scholarly journals Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology

Author(s):  
Francisco Benita ◽  
Vittorio Bilò ◽  
Barnabé Monnot ◽  
Georgios Piliouras ◽  
Cosimo Vinci
2018 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 538-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Sepideh Pourazarm ◽  
Christos G. Cassandras ◽  
Ioannis Ch. Paschalidis

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (37) ◽  
pp. 9300-9305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuo Wang ◽  
Erik D. Herzog ◽  
István Z. Kiss ◽  
William J. Schwartz ◽  
Guy Bloch ◽  
...  

Extracting complex interactions (i.e., dynamic topologies) has been an essential, but difficult, step toward understanding large, complex, and diverse systems including biological, financial, and electrical networks. However, reliable and efficient methods for the recovery or estimation of network topology remain a challenge due to the tremendous scale of emerging systems (e.g., brain and social networks) and the inherent nonlinearity within and between individual units. We develop a unified, data-driven approach to efficiently infer connections of networks (ICON). We apply ICON to determine topology of networks of oscillators with different periodicities, degree nodes, coupling functions, and time scales, arising in silico, and in electrochemistry, neuronal networks, and groups of mice. This method enables the formulation of these large-scale, nonlinear estimation problems as a linear inverse problem that can be solved using parallel computing. Working with data from networks, ICON is robust and versatile enough to reliably reveal full and partial resonance among fast chemical oscillators, coherent circadian rhythms among hundreds of cells, and functional connectivity mediating social synchronization of circadian rhythmicity among mice over weeks.


Algorithms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Vittorio Bilò ◽  
Michele Flammini ◽  
Luca Moscardelli

We consider the problem of determining a routing in all-optical networks, in which some couples of nodes want to communicate. In particular, we study this problem from the point of view of a network provider that has to design suitable payment functions for non-cooperative agents, corresponding to the couples of nodes wishing to communicate. The network provider aims at inducing stable routings (i.e., routings corresponding to Nash equilibria) using a low number of wavelengths. We consider three different kinds of local knowledge that agents may exploit to compute their payments, leading to three corresponding information levels. Under complete information, the network provider can design a payment function, inducing the agents to reach a Nash equilibrium mirroring any desired routing. If the price to an agent is computed only as a function of the wavelengths used along connecting paths (minimal level) or edges (intermediate level), the most reasonable functions either do not admit Nash equilibria or admit very inefficient ones, i.e., with the largest possible price of anarchy. However, by suitably restricting the network topology, a constant price of anarchy for chains and rings and a logarithmic one for trees can be obtained under the minimal and intermediate levels, respectively.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi ◽  
Roberto Cominetti ◽  
Panayotis Mertikopoulos ◽  
Marco Scarsini

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 1540003
Author(s):  
Xujin Chen ◽  
Xiaodong Hu ◽  
Weidong Ma

This paper concerns the asymmetric atomic selfish routing game for load balancing in ring networks. In the selfish routing, each player selects a path in the ring network to route one unit traffic between its source and destination nodes, aiming at a minimum maximum link load along its own path. The selfish path selections by individuals ignore the system objective of minimizing the maximum load over all network links. This selfish ring load (SRL) game arises in a wide variety of applications in decentralized network routing, where network performance is often measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), the worst-case ratio between the maximum link loads in an equilibrium routing and an optimal routing. It has been known that the PoA of SRL with respect to classical Nash Equilibrium (NE) cannot be upper bounded by any constant, showing large loss of efficiency at some NE outcome. In an effort to improve the network performance in the SRL game, we generalize the model to so-called SRL with collusion (SRLC) which allows coordination within any coalition of up to k selfish players on the condition that every player of the coalition benefits from the coordination. We prove that, for m-player game on n-node ring, the PoA of SRLC is n - 1 when k ≤ 2, drops to 2 when k = 3 and is at least 1 + 2/m for k ≥ 4. Our study shows that on one hand, the performance of ring networks, in terms of maximum load, benefits significantly from coordination of self-interested players within small-sized coalitions; on the other hand, the equilibrium routing in SRL might not reach global optimum even if any number of players can coordinate.


Algorithmica ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgos Christodoulou ◽  
Kurt Mehlhorn ◽  
Evangelia Pyrga

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