The Cognitive Penetrability of Perceptual Experience

2020 ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Francesco Marchi
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Cognitive Penetrability

Numerical symbols as explanations of human perceptual experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Barner
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Number Words ◽  
The World ◽  
Symbolic Systems ◽  
Perceptual Systems

Why did humans develop precise systems for measuring experience, like numbers, clocks, andcalendars? I argue that precise representational systems were constructed by earlier generationsof humans because they recognized that their noisy perceptual systems were not capturingdistinctions that existed in the world. Abstract symbolic systems did not arise from perceptualrepresentations, but instead were constructed to describe and explain perceptual experience. Byanalogy, I argue that when children learn number words, they do not rely on noisy perceptualsystems, but instead acquire these words as units in a broader system of procedures, whosemeanings are ultimately defined by logical relations to one another, not perception.

Getting Outside of Ourselves

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McCarroll
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
The Self ◽  
Sources Of Information

This chapter provides an account of the spatial perspectival characteristics and the self-presence of remembering from-the-outside. The chapter develops the Constructive Encoding approach, according to which the context of encoding may play a role in the construction of observer perspectives. The Constructive Encoding approach recognizes the multiple and multiperspectival sources of information available during perception, and suggests that observer perspectives may be constructed from non-egocentric information available during perceptual experience. This chapter provides a way of understanding the idea that one need not see oneself from-the-outside in order to have a memory that is recalled from-the-outside. This chapter not only provides a better understanding of observer perspectives but also sheds light on the perspectival mind.

Attentional Engines

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William P. Seeley
Keyword(s):  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Musical Expression ◽  
Broad Base ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Perceptual Psychology ◽  
Unique Source ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

What is it about art that can be so captivating? How is it that we find value in these often odd and abstract objects and events that we call artworks? My proposal is that artworks are attentional engines. They are artifacts that have been intentionally designed to direct attention to critical stylistic features that reveal their point, purpose, or meaning. My suggestion is that there is a lot that we can learn about art from interdisciplinary research focused on our perceptual engagement with artworks. These kinds of studies can reveal how we recognize artworks, how we differentiate them from other, more quotidian artifacts. In doing so they reveal how artworks function as a unique source of value. Our interactions with artworks draw on a broad base of shared artistic and cultural constitutive of different categories of art. Cognitive systems integrate this information into our experience of art, guiding attention, and shaping what we perceive. Our understanding and appreciation of artworks is therefore carried in our perceptual experience of them. Teasing out how this works can contribute valuable information to our philosophical understanding of art. Attentional Engines explores this interdisciplinary strategy for understanding art. It articulates a cognitivist theory of art grounded in perceptual psychology and the neuroscience attention and demonstrates its application to a range of puzzles in the philosophy of the arts, including questions about the nature of depiction, the role played by metakinesis in dance appreciation, the nature of musical expression, and the power of movies.

Direct Realism and Illusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Standard Response ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Ambiguous Stimuli ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Apparent Problem

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.

Reply to Keith A. Wilson

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
The Senses

In my essay, ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004, revised 2013) I argued that perceptual experience has no representational content, or at least none if you exclude the content of a perceiver’s, or experiencer’s responses to his experience, e.g., in a case of perceiving, recognizing...

Evaluative Perception

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Ethical Perception ◽  
Aesthetic Judgement ◽  
Evaluative Judgement

Evaluation is ubiquitous. Indeed, it isn't an exaggeration to say that we assess actions, character, events, and objects as good, cruel, beautiful, etc., almost every day of our lives. Although evaluative judgement—for instance, judging that an institution is unjust—is usually regarded as the paradigm of evaluation, it has been thought by some philosophers that a distinctive and significant kind of evaluation is perceptual. For example, in aesthetics, some have claimed that adequate aesthetic judgement must be grounded in the appreciator's first-hand perceptual experience of the item judged. In ethics, reference to the existence and importance of something like ethical perception is found in a number of traditions, for example, in Virtue Ethics and Sentimentalism. This volume brings together philosophers in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and value theory, to contribute in novel ways to debates about what we call Evaluative Perception. Specifically, they engage with (1) Questions regarding the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are perceptual experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of perceptual experience? (2) Questions about Epistemology: Can evaluative perceptual experiences ever justify evaluative judgements? Are perceptual experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgements? (3) Questions about Value Theory: Is the existence of evaluative perceptual experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of evaluative perceptual experience?

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