scholarly journals The Problem of Transworld Identity: in Defence of Essentialism

Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pranciškus Gricius
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Identity Problem ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Chisholm’S Paradox ◽  
Transworld Identity

In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for successful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.

The Ontology of Many-Worlds

1998 ◽  
pp. 42-46
Author(s):  
Daisuke Kachi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Many Worlds ◽  
The Many ◽  
Transworld Identity

There are two types of theories regarding many worlds: one is modal, while the other is temporal. The former regards reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, paying close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to be one of the best ways of grasping the reality of time. First, I show that there is reason to adopt the many-worlds view because transworld identity is meaningful for both of them, while it is not for space. Second, I argue that transmoment identity is different from transpossible world identity concerning reality. The former is a realistic relation, while the latter is not. Thus, I find that the reality of time is in the relation of transmoment identity. Such a view, I contend, has merit on the basis that it recognizes the reality of time in a sense that is not true of space.

scholarly journals Social Utopias and Engineering Design

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 570-583
Author(s):  
Waldemar Czajkowski
Keyword(s):  
Engineering Design ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
The Other ◽  
Effective Solution ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Adequate Knowledge ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Engineering Sciences ◽  
Global Problems ◽  
The One

AbstractA paradox of our time is identified: on the one hand – the development of one global system (ecological, technological and social), on the other hand – the still increasing “balkanization” of science. The dynamics of this systems is a source of well-known numerous global problems. Its possibly effective solution needs adequate knowledge about the system. For this reason, counteraction to “balkanization” of science is of great practical importance. And this counteraction should comprise not only development of “transboundary” sciences (such as biochemistry or social psychology) but also establishing and developing links between very distant disciplines. This text is intended as a contribution to linking social and engineering sciences. The notion of design plays the central role in this text. Its meaning in the engineering sciences. The notion of utopia has been chosen as a partial counterpart to the term of engineering design. This notion was defined using a concept of possible world – taken from modal logic. It encompasses two ideas: this of design and that of prediction, It is claimed that we need many utopias and that their plurality is of fundamental importance for protecting us against the threats of utopianism. The paper suggests that social utopias can play a heuristic role in engineering design (particularly in the initial phase of defining technological problems), and – on the other hand – that the theory of engineering design can be supportive for, badly needed, development of methodology of utopias creation.

Al-kindī, vues sur le temps

1993 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Jolivet
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
First Philosophy

Al-Kindī's views concerning time are dispersed in different places in his works, but they are to be found principally in his On First Philosophy and De quinque essentiis (Sermo de tempore). Yes, he does follow Aristotle, but he insists on the homogeneity of the instant and of time; he also distances himself from the Philosopher by denying the eternity of the world a parte ante as well as a parte post. On the other hand, in his accounts of the realization of possible things and of the organization of the cosmos, he presents certain views that sometimes tend toward the principle of plenitude, and sometimes toward the doctrine of the best possible world, and here one can discern a principle that is distinctly theological.

De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Rigid Designator ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Identity Statement ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.

Particulars

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bigelow
Keyword(s):  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Particulars are to be understood by contrasting them with universals, that term being used to comprise both properties and relations. Often the term ‘individuals’ is used interchangeably with ‘particulars’, though some restrict the term ‘individuals’ to those particulars whose existence has more than momentary duration. It is sometimes taken as a distinctive feature of particulars that they cannot be in more than one place at a time, whereas universals are capable of being wholly present in more than one place at a given time: if you have a white thing here and a white thing there, then you have two particulars but only one property. This way of distinguishing between particulars and universals may help us to focus on apt paradigm cases of each, but arguably this does not get us to the heart of the matter. On the one hand, some think it is possible, at least in principle, for a magician, or Pythagoras, or a time traveller, or a subatomic particle to be in two places at once, even though each is a particular. On the other hand, some think that there are properties which could not possibly be manifested in two different places at the same time, and yet which nonetheless are universals: think, for instance, of the divine property of absolute perfection, or of the conjunction of all intrinsic properties of a Leibnizian monad (or possible world); or of Judas’ property of simply being Judas. Particulars are things which have properties and which stand in relations – particulars ‘instantiate’ properties and relations. By itself, however, this does not distinguish particulars from universals since universals, too, are naturally thought to have properties and to stand in relations. What distinguishes particulars is the fact that, while a particular instantiates properties and relations, nothing instantiates a particular. Universals both ‘have’ (properties and relations) and are ‘had’; particulars ‘have’ but are not ‘had’. Since a particular is not instantiated by another thing, it is sometimes said to exist ‘in itself’, whereas a universal exists ‘in’ something else. For this reason, the term ‘particular’ is related to the term ‘substance’, which is traditionally used to mean something capable of independent existence.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

