Redefining Counterpart Theory and Transworld Identity

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-120
Author(s):  
Riyukta Raghunath
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Transworld Identity

scholarly journals In Memoriam

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-109
Author(s):  
Abraham D. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Postdoctoral Fellow ◽  
The World ◽  
In Memoriam ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Transworld Identity

I remember distinctly the moment I learned that David Lewis had died. It was during my years as a postdoctoral fellow, when I was more than a little isolated, and so it turned out to have been some time—months, maybe—since the event. I recall thinking: the world in which I thought I was living, during those months, turned out not to be the actual world, and so I turned out not to be the person I thought I was, but merely a counterpart of that person. And thus arose the half-formed thought (still only half-formed now, alas) that therein lay some insight into what is actually at stake in the conflict between counterpart theory and transworld identity.

scholarly journals The Problem of Transworld Identity: in Defence of Essentialism

Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pranciškus Gricius
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Identity Problem ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Chisholm’S Paradox ◽  
Transworld Identity

In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for successful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.

Modal Fragmentalism

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (280) ◽  
pp. 570-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuele Iaquinto
Keyword(s):  
Outright Rejection ◽  
Modal Analogue ◽  
Transworld Identity

Abstract In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity.

scholarly journals Grounding Personal Persistence

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Personal Identity

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
THEODORE SIDER
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Counterpart Theory

AbstractPersonal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity—such as memory and anticipation—are asymmetric and ‘count in favor of personal identity from one side only’. Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.

scholarly journals Counterpart theories for everyone

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4691-4715
Author(s):  
Achille C. Varzi
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Identity Based

Abstract David Lewis’s counterpart theory (CT) is often seen as involving a radical departure from the standard, Kripke-style semantics for modal logic (ML), suggesting that we are dealing with deeply divergent accounts of our modal talk. However, CT captures but one version of the relevant semantic intuition, and does so on the basis of metaphysical assumptions (all worlds are equally real, individuals are world-bound) that are ostensibly discretionary. Just as ML can be translated into a language that quantifies explicitly over worlds, CT may be formulated as a semantic theory in which world quantification is purely metalinguistic. And just as Kripke-style semantics is formally compatible with the doctrine of world-boundedness, a counterpart-based semantics may in principle allow for cases of trans-world identity. In fact, one may welcome a framework that is general enough to include both Lewis’s counterpart-based account and Kripke’s identity-based account as distinguished special cases. There are several ways of doing so. The purpose of this paper is to outline a fully general option and to illustrate its philosophical significance, showing how the large variety of intermediate relations that lie between Lewisian counterparthood and Kripkean identity yield a corresponding variety of modal theories that would otherwise remain uncharted.

Propositions and counterpart theory

Analysis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Dorr
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory
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