Free Will and Moral Bioenhancement as a Compulsory Means of Avoiding “Ultimate Harm”

The epidemiology of moral bioenhancement

Medicine Health Care and Philosophy ◽

10.1007/s11019-020-09980-1 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

R. B. Gibson

Keyword(s):

Herd Immunity ◽

Moral Standing ◽

Minimum Threshold ◽

Moral Bioenhancement ◽

Ultimate Harm

Abstract In their 2008 paper, Persson and Savulescu suggest that for moral bioenhancement (MBE) to be effective at eliminating the danger of ‘ultimate harm’ the intervention would need to be compulsory. This is because those most in need of MBE would be least likely to undergo the intervention voluntarily. By drawing on concepts and theories from epidemiology, this paper will suggest that MBE may not need to be universal and compulsory to be effective at significantly improving the collective moral standing of a human populace and reducing the threat of ultimate harm. It will identify similarities between the mechanisms that allow biological contagions (such as a virus) and behaviours (such as those concerned with ethical and unethical actions) to develop, spread, and be reinforced within a population. It will then go onto suggest that, just as with the epidemiological principle of herd immunity, if enough people underwent MBE to reach a minimum threshold then the incidence and spread of immoral behaviours could be significantly reduced, even in those who have not received MBE.

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Moral Bioenhancement and Free Will: Continuing the Debate

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics ◽

10.1017/s0963180116001043 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 26 (3) ◽

pp. 384-393 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

VOJIN RAKIĆ

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Moral Enhancement ◽

Threshold Concept ◽

Moral Bioenhancement ◽

Political Concept ◽

Freedom Of The Will ◽

The Will

Abstract:This article continues and expands differences I have with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu concerning issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. They have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement, claiming that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter of degree. Here, I argue that freedom as a political concept (or as one that is analogous to a political concept) is indeed scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is to be understood as a threshold concept and therefore not as subject to degree. Consequently, I contend, by asserting that freedom is a matter of degree, that Persson and Savulescu have not undermined my arguments favoring voluntary moral enhancement. In addition, I add three further arguments against compulsory moral bioenhancement.

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Evaluating the Debate Thus Far over Moral Bioenhancement

Posthuman Bliss? ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190051495.003.0004 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 85-130

Author(s):

Susan B. Levin

Keyword(s):

Evolutionary Psychology ◽

Genetic Manipulation ◽

Human Existence ◽

Phenotypic Traits ◽

Moral Bioenhancement ◽

Prosocial Attitudes ◽

Ultimate Harm ◽

Human Extinction

To avoid “ultimate harm,” or human extinction, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu maintain that a species-wide, biological upgrade of human morality is required. To support their claim that we already possess biological kernels of their featured, prosocial attitudes, they rely implausibly on evolutionary psychology. Further, they support “neuroessentialism” and misconceive what genetic manipulation could deliver regarding complex phenotypic traits. Alongside their talk of augmenting prosocial attitudes, Persson and Savulescu stress that, to forestall ultimate harm, what we ultimately require is the elimination of antisocial acts. Though presented as two interpretive lenses on one endeavor, their prosocial and antisocial focuses represent different agendas for our moral alteration. Further, from their utilitarian standpoint, if making antisocial acts impossible to perform were a streamlined route to avoiding extinction, then this is what we should do. Persson and Savulescu’s antisocial focus, in particular, reflects a willingness to forgo what makes human existence worth conducting.

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An Unfit Future: Moral Enhancement and Technological Harm

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement ◽

10.1017/s1358246118000449 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 83 ◽

pp. 351-370

Author(s):

Lewis Coyne

Keyword(s):

Ecological Crisis ◽

Moral Enhancement ◽

Environmental Concerns ◽

Complex Phenomenon ◽

Hans Jonas ◽

Moral Bioenhancement ◽

Ultimate Harm

AbstractThis essay addresses two aspects of Persson and Savulescu's case for moral enhancement: 1) the precise technological nature of ultimate harm, particularly as it applies to the ecological crisis, and 2) what is at stake in the solution they propose. My claim is that Persson and Savulescu's treatment of both issues is inadequate: the ecological crisis is a more complex phenomenon than they suppose, and more is at stake in moral enhancement than they claim. To make my case I draw on the work of Hans Jonas, who presciently and insightfully dealt with related questions. Jonas’ philosophy unites bioethical, technological, and environmental concerns and so offers a useful contrast to Persson and Savulescu's proposal. If my analysis is correct then we have both practical and principled reasons to be sceptical about the prospect of moral bioenhancement, which I assume, for the sake of argument, to be feasible.1

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Moral Bioenhancement: Widespread Harm and Broad Cooperation

10.26686/wgtn.17012399.v1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

◽

Morgan Wisheart

Keyword(s):