Infinitive Perfect and Backward Causation

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Johan Sæbø
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Counterfactual Analysis ◽  
Present Perfect ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
Causative Constructions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
General Semantic ◽  
Backward Causation

The present paper represents an attempt to explain the semantically deviant nature of causative constructions with present perfect effect sentences. As far as I known, such constructions have not been commented upon in the literature on causativity. I show that any counterfactual analysis of the traditional sort will bring them out as synthetic sentences, provided they are syntactically well-formed. On the other hand, if the notion os counterfactural dependence is re-interpreted along the lines of branching possible worlds, they can be shown to be systematically contradictory. I discuss the various revisions of the truth conditions for tensed formulae and of the general semantic framework which are necessary to accomplish this.

Free Will and the Problem of Evil

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Mason Myers
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Traditional Theist

Hume after arguing for the compatibility of liberty and necessity, a view now known as soft determinism or compatibilism, noted that it is not ‘possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of the actions of sin and moral turpitude’. It seems that Hume is correct if the explanation must show specifically why an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity must permit certain actions that to human reason seem to be unnecessary evils. On the other hand if such specifity is not required, the soft determinist who also happens to be a theist can argue that it is possible that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds even though the reason for any specific apparent evil cannot be known. If seemingly evil choices are free in the soft determinist's sense but determined by an omnipotent and omniscient deity, then either that deity is not omnibenevolent or that deity has determined the world to have the maximum possible goodness through including seemingly evil choices in the scheme of things. Consequently if, as the traditional theist believes, the creator is omnibenevolent as well as omnipotent and omniscient, the occurrence of seemingly evil choices are necessary for maximizing the goodness of the whole.

Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Modal Fictionalism ◽  
The Way

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory, the stage view, according to which people and other ordinary objects are instantaneous stages, identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Both counterpart theories invite what has been called ‘the argument from concern’ (Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99 (395): 327–54). Why should I be concerned about my counterparts at other possible worlds or other times? I care about how things might have gone for me—not how they go for other people at other possible worlds; I care about my prospects—not the way go for other people at other times. Jiri Benovsky has argued that while modal counterpart theory can be defended against this style of argument, temporal counterpart theory cannot (Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34). I argue that temporal counterpart theory, like modal counterpart theory, resists the argument from concern.

scholarly journals PROPOSITIONALITY AND FACTIVITY EXPRESSED BY CONJUNCTIONS DA, ŠTO AND ČE IN SERBIAN AND BULGARIAN FROM THE SUBJUNCTIVE PERSPECTIVE

2017 ◽  
pp. 222-231
Author(s):  
A. A. Janić
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject

The subject of this paper is the semantic and syntactic nature of Serbian complementizers da and što, as well as Bulgarian da and če, and the relation among all of them in the light of (non-)specificity for factivity and propositionality. They have been analyzed in various syntactic contexts and have also been related to the possible world semantics, as well as to the subjunctive semantics. Stemming from the relation propositional-factive, it is concluded that da-complements in Bulgarian can just be connected to a strong subjunctivity. On the other hand, with dacomplements in Serbian both the strong and the weak subjunctive are expressed. Considering all of the above, it is clear that the usage of da is broader in Serbian than in Bulgarian, and that da marks the subjunctive context in both languages. After comparing these four complementizers, we can conclude that the Bulgarian da is stronger than the Serbian da, and that the Serbian što is stronger than the Bulgarian če. In other words, the Serbian da (it can be propositional or factive) and Bulgarian če (propositional or factive) are non-specified complementizers, contrary to the Bulgarian da (propositional) and Serbian što (mainly factive, compared to sentences with da), which are specified.

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