Location Games

1997 ◽  
pp. 149-172
Author(s):  
Imma Curiel
Keyword(s):  
Location Games

scholarly journals Home sweet home: Quantifying home court advantages for NCAA basketball statistics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Matthew van Bommel ◽  
Luke Bornn ◽  
Peter Chow-White ◽  
Chuancong Gao
Keyword(s):  
Regression Model ◽  
National Collegiate Athletic Association ◽  
Score Statistic ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Home Team ◽  
The Road ◽  
Score Statistics ◽  
Location Games ◽  
On The Road ◽  
Measures Of Performance

Box score statistics are the baseline measures of performance for National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball. Between the 2011-2012 and 2015-2016 seasons, NCAA teams performed better at home compared to on the road in nearly all box score statistics across both genders and all three divisions. Using box score data from over 100,000 games spanning the three divisions for both women and men, we examine the factors underlying this discrepancy. The prevalence of neutral location games in the NCAA provides an additional angle through which to examine the gaps in box score statistic performance, which we believe has been underutilized in existing literature. We also estimate a regression model to quantify the home court advantages for box score statistics after controlling for other factors such as number of possessions, and team strength. Additionally, we examine the biases of scorekeepers and referees. We present evidence that scorekeepers tend to have greater home team biases when observing men compared to women, higher divisions compared to lower divisions, and stronger teams compared to weaker teams. Finally, we present statistically significant results indicating referee decisions are impacted by attendance, with larger crowds resulting in greater bias in favor of the home team.

scholarly journals Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix Carvalho Rodrigues ◽  
Eduardo Xavier
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games

OPEN PROBLEMS IN COOPERATIVE LOCATION GAMES

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340015 ◽  
Author(s):  
VITO FRAGNELLI ◽  
STEFANO GAGLIARDO
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Objective Function ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
The State ◽  
Location Problems ◽  
Open Problems ◽  
Location Games

Location problems describe those situations in which one or more facilities have to be placed in a region trying to optimize a suitable objective function. Game theory has been used as a tool to solve location problems and this paper is devoted to describe the state-of-the-art of the research on location problems through the tools of game theory. Particular attention is given to the problems that are still open in the field of cooperative location game theory.

Facility location games with optional preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 847 ◽  
pp. 185-197
Author(s):  
Zhihuai Chen ◽  
Ken C.K. Fong ◽  
Minming Li ◽  
Kai Wang ◽  
Hongning Yuan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games

scholarly journals From Recommendation Systems to Facility Location Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1772-1779
Author(s):  
Omer Ben-Porat ◽  
Gregory Goren ◽  
Itay Rosenberg ◽  
Moshe Tennenholtz
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Recommendation Systems ◽  
Semantic Space ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Intervention Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Profile ◽  
Location Games ◽  
Facility Location Models ◽  
The One

Recommendation systems are extremely popular tools for matching users and contents. However, when content providers are strategic, the basic principle of matching users to the closest content, where both users and contents are modeled as points in some semantic space, may yield low social welfare. This is due to the fact that content providers are strategic and optimize their offered content to be recommended to as many users as possible. Motivated by modern applications, we propose the widely studied framework of facility location games to study recommendation systems with strategic content providers. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a mediator to facility location models, in the pursuit of better social welfare. We aim at designing mediators that a) induce a game with high social welfare in equilibrium, and b) intervene as little as possible. In service of the latter, we introduce the notion of intervention cost, which quantifies how much damage a mediator may cause to the social welfare when an off-equilibrium profile is adopted. As a case study in high-welfare low-intervention mediator design, we consider the one-dimensional segment as the user domain. We propose a mediator that implements the socially optimal strategy profile as the unique equilibrium profile, and show a tight bound on its intervention cost. Ultimately, we consider some extensions, and highlight open questions for the general agenda.

scholarly journals Cooperative facility location games

2004 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel X. Goemans ◽  
Martin Skutella
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games
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