Scientific Progress ◽

Moral Disagreement ◽

Fine Tuning ◽

Moral Intuitions ◽

Psychological Traits ◽

Moral Bioenhancement ◽

Course Of Action ◽

Group Cooperation ◽

Medicinal Drugs ◽

Ultimate Harm

<p>A controversial issue in contemporary bioethics has emerged in recent years: moral bioenhancement (MB). Human bioenhancement in general has seen its share of controversy, but it is generally agreed that there is potential to improve human physical and mental capacities through biotechnological interventions such as medicinal drugs and genetic modification. The discussion has turned to whether biotechnological interventions could similarly improve human moral capacities. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that MB is imperative if humans are to survive into the future, because our current moral capacities do not equip us to address future catastrophic problems, Ultimate Harm, which will be caused by modern advanced scientific progress. I suggest related but distinct reasons why MB is appealing: scientific progress and deficient human moral capacities are jointly responsible for enormous amounts of harm all over the world, Widespread Harm, and MB has the potential to reduce that harm. Human moral capacities are deficient because of their dependence on what I call ‘moral intuitions’; evolved psychological traits that shape our many societies’ varied moral values, resulting in moral disagreement and the disruption of inter-group cooperation. Addressing modern problems requires a broader level of cooperation that is unlikely to be achieved by depending on our current moral intuitions. This is why our moral capacities should be improved. However, typical accounts of MB do not describe interventions that will improve our moral capacities in this way. They are focused on the vague objective of ‘making people morally better’, assuming that this will address human moral deficiency and that this will in turn address the resulting problems. ‘Making people morally better’ means making them more satisfactory to our current moral intuitions, which are the root of moral deficiency, so these MB strategies are unlikely to be effective. An alternative MB strategy, which I propose, instead focuses on the objective of modifying current moral intuitions so that they promote broad cooperation. This will result in improved moral capacities in the sense that our moral capacities will be more practically useful to us. However, because this strategy disregards the importance of satisfying our current moral intuitions, it will be morally unpalatable. This is its main disadvantage over the typical MB strategy, though it is better at handling many common objections. Ultimately, there are a number of practical concerns that cannot be completely satisfactorily responded to even by my new MB strategy, such as the issues of mandatory MB and of fine-tuning our moral capacities. These concerns may mean that MB is too risky, and therefore not the best course of action in response to modern problems rooted in scientific progress and moral deficiency, particularly since we have promising alternatives available such as traditional moral enhancement techniques and further scientific progress. The prospect of MB should continue to be investigated, but it should focus on improving upon our current problematic moral intuitions rather than better satisfying them.</p>

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Moral Bioenhancement: Widespread Harm and Broad Cooperation

10.26686/wgtn.17012399 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

◽

Morgan Wisheart

Keyword(s):

Scientific Progress ◽

Moral Disagreement ◽

Fine Tuning ◽

Moral Intuitions ◽

Psychological Traits ◽

Moral Bioenhancement ◽

Course Of Action ◽

Group Cooperation ◽

Medicinal Drugs ◽

Ultimate Harm

<p>A controversial issue in contemporary bioethics has emerged in recent years: moral bioenhancement (MB). Human bioenhancement in general has seen its share of controversy, but it is generally agreed that there is potential to improve human physical and mental capacities through biotechnological interventions such as medicinal drugs and genetic modification. The discussion has turned to whether biotechnological interventions could similarly improve human moral capacities. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that MB is imperative if humans are to survive into the future, because our current moral capacities do not equip us to address future catastrophic problems, Ultimate Harm, which will be caused by modern advanced scientific progress. I suggest related but distinct reasons why MB is appealing: scientific progress and deficient human moral capacities are jointly responsible for enormous amounts of harm all over the world, Widespread Harm, and MB has the potential to reduce that harm. Human moral capacities are deficient because of their dependence on what I call ‘moral intuitions’; evolved psychological traits that shape our many societies’ varied moral values, resulting in moral disagreement and the disruption of inter-group cooperation. Addressing modern problems requires a broader level of cooperation that is unlikely to be achieved by depending on our current moral intuitions. This is why our moral capacities should be improved. However, typical accounts of MB do not describe interventions that will improve our moral capacities in this way. They are focused on the vague objective of ‘making people morally better’, assuming that this will address human moral deficiency and that this will in turn address the resulting problems. ‘Making people morally better’ means making them more satisfactory to our current moral intuitions, which are the root of moral deficiency, so these MB strategies are unlikely to be effective. An alternative MB strategy, which I propose, instead focuses on the objective of modifying current moral intuitions so that they promote broad cooperation. This will result in improved moral capacities in the sense that our moral capacities will be more practically useful to us. However, because this strategy disregards the importance of satisfying our current moral intuitions, it will be morally unpalatable. This is its main disadvantage over the typical MB strategy, though it is better at handling many common objections. Ultimately, there are a number of practical concerns that cannot be completely satisfactorily responded to even by my new MB strategy, such as the issues of mandatory MB and of fine-tuning our moral capacities. These concerns may mean that MB is too risky, and therefore not the best course of action in response to modern problems rooted in scientific progress and moral deficiency, particularly since we have promising alternatives available such as traditional moral enhancement techniques and further scientific progress. The prospect of MB should continue to be investigated, but it should focus on improving upon our current problematic moral intuitions rather than better satisfying them.</p>

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When Mother Earth Rises Up

Social Psychology ◽

10.1027/1864-9335/a000112 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 44 (4) ◽

pp. 271-277 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Simona Sacchi ◽

Paolo Riva ◽

Marco Brambilla

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Natural Disasters ◽

Natural Disaster ◽

Mental States ◽

Disaster Victims ◽

Willingness To Help ◽

Mother Earth

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.

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