The Problem of Transworld Identity: in Defence of Essentialism

In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for successful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.

D. Chalmers’ argument from logical supervenience in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness

The subject of this research is D. Chalmers’ argument in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness –sentience or qualia – explanation on the basis of dualism of the low-level physical and high-level mental propertoes of the brain. The dualism of properties in the philosophy of consciousness means that consciousness is a high-level property, supervenient on the physical properties of the brain. Chalmers introduces the concept of logical supervenience and explains the phenomenal consciousness by the fact that psychical properties are supervenient on physical properties naturally, rather than logically. This comprises the essence of Chalmers' concept of naturalistic dualism. The article reviews the concept of supervenience in most commonly used form, and the definition of logical and natural supervenience. Supervenience becomes logical and/or natural due to the fact that its definition includes the modal term “possibility”, which concedes different interpretations: possibility by virtue of the laws of nature – nomic possibility, and logical possibility. The author demonstrates that the definition of logical supervenience, which leans on the concept of identity, makes sense only in the context of transtemporal, rather than transworld identity. Such circumstance substantially changes the meaning of the definition of logical supervenience. The novelty of this work consists in showing that unlike the logical and natural possibilities, logical and natural supervenience are different names for the same type of relationship. The conclusion is formulated that naturalistic dualism, which claims their fundamental difference, cannot explain the phenomenal consciousness using this distinction.

In Memoriam

I remember distinctly the moment I learned that David Lewis had died. It was during my years as a postdoctoral fellow, when I was more than a little isolated, and so it turned out to have been some time—months, maybe—since the event. I recall thinking: the world in which I thought I was living, during those months, turned out not to be the actual world, and so I turned out not to be the person I thought I was, but merely a counterpart of that person. And thus arose the half-formed thought (still only half-formed now, alas) that therein lay some insight into what is actually at stake in the conflict between counterpart theory and transworld identity.

Modal Fragmentalism

In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity.

Judas, Nixon und „Ich“

Zusammenfassung Laut Leibniz kann sich ein Bauernsohn nicht konsistent wünschen, der Sohn einer Königin zu sein, da die Erfüllung seines Wunsches mit der Aufhebung seiner Existenz koinzidieren würde. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz erörtere ich dieses Argument in Hinblick auf die neuere angloamerikanische Debatte um das Theodizeeproblem. Dafür kläre ich zunächst die metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des Arguments und diskutiere verschiedene Einwände, die vor allem unter Berufung auf das Problem der sogenannten transworld identity gegen Leibniz vorgebracht werden können. In einem letzten Schritt unterscheide ich im Rückgriff auf Überlegungen Robert Adams’ zwischen metaphysischer und personaler Identität, um zu zeigen, dass Leibniz’ Argument, obwohl die damit verbundene These kontrafaktischer Identität problematisch ist, dennoch einen wichtigen Beitrag zum theologischen Umgang mit dem Theodizeeproblem liefert.

Gettier Cases

Epistemologists in general have long agreed that a belief’s being gettiered precludes its being knowledge. However, they have long disagreed on how to understand or explicate that preclusion relation. Of course, some suggestions attract more approval than others do. One of the most commonly favored ones talk, in modal terms, of epistemic safety and epistemic luck. But this chapter argues that such attempted explications fail, because they have not learned enough from the history of modal metaphysics. In particular, epistemologists who reach for such an approach when seeking to understand Gettier cases have unwittingly allowed themselves to be conceiving of such cases in counterpart-theoretic terms, even while deriving a putative result that depends instead on a kind of transworld identity for Gettier cases and for gettiered beliefs. Methodologically, this combination is not viable.

Modal Noneism: Transworld Identity, Identification, and Individuation

Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Routley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely discussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest's noneism is based upon the double move of (a) building a worlds semantics including impossible worlds, besides possible ones, and (b) admitting a new comprehension principle for objects, differerent from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons' and Zalta's. The new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can deliver objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach can be conveniently labeled as "modal noneism". In this paper, I put modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the theory (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; (2) faces a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld individuation, which is often taken (especially after Kripke's notorious 'stipulation' solution) as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem; and (3) may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I shall call 'extensionally indiscernible entities' - particular nonexistent objects modal noneism is committed to.

Modal logic and logic of fiction

This paper analyzes the views of representative theoreticians of possible worlds semantics and possible worlds theory in an attempt to ascertain the degree and manner of interdisciplinary borrowing through focusing on possible worlds and individuals in those worlds. The paper first clarifies the general perceptions of possible worlds, perceptions in the field of modal restrictions, transworld identity, and identity over time, as presented in the works of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and Nicholas Rescher, the representative semanticists of possible worlds, and then ascertains the degree and manner of their adaptations in the theory proposed by Ljubomir Dolezel within literary theory. The conclusion is that the cooperation between the two disciplines stands on fertile ground but that it is necessary to perform more systematic adaptations due to different subjects of research and different objectives.