The Application of National Law and Composite Procedures in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Did the Court of Justice of the EU find a New Van Gend en Loos?

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) represents the most recent legal novelty in EU law. The SSM has created a hybrid dual administration formed by both national and European authorities. The application of national law and composite procedures make it more difficult to distinguish, in practice, which courts should be responsible for evaluating the legality of the measures adopted. This article attempts to analyse the existence of a gap in the current system of legal protection, and suggests some proposals to continue to guarantee access to courts and a complete and coherent system of judicial remedies under EU law. A possible extension of the approach used by the Court of Justice in the Rimšēvičs case could be considered in areas where there is a less marked distinction between EU and national law, such as in the SSM. Following this principle, the Court should be able to directly annul any national act that contravenes EU law.

Financial stability and supervisory cooperation (SSM in Eurozone – Banking supervisory cooperation in Egypt)

PurposeThis study aims to analyze the impact of cooperation between banking supervisory entities on maintaining financial stability, using Single Supervisory Mechanism evolution and performance as instance. Then banking supervisory cooperation and financial stability in Egypt are reviewed.Design/methodology/approachThe qualitative method is used to study and analyze the practices that contributed to financial instability and raised the need for supervisory cooperation. Descriptive qualitative method is used to study the interrelations between supervisory authorities on various levels and its impact on financial stability.FindingsFindings show that maintaining financial stability through strong, consistent complete or semi unified supervisory framework faces challenges. Providing cooperation between different supervisory authorities, effective information sharing, gained experience in the long run contributes to financial stability.Originality/valueThe originality of this research paper arises from the fact that it encompasses the academic aspect through interpreting the developments that occurred to the cooperation in banking supervision in relation to the financial instability times in the Eurozone that led to the establishment of Single Supervisory mechanism, and the challenges it faced. The supervisory cooperation in Egypt is studied as well at international, regional levels and its role in contributing to financial stability. To the best of the authors' knowledge this is the first study that studies the banking supervisory cooperation between Egyptian supervisory authorities and other international and regional authorities.

European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism

This paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk disclosure increased overall following BU but there was a weakening of disclosure by SSM-supervised banks relative to banks supervised by national authorities. We also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI countries), while the negative effect on centrally supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act also as chairmen (CEO duality). We interpret these findings in light of the fact that the new institutional arrangements for bank supervision under which the ECB relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act gives rise to inefficiencies with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM supervised banks and the ECB, which are reflected in bank disclosure practices.

Composite Procedures and Judicial Review in the Single Resolution Mechanism: Iccrea Banca

Iccrea Banca is a landmark ruling regarding judicial protection in composite decision-making procedures. Its importance extends not only to the Banking Union but also to EU administrative law more broadly. This paper argues that the Court's judgment in Iccrea Banca affirms the recent Berlusconi and Fininvest ruling regarding the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and extends its ratio decidendi to the Single Resolution Mechanism. It further argues that Iccrea Banca leaves open a number of questions, notably as regards the irregularities affecting the national preparatory act or proposal that would be reviewed by the CJEU, and the 'legal fate' of that national measure. Furthermore, we do not know which other composite procedures, whether within or beyond the Banking Union, would come to be decided under the principles established in this case. It is likely that more litigation will follow on these matters, and that future case law will provide much-needed answers to the questions left open in Iccrea Banca and earlier rulings.