scholarly journals Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better

2021 ◽  
pp. 17-51
Author(s):  
Piotr Faliszewski ◽  
Stanislaw Szufa ◽  
Nimrod Talmon
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rule

Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Caragiannis ◽  
Christos Kaklamanis ◽  
Nikos Karanikolas ◽  
Ariel D. Procaccia
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rule

scholarly journals Joint bodies in the European Union's international agreements: Delegating powers to the European Commission in EU external relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 146511652110273
Author(s):  
Markus Gastinger ◽  
Andreas Dür
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Set Up

In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association councils’ or ‘joint committees’. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the literature.

scholarly journals Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilat Levy
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
The Right

In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)

scholarly journals A networked voting rule for democratic representation

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 172265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis R. Hernández ◽  
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro ◽  
Edgardo Brigatti ◽  
Yamir Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
General Relation ◽  
Community Size ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Large Populations ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
High Connectivity ◽  
Better Than

We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability of the elected. The results of our simulations suggest that this algorithm-based approach is able to obtain a high representativeness for relatively small committees, performing even better than a classical voting rule based on a closed list of candidates. We show that a general relation between committee size and representatives exists in the form of an inverse square root law and that the normalized committee size approximately scales with the inverse of the community size, allowing the scalability to very large populations. These findings are not strongly influenced by the different networks used to describe the individuals’ interactions, except for the presence of few individuals with very high connectivity which can have a marginal negative effect in the committee selection process.

Deliberation and Voting Entwined

2018 ◽  
pp. 217-236
Author(s):  
Gerry Mackie
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
The Ideal

Deliberative democracy arose in opposition to a reigning aggregative conception of democracy in political science, solely about voting. Not long ago, political scientists arduously believed, based on logical speculations, that democratic voting is arbitrary and meaningless and that democratic voting is irrational as well. Rather than challenge these mistaken views about voting, democratic theorists instead singled out and celebrated deliberation. We review how those views about voting failed and report democratic theory’s reconciliation with voting.. Deliberative theory often says that variation in quality of deliberation can shape voting for better or worse; we add the idea that choice of voting rule can shape the value of deliberation for better or worse, illustrated with three examples. Finally, we compare the ideal values of voting and discussion, which overlap but are not identical.

The Value-Extracting Enablers

2019 ◽  
pp. 90-126
Author(s):  
William Lazonick ◽  
Jang-Sup Shin
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Index Funds ◽  
Business Corporation ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Compulsory Voting ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Institutional Activism ◽  
Shareholder Democracy

This chapter explains historical and systemic sources of institutional activism. Starting from re-examining underlying principles of New Deal financial regulations established in the 1930s that discouraged institutional activism, it argues that they were overturned in the 1980s and 1990s in the name of promoting “shareholder democracy.” It analyzes these misguided regulatory “reforms” including the introduction of compulsory voting by institutional investors, a proxy-voting rule change that greatly facilitated aggregation of proxy votes by predatory value extractors. The chapter argues that those reforms created a large vacuum in corporate voting because, contrary to the ideal of shareholder democracy and particularly with the increasing dominance of index funds, institutional investors had little ability and incentive to vote the shares in their portfolios. The main beneficiaries of these reforms have been the leading proxy advisory firms and a small group of hedge-fund activists intent on looting the business corporation.

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