Causal Agency and Responsibility: A Refinement of STIT Logic

Justification announcements in discrete time. Part II: Frame definability results

Logic Journal of IGPL ◽

10.1093/jigpal/jzy074 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 27 (5) ◽

pp. 671-692

Author(s):

Grigory K Olkhovikov

Keyword(s):

Discrete Time ◽

Time Structure ◽

Stit Logic ◽

Completeness Result ◽

Time Part

Abstract In Part I of this paper we presented a Hilbert-style system $\Sigma _D$ axiomatizing stit logic of justification announcements interpreted over models with discrete time structure. In this part, we prove three frame definability results for $\Sigma _D$ using three different definitions of a frame plus another version of completeness result.

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Choice-Driven Counterfactuals

Journal of Philosophical Logic ◽

10.1007/s10992-021-09629-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Ilaria Canavotto ◽

Eric Pacuit

Keyword(s):

Choice Behavior ◽

The Other ◽

Philosophical Literature ◽

Stit Logic

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic (Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001), with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish between deviant and non-deviant actions at a moment, where an action available to an agent at a moment is deviant when its performance does not agree with the agent’s default choice behavior at that moment. After developing and axiomatizing a stit logic with action types, instants, and deviant actions, we study the philosophical implications and logical properties of two candidate semantics for choice-driven counterfactuals, one called rewind models inspired by Lewis (Nous13(4), 455–476 1979) and the other called independence models motivated by well-known counterexamples to Lewis’s proposal Slote (Philos. Rev.87(1), 3–27 1978). In the last part of the paper we consider how to evaluate choice-driven counterfactuals at moments arrived at by some agents performing a deviant action.

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Probabilistic Stit Logic

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-22152-1_44 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 521-531 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jan M. Broersen

Keyword(s):

Stit Logic

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Deontic epistemic stit logic distinguishing modes of mens rea

Journal of Applied Logic ◽

10.1016/j.jal.2010.06.002 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 137-152 ◽

Cited By ~ 31

Author(s):

Jan Broersen

Keyword(s):

Mens Rea ◽

Stit Logic

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The Ethics of Controllability as Influenceability

10.3233/faia210344 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Emiliano Lorini ◽

Giovanni Sartor

Keyword(s):

Autonomous Agents ◽

Logical Analysis ◽

Artificial Agents ◽

Logical Framework ◽

Stit Logic ◽

And Control ◽

The Way

We present a logical analysis of influence and control over the actions of others, and address consequential causal and normative responsibilities. We first account for the way in which influence can be exercised over the behaviour of autonomous agents. On this basis we determine the conditions under which influence leads to control on the implementation of positive and negative values. We finally define notions of causal and normative responsibility for the action of others. Our logical framework is based on STIT logic and is complemented with a series of examples illustrating the application. Our analysis applies to interactions between humans as well as to those involving autonomous artificial agents.

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