Intelligence, empathy, and memory: Exploring moral enhancement through gene editing, training, and computer–brain interfaces

In this research article, I seek to expand the conversation regarding moral enhancement by identifying traits or capacities that if enhanced would lead to an increase in moral behaviour. I decided to focus on the three capacities: intelligence, empathy and memory. These abilities do not necessarily lead to moral behaviour on their own; however, building on a study on the relationship of intelligence and morality, I argued that enhancing intelligence and empathy simultaneously allows for moral behaviour as an emergent property. Intelligence alone is not sufficient because even though greater intelligence leads to more prosocial behaviour, prosocial behaviour is not inherently moral. Empathy alone can lead to partiality, especially favouring those who are a part of one’s in-group. The virtue of prudence, practical wisdom, relies on more than intellect or reason; it requires lived experience in order to effectively deliberate. Memory provides intelligence with that information. There are a variety of ways in which human enhancement can be pursued. I chose to focus on three methods in this study: gene editing, training and computer–brain interfaces. Turning to the existing scientific literature, I attempted to find examples or potential ways in which intelligence, empathy and memory could be enhanced through these methods. Genetic examples are difficult given the complexity of multi-gene traits, and that heritability is only a small percentage of overall variance. Training these capacities has had limited success, and there is no consensus in the literature on how effective is the training. Computer–brain interfaces appear to offer potential, but some experiments have only just begun on human subjects, whilst other approaches are still being tested on other animals.Contribution: This article ends with an appeal to prioritise moral enhancements over other forms. Doing so allows for a great impact on society and a safer overall approach to enhancements.

Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?

Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.

Un debate que falta. Sobre la necesidad de un adecuado concepto de libertad para fundamentar el «moral enhancement»

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que la discusión sobre el moral enhancement no ha abordado un tema central. Se trata del concepto de libertad, del cual depende que se entiende por moralidad. Según que concepto de libertad se utilice, será distinta la noción de moralidad implícita en las propuestas de moral enhancement. El problema que se sigue de la indefinición del concepto de libertad es que la moralidad que se pretende mejorar es ambigua y, por lo tanto, no es posible determinar con suficiente precisión que mejoras morales son aceptables y que mejoras no lo son. Para lograr lo anterior el trabajo se dividirá en a) una breve introducción en la que se presenta el problema; b) un examen rápido de algunas propuestas de mejora moral; c) un análisis que muestre como las susodichas propuestas ponen en juego la libertad; d) una explicación de la relevancia de la premisa sobre la libertad como base de la moralidad; e) una revisión de diversas visiones de la libertad desde las cuales se entiende diversamente la moralidad; f) la exploración del vacío que ha dejado la ausencia de la noción clásica de libre albedrio; y g) una conclusión que muestra que la ambigüedad en el concepto de libertad no permite señalar con claridad que mejora son aceptables y cuales no lo son.