Completeness Theorems for First-Order Logic Analysed in Constructive Type Theory

Author(s):  
Yannick Forster ◽  
Dominik Kirst ◽  
Dominik Wehr
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-151
Author(s):  
Yannick Forster ◽  
Dominik Kirst ◽  
Dominik Wehr

Abstract We study various formulations of the completeness of first-order logic phrased in constructive type theory and mechanised in the Coq proof assistant. Specifically, we examine the completeness of variants of classical and intuitionistic natural deduction and sequent calculi with respect to model-theoretic, algebraic, and game-theoretic semantics. As completeness with respect to the standard model-theoretic semantics à la Tarski and Kripke is not readily constructive, we analyse connections of completeness theorems to Markov’s Principle and Weak K̋nig’s Lemma and discuss non-standard semantics admitting assumption-free completeness. We contribute a reusable Coq library for first-order logic containing all results covered in this paper.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liron Cohen ◽  
Robert L Constable

Abstract In this article we define pure intuitionistic Ancestral Logic ( iAL ), extending pure intuitionistic First-Order Logic ( iFOL ). This logic is a dependently typed abstract programming language with computational functionality beyond iFOL given by its realizer for the transitive closure, TC . We derive this operator from the natural type theoretic definition of TC using intersection. We show that provable formulas in iAL are uniformly realizable, thus iAL is sound with respect to constructive type theory. We further show that iAL subsumes Kleene Algebras with tests and thus serves as a natural programming logic for proving properties of program schemes. We also extract schemes from proofs that iAL specifications are solvable.


Author(s):  
Ernesto Copello ◽  
Nora Szasz ◽  
Álvaro Tasistro

Abstarct We formalize in Constructive Type Theory the Lambda Calculus in its classical first-order syntax, employing only one sort of names for both bound and free variables, and with α-conversion based upon name swapping. As a fundamental part of the formalization, we introduce principles of induction and recursion on terms which provide a framework for reproducing the use of the Barendregt Variable Convention as in pen-and-paper proofs within the rigorous formal setting of a proof assistant. The principles in question are all formally derivable from the simple principle of structural induction/recursion on concrete terms. We work out applications to some fundamental meta-theoretical results, such as the Church–Rosser Theorem and Weak Normalization for the Simply Typed Lambda Calculus. The whole development has been machine checked using the system Agda.


1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B. Andrews

In [8] J. A. Robinson introduced a complete refutation procedure called resolution for first order predicate calculus. Resolution is based on ideas in Herbrand's Theorem, and provides a very convenient framework in which to search for a proof of a wff believed to be a theorem. Moreover, it has proved possible to formulate many refinements of resolution which are still complete but are more efficient, at least in many contexts. However, when efficiency is a prime consideration, the restriction to first order logic is unfortunate, since many statements of mathematics (and other disciplines) can be expressed more simply and naturally in higher order logic than in first order logic. Also, the fact that in higher order logic (as in many-sorted first order logic) there is an explicit syntactic distinction between expressions which denote different types of intuitive objects is of great value where matching is involved, since one is automatically prevented from trying to make certain inappropriate matches. (One may contrast this with the situation in which mathematical statements are expressed in the symbolism of axiomatic set theory.).


Author(s):  
Kaustuv Chaudhuri

AbstractSubformula linking is an interactive theorem proving technique that was initially proposed for (classical) linear logic. It is based on truth and context preserving rewrites of a conjecture that are triggered by a user indicating links between subformulas, which can be done by direct manipulation, without the need of tactics or proof languages. The system guarantees that a true conjecture can always be rewritten to a known, usually trivial, theorem. In this work, we extend subformula linking to intuitionistic first-order logic with simply typed lambda-terms as the term language of this logic. We then use a well known embedding of intuitionistic type theory into this logic to demonstrate one way to extend linking to type theory.


2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Schiemer ◽  
Erich H. Reck

AbstractIn historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style of Principia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory.


Author(s):  
R. A. G. Seely

It is well known that for much of the mathematics of topos theory, it is in fact sufficient to use a category C whose slice categories C/A are cartesian closed. In such a category, the notion of a ‘generalized set’, for example an ‘A-indexed set’, is represented by a morphism B → A of C, i.e. by an object of C/A. The point about such a category C is that C is a C-indexed category, and more, is a hyper-doctrine, so that it has a full first order logic associated with it. This logic has some peculiar aspects. For instance, the types are the objects of C and the terms are the morphisms of C. For a given type A, the predicates with a free variable of type A are morphisms into A, and ‘proofs’ are morphisms over A. We see here a certain ‘ambiguity’ between the notions of type, predicate, and term, of object and proof: a term of type A is a morphism into A, which is a predicate over A; a morphism 1 → A can be viewed either as an object of type A or as a proof of the proposition A.


2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 751-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. W. Tait

AbstractRestricted to first-order formulas, the rules of inference in the Curry-Howard type theory are equivalent to those of first-order predicate logic as formalized by Heyting, with one exception: ∃-elimination in the Curry-Howard theory, where ∃x: A,F(x) is understood as disjoint union, are the projections, and these do not preserve first-orderedness. This note shows, however, that the Curry-Howard theory is conservative over Heyting's system.


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