water ◽  
Low Flow ◽  
Critical Periods ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
Water Abstraction ◽  
The Ganges ◽  
The Impact

Abstract The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was an important breakthrough in solving disputes over sharing Ganges water between India and Bangladesh. This study evaluates cooperation reflected in the Treaty by performing a quantitative analysis on available water sharing data. The study recognized that inaccurate projection of future flow and the obligation of allocating guaranteed 991 m3/s flows perpetuate the ongoing water sharing conflicts. The provision of guaranteed minimal flow alternately to India and Bangladesh during critical periods leads to frequent occurrences of low-flow events. Results indicated that the Treaty underestimated the impact of climate variability and possibly increasing upstream water abstraction. Statistical analysis of the post-Treaty data (1997–2016) also indicated that 65% of the time Bangladesh did not receive its guaranteed share during critical dry periods with high water demand. It is advised to project the reliable water availability using a combination of modelling and improved observation of river flows. In addition, the condition of minimum guaranteed share should be removed to reduce the frequency of low-flow events in future. Although our analyses show a number of weaknesses, the Treaty could still enhance the future regional cooperation if some adjustments are made to the current terms and conditions.

International water transfer and sharing: the case of the Ganges River

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANIK BHADURI ◽  
EDWARD B. BARBIER
Keyword(s):  
Water Transfer ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Ganges River ◽  
Optimal Amount ◽  
Water Sharing ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
International Water ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Ganges

ABSTRACTThe following paper is concerned with water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh, with possible augmentation through water transfers from Nepal. We analyzed the case when water from Nepal can be transferred to Bangladesh through the upstream country, India, as the local geography only permits such water transfer. A game theoretic model is formulated to determine the optimal share of water diverted to Bangladesh by India, and the optimal amount of water transfer from Nepal. India may gain positive externalities from such water transfer. The positive externalities generated from water transfer from Nepal may influence the water share of both India and Bangladesh. In the absence of altruism, India would allow less water flow to Bangladesh than in the case when there is no provision to buy water from Nepal. We also explored whether positive externalities could induce India to buy water jointly with Bangladesh, and such a case will only occur if the countries possess altruistic concerns and share water according to an agreement.

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