Democratic Legitimation of Central Bank Independence in the European Union

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.

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The Binding Force of Babel: The Enforcement of EC Law Unpublished in the Languages of the New Member States

Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies ◽

10.5235/152888712802746821 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 9 ◽

pp. 43-80 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michal Bobek

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Central Bank ◽

European Central Bank ◽

The European Union ◽

Member States ◽

Community Law ◽

New Member States ◽

European Central ◽

Binding Force ◽

Ec Law

On 1 may 2004, 10 new Member States joined the European Union. This meant inter alia that, save for the express derogations provided for in the Act of Accession, the entire mass of Community secondary legislation became binding in the new Member States. This principle of the immediate effects of Community law in the new Member States was provided for in Article 2 AA: From the date of Accession, the provisions of the original Treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions and the European Central Bank before Accession shall be binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those States under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and in this Act.

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The European Central Bank

Oxford Principles Of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order: Volume I ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199533770.003.0022 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Chiara Zilioli ◽

Phoebus Athanassiou

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Central Bank ◽

Monetary Union ◽

European Central Bank ◽

Central Banks ◽

The European Union ◽

European Central ◽

European System ◽

The Eu

The provisions on Monetary Union (MU), of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU or the Treaty), as well as the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the Statute), are important in their own right, and are amongst those from which any student of the European Union (EU) can learn a great deal with regard to the EU.

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Guaranteeing the ECB’s democratic accountability in the post-Banking Union era: An ever more difficult task?

Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law ◽

10.1177/1023263x18822788 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 26 (1) ◽

pp. 48-62

Author(s):

Diane Fromage

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Central Bank ◽

European Central Bank ◽

Banking Union ◽

Democratic Accountability ◽

Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽

The European Union ◽

Banking Supervision ◽

National Parliaments ◽

European Central

Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank’s functions have been significantly altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies, new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank’s role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank’s democratic accountability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European Union and national parliaments where applicable.

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Central Bank Independence and Inflation IN EU-28

Land Forces Academy Review ◽

10.1515/raft-2017-0034 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 22 (4) ◽

pp. 253-262

Author(s):

Daniela-Georgeta Beju ◽

Maria-Lenuţa Ciupac-Ulici ◽

Codruța-Maria Fǎt

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Central Bank ◽

Monetary Union ◽

Central Banks ◽

Central Bank Independence ◽

Price Stability ◽

Economic And Monetary Union ◽

Great Level ◽

Member States ◽

High Level

Abstract Today, both policymakers and academicians consider that the central bank’s main goal is to guarantee price stability. The central bank can sustain the government’s economic policies, but only without prejudicing this objective. In order to focus on price stability several studies found that central bank should have a high level of independence. This is why during the recent decades the majority of developed countries, but also several emerging economies have employed institutional reforms that conferred their monetary authorities – the central bank – more independence. Within the European Union the central bank independence is a crucial issue, since the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that one requirement for joining Economic and Monetary Union for the candidate member states is to give their central banks a sufficiently high level of independence. This official requirement has encouraged the countries from Centre and East Europe engaged on the way to adhere the Economic and Monetary Union to confer their central bank a great level of independence. In this paper we analyze some important theoretic issues about central bank independence. We also make an empirical investigation regarding the evolution of inflation within European Union relative to the independence of member states’ central banks.

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